

THE "L-WORD" AND THE 1988 PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION  
CAMPAIGN: THE EFFECTS OF SYMBOLIC VALUE ISSUES ON VOTE CHOICE

By

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL  
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1996

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by

Shaun Patrick Richard Herness

*I'm going to be the champion of ethnic America. And do you know why? It's because of the values, not where you were born.*

George Bush, May 27, 1988

*I didn't realize all these things when I said I was for Dukakis. He's a liberal.*

Focus group participant, May 1988

*Michael Dukakis on crime is the standard old-style sixties liberalism . . . he has steadfastly opposed the death penalty . . . he has supported the only state program in the whole country, the first one, that gives unsupervised weekend furloughs to first degree murderers!*

George Bush, June 9, 1988

*There's a wide chasm on the question of values between me and the liberal governor whom I'm running against.*

George Bush, August 1988

*When a person goes into that voting booth, they're going to say, who has the values I believe in?*

George Bush, September 25, 1988

*I'm not (the) big 'L-word' candidate. I'm more in tune with the mainstream.*

George Bush, October 15, 1988

*Little kids in school have to be taught things. One of them is that there are a lot of good people who died for this country. You've got to remember your past or you won't have a country anymore.*

Joseph Stinson, blue collar worker,  
in reference to the Pledge issue, 1988

*I was strongly for Dukakis . . . but I've reneged on my support for him. I don't go along with his positions on the Pledge of Allegiance, abortion, drugs, and prison release.*

Bob Willmoth, a Texas teacher, 1988

*Yes, I'm a liberal!*

Michael S. Dukakis, October 30, 1988

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Frank and Marlene Herness, without whose support and encouragement my academic goals would never have been realized. Your patience, understanding, generosity, and love are greatly appreciated.



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The successful completion of this project and the requirements for the conferring of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy would not have been possible without the help and assistance of a unique group of people who deserve special recognition.

In any graduate student's life, his or her supervisory committee plays an integral role in the development and successful execution of the dissertation. In my case, I was fortunate to have exceptional committee members who worked to assure that my contribution to the literature was sound, cogent, and rigorous. My committee chair Walter A. Rosenbaum and M. Margaret Conway provided outstanding guidance and valuable constructive criticism in all stages of the project. I am particularly grateful to Professor Rosenbaum for his willingness to assume the responsibilities associated with the tasks of committee chair and his enthusiastic advocacy of my candidacy. Wayne L. Francis, the department's resident methodologist, can take credit for instilling in me the statistical knowledge required to complete the research. Similarly, Michael D. Martinez became a valuable resource in regard to certain statistical applications and social psychological models relevant to the research. James W. Button, an expert concerning the effects of race and gender on politics, was particularly helpful in organizing my thoughts and arguments with regard to the issue of crime and its effects on race and gender voting in the 1988 presidential general election campaign. My external committee member, Ronald P. Formisano, provided helpful insights on Massachusetts politics. I am personally grateful for his willingness to contact his friend, John Blydenburgh of Clark University, who generously shared survey data on the 1978 Massachusetts gubernatorial campaign.

Chris Arterton, the Dean of The George Washington University Graduate School of Political Management, deserves special recognition for his enthusiastic willingness to take an active interest in the project. For his counsel and friendship I am most grateful.

I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the contribution of former Massachusetts Governor Edward J. King who availed himself on numerous occasions to my torrent of questions regarding the 1978 Massachusetts gubernatorial campaign. It was through my association and discussions with Governor King that I initially developed the idea to pursue the topic of this dissertation.

My teaching assistant, Scott A. Boyer, deserves special recognition for his willingness not only to ease my classroom pressures when deadlines were imminent, but for serving as an editor of the manuscript. His reliability, thoroughness, dependability, and friendship are greatly appreciated.

As in any significant life endeavor, certain friends have played a vital part in this project's successful realization. Specifically, my political mentor and fellow Catholic University alumnus Mark Healey Rayder, my academic and philosophic contemporary and fellow Georgetown University alumnus Dean M. Carignan, and my ideological counter balance and fellow George Washington University alumnus Jane Hatch deserve recognition for their willingness to provide constructive criticism, encouragement, and moral support sometimes, as was the case with Dean, from half-way around the world in Jakarta, Indonesia. My fellow graduate colleagues, Elizabeth Williams and Scott Richards, also deserve acknowledgment for their kind advice and assistance throughout my studies at the University of Florida. Both were an information asset second to none!

I would also like to acknowledge the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) located in Ann Arbor, Michigan for providing the *ABC News Washington Post* and *CBS News New York Times* survey data used in this research.

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May 1996

Chairperson: Dr. Walter A. Rosenbaum  
Major Department: Political Science

In deliberating on the cognitive processes citizens engage when making their choices at the ballot box, voting behavior scholars have often focused their research on rational factors such as partisanship, assessment of economic performance, and issue specifics. Often neglected by scholars in their research is the impact of non-rational factors, such as emotions and values, on vote choice. As Jean Bethke Elshtain observes, "For a complex set of reasons, analysts have relegated 'values' issues to a secondary and suspect status--seen as a way to draw attention away from 'real' issues. . . . But does this distinction, with its underlying assumption that symbolic and values questions are somehow less real than specific, limited policy matters make sense?"

The current research is based on three elements: the theory of symbolic politics; an explanation of information processing developed in social psychology known as schema theory; and shared values understood in the context of American political culture. The theoretical basis for this research provides the foundation to analyze the 1988 presidential general election to assess the impact of specific symbolic value issues on both vote choice

and voters' perceptions of Democratic candidate, Massachusetts Governor Michael S. Dukakis. Central to the discussion is the campaign conducted by Republican candidate Vice President George Bush. The Bush campaign used symbolic value issues in an attempt to label Dukakis as a "liberal." Using individual level survey data, a longitudinal analysis is created to demonstrate the effectiveness of Bush's ideologically based symbolic issues campaign on influencing voter perceptions of Governor Dukakis. In addition, exit poll surveys are analyzed to assess the extent to which certain emotional, symbolic social and cultural value issues employed by Bush affected voting choices, particularly among specific segments of the electorate judged by Republican strategists to be strategically important to the vice president's success.

The findings suggest that non-rational factors, such as symbolic values, must be considered as important elements in the decision-making calculus of voters.

## INTRODUCTION

In attempting to understand what factors influence how voters make their electoral choices, many voting behavior scholars have focused their research on rational criteria such as partisanship, retrospective and prospective analyses of economic performance, and issue specifics. Often neglected in voting behavior research is how non-rational factors, particularly emotions, affect the choices citizens make at the ballot box. Lyn Ragsdale, a pioneer in research concerning emotional effects on voter decision-making, concludes in her study on emotional responses to presidents that "emotions, more consistently than issues, events, or conditions, affect the strength of individuals' approval and vote choice" (Ragsdale 1991, 58).

Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman echo Ragsdale's findings in their research concerning emotional reactions to the economy. Conover and Feldman found similar correlations between emotions and political evaluations:

Consistently, we found that emotions have a significant and strong impact on political evaluations even when compared with the effects of the standard cognitive variables. . . . Emotional reactions to an issue provide an indication of what people think about issues and potentially shape how people process information about issues. (Conover & Feldman 1986, 75)

Despite their efforts, little quantitative research within the academic community has been undertaken to expand upon the findings. As Conover and Feldman observe, "emotional responses to politics are a critical aspect of political behavior that has been neglected in previous research" (Conover & Feldman 1986, 75).



Outside the academic environment, political professionals have long recognized the importance of emotions on influencing vote choice and voters' perceptions of candidates. Richard Wirthlin, pollster to former president Ronald Reagan, once remarked:

You move people's votes through emotion, and the best way to give an emotional cut to your message is through talking about values. (White 1989, 152)

If we accept the premise of Wirthlin's argument, then to advance our understanding of how emotions affect political behavior it is appropriate to measure the effect values have on electoral choices and their influence on voters' perceptions of candidates. Like emotions, values have received minimal theoretical attention from political scientists. As Jean Bethke Elshtain observes:

For a complex set of reasons, analysts have relegated "values" issues to a secondary and suspect status--seen as a way to draw attention away from "real" issues. . . . But does this distinction, with its underlying assumption that symbolic and values questions are somehow less real than specific, limited policy matters make sense? (Elshtain 1989, 117)

Recently, a school of thought has evolved within the academic community which contends that value issues are important factors in understanding political behavior. Symbolic politics theory argues that symbols, when used in a political context, can evoke certain conditioned and consistent evaluations, known as predispositions, which, when stimulated, can influence individuals' voting behavior. Some scholars claim that value-based predispositions are the most potent influences on political behavior. John Zaller, for example, argues that "values seem to have a stronger and more pervasive effect on mass opinions than any other predispositional factors" (Zaller 1992, 23). If this is true, then it is plausible that symbols which evoke certain value predispositions can exert a powerful influence on voting behavior.

To examine the extent symbols that evoke certain value predispositions influence voting behavior, it is appropriate to analyze instances in which symbolic value issues played a prominent role in electoral politics. Political analysts and commentators have

often claimed that one of the reasons why Ronald Reagan and George Bush were elected in the 1980s was because they effectively influenced certain segments of the electorate by elevating to saliency status issues with distinct values appeals. In the case of Bush:

There has been considerable debate over the degree to which [value] themes used by the Bush campaign affected the presidential election of 1988. . . . [P]olls that tracked voter shifts through the campaign clearly suggest that the . . . social/moral/racial issues raised by the Bush campaign functioned to push specific segments of the electorate toward the GOP. (Edsall & Edsall 1991, 225)

Martin Wattenberg observes that "rather than discussing what policies he would pursue if elected in 1988, Bush focused on sensationalizing [symbolic value] issues that were damaging to Dukakis" (M. Wattenberg 1995, 253). Political commentator and columnist Ben Wattenberg opines that "perhaps the quintessential values issue candidacy of our time was George Bush's in 1988" (B. Wattenberg 1995, 35). In this regard, the 1988 presidential general election provides an excellent laboratory in which to investigate whether symbolic value issues are important factors in determining vote choice and influencing voters' perceptions of the candidates. Issues imbued with symbolic meaning reflective of widely shared American political and cultural values, such as the Pledge of Allegiance, the death penalty, prison furloughs, a strong national defense, taxes, and the value connotations associated with the label "liberal," played a major role in the dialogue of the 1988 campaign.

Despite a post election report by the Gallop organization in which they concluded that "the success of the Bush campaign was based on making liberalism, the Pledge of Allegiance, and the prison furlough controversies salient," little quantitative research has been conducted measuring the effect symbolic value issues had on voting behavior in 1988 (Abramson, Aldrich, & Rohde 1990, 52). As John Sullivan, Amy Fried, and Mary Dietz observe:

It has subsequently become public knowledge that Bush's decision to emphasize patriotism, defense, and the "Willie Horton" issue was shaped by results of systematic focus group research. Scholarly investigations therefore are needed to determine whether, as Bush's research suggested, these "hot button" issues really did have a significant impact on voter behavior in 1988. (Sullivan, Fried, & Dietz 1992, 201)

It is the intent of this research to employ quantitative analysis techniques to validate the contention that symbols which evoke certain value predispositions can exert a powerful influence on voting behavior and voters' perceptions of political candidates. The research will use data gathered during the 1988 presidential general election campaign to determine whether Bush's use of symbolic "hot button" value issues (known as the "negative cluster") had an impact on both voting behavior in 1988 and the electorate's perceptions of Democratic candidate Michael S. Dukakis.

## THE THEORY OF SYMBOLIC POLITICS

### Introduction: The Importance of Rational Choice Theory and the Theory of Cognitive Heuristics to the Development of the Theory of Symbolic Politics

The central theoretical foundation of the current research is symbolic politics theory. When discussing symbolic politics theory it is important to note that two models of voting behavior, formal rational choice theory and the theory of cognitive heuristics, are important to the development of the theory itself. Rational choice and cognitive heuristics are important not because of the contributions each made to the formation of symbolic politics theory, but for the omissions inherent in both which the theory of symbolic politics attempts to address.

Rational choice theory argues that voters make purposive, goal seeking choices based on their own preferences. Rational choice models assume that an individual is able to rank alternatives from best to worst by having at his or her disposal all available information to make an informed and deliberative decision. Based on their knowledge, individuals assess their available options and choose those which they expect will best achieve their goals. In essence, voters engage in individual cost benefit analyses making decisions based on which alternatives provide the maximum utility for the least cost. As Anthony Downs, the forerunner of modern formal theory, states, "a rational man always takes the one [decision] which yields him the highest utility *ceteris paribus*; i.e., he acts to his own greatest benefit" (Downs 1957, 36-37).

A fundamental problem with the rational choice method is that it assumes that decision makers, in this case voters, have complete and perfect information to make a well

reasoned, deliberative choice. In contemporary society rich with voluminous information sources it is a near impossible task for everyone to have knowledge of everything dealing with every topic in which a decision must be rendered. Despite his association with formal theory, Down's observation that "voters are not always aware of what the government is or could be doing, and often they do not know the relationship between government actions and their own utility incomes," sets the stage for the development of a second model of political decision-making which presumes that voters do not have complete and perfect information to make rational political decisions (Downs 1957, 77-81).

In the decision-making process the public does not suffer from a lack of access to information to make a deliberative decision. Instead, assuming that the public cannot possibly have total and complete information on all matters political, the problem is understanding how the public makes political decisions from its incomplete and limited knowledge of politics. This leads to a second problem, how does the public assimilate what information it does possess to make political choices? This dilemma, known as Simon's puzzle in recognition of Herbert Simon's research on decision-making based on limited information and processing capacity, has given rise to a second school of thought which argues that voters use information shortcuts known as "cognitive heuristics" to reach political decisions. According to Paul Sniderman, Richard Brody, and Philip Tetlock:

Citizens frequently can compensate for their limited information about politics by taking advantage of judgmental heuristics. Heuristics are judgmental shortcuts, efficient ways to organize and simplify political choices, efficient in the double sense of requiring relatively little information to execute, yet yielding dependable answers even to complex problems of choice. . . . Insofar as they can be brought into play, people can be knowledgeable in their reasoning about political choices without necessarily possessing a large body of knowledge about politics. (Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock 1991, 19)

Samuel Popkin refers to the type of reasoning described by Sniderman et al. as "low information rationality." According to Popkin:

[Low information rationality] is a method of combining, in an economical way, learning and information from past experiences, daily life, the media, and political campaigns. This reasoning draws on various information shortcuts and rules of thumb that voters use to obtain and evaluate information and to simplify the process of choosing between candidates. People use shortcuts which incorporate much political information; they triangulate and validate their opinions in conversations with people they trust and according to opinions of national figures whose judgments and positions they have come to know. With these shortcuts, they learn to "read" politicians and their positions. (Popkin 1991, 7)

Therefore, the theory of cognitive heuristics argues that voters engage in a degree of rational decision-making based not on complete and perfect information but shortcuts which are the by-products of information gathered from everyday experiences and activities as parent, consumer, neighbor, and employee. These shortcuts provide an economical, efficient, and simple way for voters to gather and process enough information to make reasoned choices.

John Zaller echoes Sniderman's and Popkin's premise that voters have limited information when confronted with the need to make political decisions. Zaller argues that people vary in their habitual attention to politics which in turn affects their exposure to political information. Therefore, the level and extent of a person's knowledge of and exposure to political affairs affects their ability to react critically to political arguments. Because citizens do not have fixed attitudes on every political issue, they construct opinions on the fly as they confront each new issue, making use of ideas that are most immediately salient to them. In other words, voters construct opinion statements from information that is at "the top of the head" (Zaller 1992, 1).

Where Zaller departs from Popkin, Sniderman, and other cognitive heuristic theorists is his assertion that in making political decisions "[voters] possess a variety of interests, values, and experiences that may greatly affect their willingness to accept--or alternatively, their resolve to resist--persuasive influences" (Zaller 1992, 22). In Zaller's words:

... I refer to these factors [interests, values, and experiences] as *political predispositions*, by which I mean stable, individual-level traits that regulate the acceptance or non-acceptance of the political communication the person receives. Because the totality of the communication that one accepts determines one's opinions, predispositions are the critical intervening variable between the communications people encounter in the mass media, on the one side, and their statements of political preference, on the other. (Zaller 1992, 22-23)

Both the rational choice and cognitive heuristic approaches to decision-making emphasize citizens' abilities to process varying degrees of information to reach political decisions. Rational choice theorists depict the voter as a deliberative decision-maker objectively evaluating cost and benefits from a complete and perfect set of information. Cognitive heuristic theorists see voters as engaging in rational deliberation but because of an inability to consume and process all available information they take shortcuts to complete their gaps in knowledge. What both the rational choice and cognitive heuristic approaches fail to address is the view that individuals respond affectively on the basis of long-held anachronistic predispositions which elicit gut-level, emotional responses from evocative political and social objects (Sears 1993, 137). This supposition is the basis for another model of political decision-making known as the theory of symbolic politics.

### Symbolic Politics Theory

In order to understand symbolic politics theory it is important to first explain what is a symbol. A symbol is any object used by human beings to index meanings that are not inherent in, nor discernible from, the object itself (Elder & Cobb 1983, 28). A word, phrase, event, gesture, person, place, or thing can be a symbol. As Elder and Cobb observe, "An object becomes a symbol when people endow it with meaning, value, or significance" (Elder & Cobb 1983, 29). Symbols can either be *referential* or *condensational*. Referential symbols are notational devices which serve to uniquely identify an object. A name, label, or sign that we use to designate someone or something

is a referential symbol. The symbol has no meaning or significance beyond the object to which it refers.

Objects which people imbue with meaning that transcends any concrete entity or operation that they may serve to reference is a condensational symbol. Condensational symbols summarize experiences, feelings, and beliefs (Elder & Cobb 1983, 29). For example, to most Americans our national flag is more than just tri-colored cloth. It is a symbol representing the principles inherent in the American way of life: freedom, liberty, individualism, and equality of opportunity. Condensational symbols underlie the theory of symbolic politics.

The basic theory of symbolic politics postulates that symbols can evoke certain conditioned and consistent evaluations, known as predispositions, which, when stimulated, can influence individuals' political behavior. Essential to symbolic politics theory is the notion that these core predispositions are formed early in life and shape later formed attitudes (Lau, Brown, & Sears 1978; Sears 1988, 1993; Sears & Citrin 1985; Sears & Kinder 1970). As David O. Sears, a researcher in political psychology, describes, the theory of symbolic politics holds that:

People acquire stable affective responses to particular symbols through a process of classic conditioning, which occurs most crucially at a relatively early age. These learned dispositions may or may not persist through adult life, but the strongest, called "symbolic predispositions," do. The most important of these predispositions in American politics include party identification, political ideology, and racial prejudice. (Sears 1993, 120)

The current theory of symbolic politics evolved from two primary sources: Murray Edelman's theory that the public is an unpredictable mass vulnerable to emotional appeals by organized elites; and the social-psychological model of political behavior developed by researchers at the University of Michigan which postulates that voters respond in a more rational way to new, relevant political information incorporating such information into already held long-term social-psychological predispositions.



In his seminal study, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, Edelman argued that the mass public is largely disengaged from politics, concerned and anxious only about a threatening and complex world. As such the public is relatively uninformed about political issues and unpredictable in its actions. However, when the public becomes threatened, organized elites manipulate ordinary citizens by using a host of emotional metaphors, myths, rituals, language, and other symbols which both reassures the public while promoting the interests of the elites themselves (Edelman 1964). In Edelman's view "mass publics consist largely of spectators acquiescent to the abstract and remote parade of political symbols" (Sears 1993, 117).

In his discussion Edelman identifies three forms of value structuring that he argues determines the degree of societal consensus or division which in turn influences the susceptibility of the mass populace to political symbolism. In a *unimodal* structuring the dispersion of values on one issue will often correspond in some measure with the dispersion on other strong issues. As an example, in the United States, Edelman claims, there is general agreement against restrictions on economic activity and opposition to a conciliatory posture toward Communism. The extent that such overlap exists on such issues serves to reinforce deep-seated cleavage or consensus (Edelman 1964, 175). A unimodal structuring creates little tension because, for the most part, the public is in complete agreement on the general policy direction of the state.

A *bimodal* structuring is just the opposite. Insecurity and threat are maximized by emotional issues which cause division among the populace. Those who hold the opposing position on the issue or issues dividing the populace are considered the enemy. Under this "us versus them" value structuring, mass responses are most vulnerable to manipulation by elite use of "condensational" symbols. A bimodal values structuring creates such tension and anxiety among the mass public that rational responses are held to a minimum and symbolic cues and assurances are avidly sought out and grasped (Edelman 1964, 177).

Finally, a *multimodal* structure describes when the populace sees merit in alternative sides of an issue or issues. Rather than irrational fear, a search for synthesis occurs. Alternative possibilities can be explored and the politics of pluralism recognized. In an environment devoid of fear and anxiety, the political use of symbolism is relatively ineffective.

The social-psychological model of political behavior proposed by Angus Campbell and his colleagues at the University of Michigan focuses on the mediating role of long-term social-psychological predispositions in guiding citizen action (Dalton & Wattenberg 1993, 197). In their view long-term social-psychological predispositions such as party identification, group association, ethnic prejudices, and humans' relative resistance to change make voting generally predictable. When a person receives new political information they incorporate that information in a systematic and internally relevant way corresponding to their already held predispositions (Sears 1993, 119).

The theory of symbolic politics incorporates components of both Edelman's research and the Michigan model of political behavior by focusing on the role of symbols in manipulating the public through stimulating learned affective responses or predispositions.

### Affective Predispositions

The central tenet of symbolic politics theory is that strongly held affective predispositions are automatically stimulated by attitude objects with relevant symbolic meaning. In other words, standing learned predispositions are evoked by political symbols. The relevance of these predispositions is that when stimulated they can influence peoples' political behavior. When discussing affective predispositions and their role in political decision-making, there are four propositions which must be considered. The first proposition is that affective predispositions can be identified using three criteria:

- 1) Of all the individual's attitudes, they are the most stable over time.
- 2) They produce the most consistent responses over similar attitude objects.
- 3) They are most influential over attitudes toward other objects.

The second proposition contends that symbolic predispositions are acquired relatively early in life, presumably through conditioning-like processes, and that these predispositions have strong affective components and little information content (Krosnick 1991). This early learning yields such predispositions as party identification, racial prejudices, ethnic identities, basic values, nationalism, and attachment to various symbols of the nation and regime.

The third proposition follows from the second in that predispositions which are acquired early are believed to persist throughout life and unlike nonsymbolic attitudes are thought to be resistant to persuasion.

The fourth proposition is that symbolic meaning influences evaluations of the attitude object. Therefore which affective predispositions are evoked by political symbols is dependent on the perceived meaning of the symbols themselves. In the political arena activist groups are constantly attempting to influence how people perceive an issue or candidate. This activity, referred to as "framing," will be discussed in greater detail. At this juncture suffice it to say that because of external influences the meaning of symbols contained in an object can vary cross-sectionally among individuals at one point in time or longitudinally within individuals over time. Variance in symbolic meaning, therefore, can affect which predispositions are evoked.

For example, research conducted by Gamson and Modigliani traced over time changes in public evaluations of the issue of affirmative action. Their findings concluded that public attitudes toward affirmative action depended on the affective predispositions that were evoked:

"Remedial action" dominated in the 1960s and early 1970s, promoted by civil rights advocates who contended that blacks needed to be given extra help because past discrimination had handicapped them in economic competition. This approach appealed to antiracist, egalitarian themes. Over time, conservatives responded with a "no preferential treatment" frame, arguing that affirmative action gave minorities preferential treatment; this response appealed to the core American value of self-reliance. Finally, during the 1980s the "reverse discrimination" frame, in which non-minorities and males were depicted as discriminated against by affirmative action policies, became dominant. This development continued the self-reliance theme but added an appeal to egalitarianism. (Sears 1993, 128-129)

In addition to the four propositions describing affective predispositions Sears argues that symbolic attitude objects create social and demographic cleavages in the electorate, are highly salient in the political environment, retain stable meaning over time, are frequently the center of political discussion, and are connected to a range of cognitive elements in voters' minds (Sears 1983). As a result symbolic politics theory has developed a hierarchy of political attitude objects ranging from highly symbolic to nonsymbolic: (1) political party identification, (2) liberal-conservative ideological orientation, (3) attitudes toward social groups, (4) attitudes toward racial policy issues, (5) attitudes on nonracial policy issues, and (6) attitudes regarding political efficacy and trust in government (Sears 1983).

Some aspects of this hierarchical ordering are unique to symbolic politics theory and as such have not been universally accepted. Yet many political scientists have reached consensus in accepting the argument that partisanship is the strongest and most consistent political predisposition. Scholars have cited evidence to support their claims that party identification is acquired early in life, usually inherited from parents, resistant to change, and an influential factor in determining one's political choices throughout life (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes 1960; Converse 1964; Converse & Markus 1979; Markus 1982).

However, not all scholars have embraced the rationale of symbolic politics theory. Jon Krosnick, for example, contends that symbolic predispositions are more consistent

over time because the survey instruments that measure symbolic predispositions contain less random measurement error, not because these attitudes, in and of themselves, are more persistent. Krosnick argues that the American National Election Panel Study (ANES) survey questions used to assess symbolic attitudes are more likely to produce highly reliable measures than questions that measure nonsymbolic attitudes because of the scales used to measure responses (Krosnick 1991). Questions that measure the higher-ordered attitudes on the symbolic politics hierarchical scale offer fewer response alternatives (party identification and ideological orientation are usually coded using a seven point scale) with wordings that facilitate clear understanding. The alternative measure, the 100 point thermometer scale, only provides verbal labels for some points on the scale and a calibration with many more alternatives from which respondents can choose. Krosnick contends that increasing the number of response alternatives decreases the reliability of the measure. Because the measures of highly symbolic attitudes employ fewer response alternatives they are more reliable therefore more consistent across time.

Like Krosnick, Alexander Heard has been critical of symbolic theory. Unlike Krosnick whose criticism is based mostly on methodological considerations, Heard's criticism is directed at symbolic theory as a basis for explaining aspects of American politics. In his discussion of party influence on political agendas Heard contends that the dominance of special interest and issue activists in formulating party platforms "signals that American politics is becoming more cognitive and less affective, more substantive and less symbolic" (Heard 1991, 139). Heard acknowledges that "increasingly Democratic conventions are ending up as contests between left and nonleft coalitions, and Republican conventions as struggles between right and nonright coalitions" (Heard 1991, 138). However, Heard fails to recognize that symbolic issues are often deliberately placed in party platforms by the very ideologically-based issue activists that he acknowledges dominate the contemporary presidential selection process. Partisan policy positions

concerning symbolic issues such as abortion, gun control, the death penalty, and taxes are often focal points in the convention platforms of the major political parties

## POLITICAL SCHEMAS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE THEORY OF SYMBOLIC POLITICS

The assertion that affective predispositions can be stimulated by political symbols to affect voting behavior is closely related to what social psychologists have identified as the ability to influence both individuals' cognitive knowledge structures and the complexity level of their intellectual reasoning. Social psychologists refer to these influence-susceptible cognitive knowledge structures as *schemas*. Schemas organize both memory and cognition into specific thematic structures. When an individual obtains new information, specific cognitive schemas filter, select, encode, and integrate it into new or existing cognitive structures (Milburn 1991, 73).

Cognitive knowledge structures are central to schema theory (Rumelhart & Norman 1983). As Ruth Hamill, Milton Lodge, and Frederick Blake explain:

The basic notion underlying this view of human information processing is deceptively simple--one's prior knowledge about some domain influences what one sees and remembers and how one interprets reality and guides behavior. (Hamill, Lodge, & Blake 1985, 851)

Schema theory contends that received information is not simply stored as separate, discrete facts, but organized into coherent "clusters" of new knowledge or assimilated into "clusters" of already understandable knowledge. These "clusters" of knowledge, or structures, provide a concordant body of comprehensive knowledge that makes new or additional information meaningful. A knowledge structure can be ascribed to one of two specific domains: declarative or associational. *Declarative knowledge* refers to factual information which describes the attributes of some particular aspect of the world. *Associational knowledge* refers to the network of interrelationships linking examples and characteristics to schema concepts (Rosch 1975; Smith & Medin 1981; Rumelhart 1984).

It is these "clusters" of knowledge organized by their specific reference domains that permits systematic information processing. According to Hamill, Lodge, and Blake:

It is this binding of declarative and associational knowledge within a coherent memory structure that turns otherwise disjointed bits of information into meaningful patterns of thought and accounts for systematic effects in human information processing. (Hamill et al. 1985, 852)

Because knowledge structures affect how people process information they influence the selection, abstraction, interpretation, and integration of new information (Alba & Hasher 1983). The assumptions underlying schema theory embrace the base tenet of cognitive heuristics that contends voters engage in information processing that economizes political decision-making. Knowledge structures permit voters to take shortcuts by providing them the means to selectively choose some stimuli while disregarding others and to make decisions in the absence of full information (Nisbett & Ross 1980; Taylor & Crocker 1981).

Taylor and Crocker identify a variety of cognition functions affected by social schemas. Schemas, they argue, provide categories for labeling people, places, events, and processes; influence what new information will be received, encoded, and retrieved from memory; enable inferences to be made from incomplete data by bridging gaps in information with best guesses; provide a scheme for problem solving; influence the degree of importance assigned to evidence used in making decisions and predictions; and generate expectations against which reality is compared and contrasted with one's own experiences.

Four different types of general knowledge structures or schemas have been identified and developed in social psychology: person, self, role, and event (Fiske & Taylor 1991). Person schemas contain knowledge and beliefs about typical people, their characteristics, and their intentions; self-schemas include information about a person's own appearance, behavior, and self-concept; role schemas hold knowledge about general social classifications such as age, race, sex, or occupations; and event schemas contain information about various life situations and experiences.



The Michigan model of political behavior was a vanguard attempt at applying social-psychological principles to political science. However, more recently political science scholars have begun to apply schema theory in their research and have identified a variety of schemas important to understanding how individuals process political information (Abelson 1979; Conover & Feldman 1984; Fiske, Kinder, & Larter 1983; Lodge & Hamill 1983; Hamill et al. 1985; Lau 1986). Richard R. Lau used responses to ANES surveys to identify four different political schemas: issues, groups, personality, and party (Lau 1986). In addition to Lau's four political schemas, Hamill, Lodge, and Blake identify two additional cognitive knowledge structures that individuals might use to process political information: a class schema (rich/poor) and an ideological schema (liberal/conservative) (Hamill et al. 1985). Hamill et al. assert that the manner in which new political information is schematically processed depends on the nature of issues themselves. "Each of the three political schemas [class, partisan, ideological] is an effective mechanism for structuring political information, although each differs in the type of issues that can be processed" (Hamill et al. 1985, 867). They argue that the class schema provides citizens with a mechanism to deal effectively with economic issues and information. Partisan and ideological schemas provide an effective cognitive framework for dealing with more abstract noneconomic issues.

Whereas some political information environments are structurally simple and highly person-centered, most are more complex, because people are exposed to information about more than one political candidate at a time (e.g., in a debate or a political campaign). Scholarly research has attempted to determine if a more complex political environment affects how people process political information:

When individuals receive information about only one person, it is usually assumed that this information is organized into a person category [schema], a knowledge structure stored in memory in which the information about the target is connected to a single, superordinate "person node." . . . It is less clear that this person-based preference for cognitive organization extends into multi-person settings; other "organizing principles" may suggest themselves. (Rahn 1995, 46)

Wendy Rahn's research suggests that under more complex conditions, memory is organized along the important attributes on which people compare candidates (e.g., partisanship, policies, and personality), rather than organized around the candidates themselves (Lodge & McGraw 1995, 5). The nature of the information structure or schema to which people are exposed affects how that information is cognitively organized. "Person-focused structures facilitated candidate-based organization, while attribute-focused structures encouraged an attributed-based organizational strategy" (Rahn 1995, 56).

The ability to influence individuals' schemas or cognitive knowledge structures of candidates is often done in the context of "priming" and "framing." To engage in the act of influencing a person's cognitive knowledge structure or schema is to engage in the act of priming. To prime is to instruct or prepare someone or something beforehand. In the psychological context, to prime someone would require the "presentation of an attitude object(s) toward which the individual processes a strong evaluative association that would automatically activate that evaluation" (Fazio 1989, 157).

The act of priming is often done through what is referred to as framing-- packaging ideas so that within each idea is embedded a dominant frame or viewpoint (knowledge structure) which acts as a central organizing concept or story line (for new information) implying a particular policy alternative (Sears 1993, 128). Influencing cognitive knowledge structures through framing is central to symbolic politics theory. According to David O. Sears the manner in which symbolic issues are framed affects which predispositions are stimulated:

The frame is displayed in "signature elements" that invoke the whole package through condensing symbols. Which frame dominates in the communications media may change overtime as the political battle goes on. The persuasive success of any given frame depends on the "cultural resonances" or larger cultural themes it invokes. All this can be put in the language of symbolic politics: each frame presents a different symbolic meaning of the attitude object, including different symbolic elements, and its relative success depends on the symbolic predispositions it evokes. (Sears 1993, 128)

There are a variety of affective predispositions which can be stimulated by priming and framing political symbols to influence individuals' cognitive knowledge structures or schemas. The current research is primarily concerned with value-based predispositions; specifically those values that are associated with the American political culture and our contemporary understanding of ideological orientations. Therefore, it is both appropriate and necessary to first discuss what is meant by the term "values," and second, to address the role of values within the context of American political culture and their influence on ideological orientations, particularly as they relate to the contemporary meaning of liberalism.

## VALUES AND THEIR EFFECT ON AMERICAN POLITICS

"Values is a highly subjective term open to many interpretations. Many words such as "orientations", "beliefs", or "principles" have been used interchangeably with the word "values." In the context of this research values "refer to 'general and enduring' standards that hold a 'more central position than attitudes' in individuals' belief systems" (Kinder & Sears 1985, 674). It is our interpretation of these values that "lead us to take particular positions on social issues" (Rokeach 1973, 13).

Ben Wattenberg, in his recent publication entitled *Values Matter Most*, subdivides values into two separate and distinct categories: social issues and cultural issues. Wattenberg claims that a fundamental difference exists between social and cultural value issues. Wattenberg argues that social issues are generally "agreed to be both important and harmful to society as a whole by a vast consensus of Americans" (B. Wattenberg 1995, 17). Cultural issues, on the other hand, do not enjoy general universal agreement. "There is often no consensus about them, that is, Americans often do not agree about what to do about them" (B. Wattenberg 1995, 97-98). According to Wattenberg patriotism, crime, welfare, and individual merit are reflective of social value issues. The vast majority of Americans love their country, agree that crime is terrible and wrong, believe that the current welfare system is malfunctioning, and subscribe to the belief that tangible reward should be based on hard work and educational achievement. In contradistinction to social value issues, Wattenberg argues that there is little agreement among Americans on cultural value issues such as abortion, questions regarding sexual lifestyles, pornography, sex education, and school prayer. "There is often no consensus because there is no agreement on the very nature of what they represent" (B. Wattenberg

1995, 98). Despite these differences, Wattenberg contends that value issues exert a tremendous influence on public opinion which in turn affects political behavior and electoral outcomes:

I suggest . . . that whichever political party, whichever political candidate, is seen as best understanding and dealing with that values issue--will be honored. Honored at the polls. Honored at the polls at national, state, and, local levels. Honored at the polls in 1996 and, . . . for a long time after that. (B. Wattenberg 1995, 10-11)

Like Wattenberg, some scholars believe values have a strong influence on public opinion, particularly in the realm of politics (White 1982, 1983, 1989; Zaller 1992). John Zaller argues that values have a strong and pervasive effect on mass opinions (Zaller 1992, 23). In the context of American politics it is central to understand the role American political culture plays in determining the effect certain values have on mass opinion.<sup>1</sup> In his discussion of political culture, Walter A. Rosenbaum argues that the behavior of large masses is most affected and influenced by those "political cultural orientations that are widely shared" (Rosenbaum 1975, 7). Political culture scholars have consistently identified freedom, liberty, individualism, patriotism, and equality of opportunity as those orientations, principles, or values that are widely shared in American political culture (Hartz 1955; Devine 1972; Rosenbaum 1975; Lipset 1979; McClosky & Zaller 1984).

Political strategists who attempt to use value issues to influence the electorate have employed these widely shared value orientations to evoke both positive and negative predispositions. Evidence of various kinds that alters the symbolic meaning of an issue does indeed influence which predisposition it elicits (Sears 1993, 129). Therefore, the

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<sup>1</sup> Wattenberg's definition of cultural values is not synonymous with values inherent to the American political culture. The values of the American political culture: freedom, liberty, individualism, patriotism, and equality of opportunity, are more closely associated with what Wattenberg terms social values. Both social value issues, according to the Wattenberg definition, and the American political culture values are characterized by a high degree of consensus as to their importance to society. Social value issues such as crime, welfare, and individual merit can often symbolize values associated with the American political culture.

manner in which symbols are used by political operatives to influence value-based predispositions affects what type of responses are elicited from the public.

John Kenneth White, a leader in qualitative values research, attempts in his publication, *The New Politics of Old Values*, to explain how and why symbolic values impact our electoral decisions. He argues that the politics of the 1980s was based primarily on shared values appeals:

When the Republicans identified the themes of family, work, neighborhood, peace, and freedom in 1980 they were reiterating traditional values. But, as White illustrates, these traditional values also laid the foundation for the Reagan presidency. Values discussions animated policy-making by the Reagan presidency's inner circle and presaged Reagan's reelection victory in 1984. (Davis 1989, 410)

In his research Professor White examines the impact that consensual American values such as freedom, patriotism, liberty, individualism, equality of opportunity, and the realization of success through the work ethic have on influencing popular opinion. White utilizes the Reagan presidency as a case study to demonstrate how widely shared values can positively influence the shaping of popular opinion and vote choice:

This [book] is not so much about Ronald Reagan's presidency as it is about how we want to see ourselves—about who we Americans are. In this vein, Reagan provides the quintessential case study of how widely shared values can be utilized to garner public support and move a nation. (White 1989, 6)

White argues that Reagan achieved his popular standing with the American electorate because the fortieth president used the chief-of-state position as a vehicle to connect positively with the American voters through symbolic appellations emphasizing shared values (White 1989, 1990).

Professor White also contends that value issues can be used in a negative fashion to divide the electorate. Symbolic value issues can be used to divide the electorate simply by controlling the manner in which they are framed so as to maximize the potential that already existing negative predispositions will be evoked. White believes that the potential

for symbolic value issues to elicit negative predispositions in the contemporary political environment is the result of the post-industrial era's changing social and cultural agenda (White 1983). White argues that the contemporary political landscape, particularly in the case of the Democratic party, is comprised of essentially two distinct generational collectives; the industrial and post-industrial classes. According to Everett Carl Ladd:

In post-industrial America, the character of social classes and their relationships depart from previous experience. Increased wealth and increased education, together with a new occupational mix, come together to produce new organizations of social classes and new class interests. (White 1983, Foreword)

Often times these new class interests are in conflict with the old class interests. The majority of non-college educated industrialists subscribe to traditional social and cultural values: opposition to abortion, pre-marital sex, and homosexuality, support for the reimposition of the death penalty, and a deep abiding patriotism. However, the new professional college educated post-industrial class embrace positions on these same social and cultural value issues that diverge from those positions held by non-college educated industrialists. The result is a polar environment ripe for political exploitation.

Maddox and Lilie lend support to White's conclusions. However, their four category typology matrix uses ideological rather than generational considerations to classify segments of the electorate. Maddox and Lilie claim that the majority of the Democratic party is composed of liberals (30%) and populists (37%). Liberals and populists, they argue, share common roots in "New Deal" economics. Both philosophies support government intervention in economic matters as a means to promote individual welfare and provide for a minimum living standard. However, populists diverge from liberals in their support for "the use of governmental power to regulate individual behavior so that it conforms to traditional moral and social values" (Maddox & Lilie 1984, 20). The divergence between liberals and populists within the Democratic party is predicated

on two different views on the nature of cultural value issues themselves. Liberals see "cultural issues as related to liberty and leeway." Populists join with traditional conservatives who "see [cultural value issues] as related to license and libertinism" (B. Wattenberg 1995, 98). This difference of opinion on the nature of cultural and moral value issues is the cause for much of the friction prevalent within the ranks of the contemporary Democratic party:

The Democratic party will continue to be plagued by a liberal-populist division, and will be forced to downplay individual liberties and emphasize traditional economic policies to hold itself together. The Wallace revolt of 1968 and the McGovern movement of 1972, however, suggest that both populists and liberals periodically will demand that issues other than economic ones be considered. As these non-economic issues also tend to be highly emotional--non-compromisable, such as abortion or women's rights--the Democratic party cannot be expected to remain at peace for very long. (Maddox & Lilie 1984, 162-163)

Recent research analyzing conservative Democrats reflects Maddox and Lilie's assessment of the economic and ideological cleavages present within the modern Democratic party (Carmines & Berkman 1994). In their publication entitled *"Ethos, Ideology, and Partisanship: Exploring the Paradox of Conservative Democrats,"* Carmines and Berkman suggest strategies that both Democrats and Republicans should pursue to successfully appeal to conservative Democrats. To build consensus and retain conservatives' partisan loyalty, Democratic candidates, they claim, should emphasize class-based issues and populist themes while portraying Republicans as economic elitists from privileged backgrounds. Republican candidates, on the other hand, should seek to exploit the ideological division within the Democratic coalition by making social and cultural value issues such as capital punishment, race, school prayer, and gun control the focal point of political debate.

E. J. Dionne, Jr., of the *Washington Post* lends support to the contention that value issues have been used to divide the electorate. Instead of eliciting positive "feel good" appeals as White argues in his case study of the Reagan presidency, Dionne



emphasizes how various value issues have been used to divide the electorate by eliciting negative predispositions through the use of racial themes. Dionne observes that racial division is not the exclusive end result of racial politics. Like Carmines and Berkman, Dionne sees the use of social and cultural value issues, particularly race, as linked to ideology. According to Dionne, "racial politics [are] only part of the much broader attack on liberalism . . . mounted in the name of traditional values" (Dionne 1991, 79). To understand the relationship between values and contemporary interpretations of liberalism it is important to address the evolution of the term liberal as it relates to various aspects of American politics, both historical and cultural.

## VALUES AND THE "L-WORD," THE DENIGRATION OF LIBERALISM

Liberalism, like values, is a term subject to a variety of interpretations.

Interpretations of liberalism range from a political ideology, a historical tradition, a philosophic theory of state, and a theory of economics. According to J. G. Merquior:

Liberalism, a manifold historical phenomenon, can scarcely be defined. Having itself shaped a good deal of our modern world, liberalism reflects the diversity of modern history, early as well as recent. The range of liberal ideas encompasses thinkers as different in background and motivation as Tocqueville and Mill, Dewey and Keynes, and nowadays, Hayek and Rawls, not to speak of their "elected ancestors," such as Locke, Montesquieu, and Adam Smith. (Merquior 1991, 1)

To adequately address the diverse variety of interpretations associated with liberalism is a task beyond the scope of this research. However, it is important and germane to the current study to discuss the evolution of the term in the context of the American experience to better understand why, in 1988, the liberal label was perceived negatively by a significant segment of the American populace. The term liberal has been used in three distinct fashions to describe various aspects of American politics. The various pedigrees of liberalism used to describe American politics include "classical" liberalism, "practical" liberalism, and "modern" liberalism.<sup>1</sup> Whether understood in its classical, practical, or modern context, American liberalism is linked to three basic value concepts inherent to the American political culture; private property or wealth, individualism, and equality of opportunity in a free market (Hartz 1955).

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<sup>1</sup> Modern liberalism is a term I employ to differentiate the post-Great Society interpretation of liberalism from classical and practical liberalism.

### Classical Liberalism

Classical liberalism, understood in the context of the American experience, can trace its roots to the rise of Protestantism and capitalism and the decline of the hierarchical, feudal social structure which dominated Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Two concepts emerged at this time which were central to the development of a new understanding of humankind's relationship to society; self and work. In the words of Isaac Kramnick:

Ascription, the assignment to some preordained rank in life, came more and more to be replaced by achievement as the major definer of personal identity. Individuals increasingly came to define themselves as active subjects. They no longer tended to see their place in life as part of some natural, inevitable, and eternal plan. Their own enterprise and ability mattered; they possessed the opportunity to determine their place through their own voluntary actions in life and in this world. (Kramnick 1991, 93)

The writings of two philosophers greatly influenced the rise of a new theory of politics based on the concepts of self and work; Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Hobbes, the progenitor of classical liberal theory, constructs in *Leviathan* a "brilliant model of individualistic society . . . with its vision of human beings as self-moving, self-directing independent machines, constantly competing with one another for power, wealth, and glory" (Kramnick 1991, 93). According to Hobbes, a person's value or worth is determined by their individual efforts. Wealth is accumulated in accordance with the degree of one's work. However, Hobbes argues, the products of one's work are not secure as competing individuals are constantly threatening its preservation. Because of this threat, the Hobbesian philosophy argues, peoples' actions are driven by their desire for self-preservation. Humans are born into a state of nature where anarchy and terror reign. To Hobbes, the state of nature is akin to a state of war of every person against every person, in which their lives are "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Portis 1994, 86). Because the human passion of fear and desire for self-preservation are so strong, people

overcome their natural bellicose tendencies and enter into a social contract or government to provide them with protection against those who would willingly harm them.

John Locke, in his *Treatise on Civil Government*, embraces the Hobbesian concepts of the state of nature and the social contract. However, unlike Hobbes, the Lockean natural state is not characterized by rampant lawlessness:

Instead of being ruled by anarchy and terror, humans pursue their individual interests with respect for one another's rights and even cooperate with one another when their interests overlap. In other words, the state of nature, a state without political authority, would not necessarily be a state of war. Instead, it would be governed by rules of reason that constitute the laws of nature. (Portis 1994, 97)

While humans are born free and equal into the state of nature, Locke argues that it is not a state of license. Natural law dictates that people should not harm one another in terms of their life, health, liberty, or property. Realizing that in an environment where people will not always agree on the meaning of natural law each individual would be free to interpret and execute the law of nature in their own selfish fashion. Therefore, Locke claims, people would be willing to sacrifice the freedom to exercise the law of nature individually and enter into social contracts to guarantee the security and protection of their rights to life, liberty, and property. The authority to exercise power would be granted to a government whose legitimacy rests with the consent of the governed. The government would enjoy the consent of the governed as long as the government functions to protect the rights and property of individual members of society. If the government should fail to perform its contractual function, then the populace as a whole can withdraw its consent and dissolve the government.

Essential to understanding Locke's philosophy is his concept of property. Like Hobbes, Locke believes that property or wealth is accumulated according to each individual's labor. In Locke's state of nature everyone is free to accumulate property. However, often times property is accumulated in disproportionate amounts. Necessary to Locke's discussion of property is the concept of equal opportunity. Everyone, Locke

argues, has equal opportunity to accumulate property but the fruits of possession are contingent on individual initiative and degree of labor. "Therefore, equal opportunity justifies unequal outcomes" (Love 1991, 2). For Locke, the accumulation of wealth is not unethical or immoral, but rather humankind's God given right to use terrestrial resources for individual personal benefit. Locke's philosophy of politics, based on the concepts of self and work, provides the rationale to replace an aristocratic feudal hierarchy with meritocracy, a social structure where power and influence is predicated on property accumulated by individual initiative rather than familial status and inheritance.

From the philosophies of Hobbes and Locke, therefore, blossom the tenets of the classic liberal state; a state where free people, equal in opportunity, utilize their individual labor to create property secure in the knowledge that their basic rights and liberties are protected by a government limited in the exercise of its power by those that it governs.

Historical realities associated with the founding of the United States created an environment where the principles of classical liberalism formed the bedrock of the American political culture. In Europe, proponents of classical liberalism had to contend with competing ideologies including socialism, feudalism, and conservatism.<sup>2</sup> No such competition between ideological factions existed in the United States. "America was founded by men and women who fled from the feudal ethos of Europe, and brought with them the liberal ideology of John Locke" (Ingersoll & Matthews 1991, 56). Unencumbered by competing ideologies the supremacy of Lockean liberalism in American political thought went largely unquestioned. "As a result, any thought that did not fit into the broadly defined Lockean--liberal perspective was considered *un-American*" (Ingersoll & Matthews 1991, 57).

The all encompassing influence of classical liberalism on American political thought is evident in the written documents upon which the American nation is founded.

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<sup>2</sup> In the context of this statement the term conservatism refers to the school of thought that advocates the retention of the traditional monarchical establishment.

Thomas Jefferson, when writing the Declaration of Independence, draws heavily from the tenets of classical liberalism espoused by both Hobbes and Locke:

We hold these truths to be self evident: That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments are instituted by men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall most likely effect their safety and happiness.

Similarly, the Constitution of the United States embodies features of classical liberalism; the creation of a government, limited in its power and authority, which receives its legitimacy from the consent of the governed through popular elections and the securing of civil liberties through the first ten constitutional amendments known as the Bill of Rights.

The tenets of classic liberalism were further legitimized by geographic factors. Unlike Europe, America was a seemingly limitless territory. The untapped economic potential of this vast new frontier supplied the means for all citizens to increase their personal property provided they were willing to engage in individual labor. The ubiquitous generational belief that one could climb the ladder of success through hard work, known metaphorically as the "American dream," can trace its origins to the time when the United States was a virgin territory ripe with undeveloped economic resources.

### Practical Liberalism

For over a century the term liberal described, for most Americans, their unique national experience; a nation where free people, equal in opportunity, could utilize their individual talents to labor in the creation of personal wealth secure in the knowledge that their basic rights and liberties were protected by a government limited in the exercise of its power by those that it governs. It was not until 140 years after the birth of the American

nation that the foundation was laid for the meaning of liberalism to be extended and ultimately transformed into its contemporary interpretation. The transformation of the meaning of liberalism can be traced to the national economic crisis of the 1930s and Democratic President Franklin Roosevelt's controversial program, known as the New Deal, that was designed to address the country's economic hardships resulting from the Great Depression. It was during this period, as Theda Skocpol observes, that liberalism emerged as an "explicit political stance defined in opposition to conservatism" (Skocpol 1983, 87).

The New Deal advocated federal government intervention in economic markets and society in general "to promote the rights and welfare of nonprivileged groups and to ensure socioeconomic security and political stability for the nation as a whole" (Skocpol 1983, 87). To advance the New Deal in an anti-statist political system Roosevelt deliberately engaged in a public relations campaign that utilized the public's positive understanding of classical liberalism to effectively communicate an acceptable meaning and purpose of his domestic agenda. "During the grave crisis of the Depression, Franklin Roosevelt needed a new political label to symbolize the 'bold, persistent experimentation' of the New Deal" (Skocpol 1983, 87).

Research conducted by Ronald Rotunda demonstrates that Roosevelt deliberately chose the label "liberal" over other alternatives to describe the New Deal. "Prior to the 1930s, 'liberalism' had been used occasionally as a synonym for 'progressivism'" (Skocpol 1983, 87). Roosevelt and his advisors rationalized the use of the term because they believed the association with progressivism would help enlist progressive political support. However, the association was ambiguous enough to allow the president to pursue innovative domestic programs. The common understanding of the term "liberal" provided two additional benefits to Roosevelt. First, it helped to counter arguments that his domestic agenda was, by its nature, socialist. And second, it aided in competing with

Herbert Hoover and other conservative anti-statist critics for the claim of best representing the traditional American values of individualism and liberty:<sup>3</sup>

Their government activism, New Deal liberals asserted, better protected democratic liberties and individual well-being and [equal] opportunity than did the cold-hearted, laissez-faire pieties of conservatism . . . . Their nascent welfare state, New Dealers told Americans, was not an attack on basic American values that conservatives were saying it was, rather merely an excellent instrument for furthering those values by avoiding anarchy or dictatorship in the Depression crisis, striking down the excessive privileges and power of "economic autocrats," and relieving economic necessity so that Americans in distress could really be free and exercise their rights to equality of opportunity . . . . New Dealers turned to this instrumental justification for their welfare-state reforms, tying them to established values of healthy market capitalism, individual rights, and equality of opportunity, precisely because New Dealers felt ideologically pressured from the right from 1934 on. They were operating in an individualist and anti-statist political system, and they were facing increasingly vociferous conservative opponents with many political levers at their disposal in Congress and in the Democratic [and Republican] parties. (Skocpol 1983, 87 & 95)

Franklin Roosevelt and his supporters exploited the positive connotations of classical liberalism for the purpose of advancing public acceptance of their innovative and controversial domestic program, the New Deal. In the process, Roosevelt and his supporters transformed the meaning of liberalism by framing the term as a label to describe a governmental posture which embraced active intervention in the economy and society "to promote the rights and welfare of nonprivileged groups and to ensure socioeconomic security and political stability for the nation as a whole" (Skocpol 1983, 87). In addition, the New Dealer's use of liberal to describe their domestic program forever linked the term, for better or worse, to the Democratic party. To differentiate classical liberalism from Roosevelt's interpretation Samuel Beer labels FDR's version "practical liberalism":

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<sup>3</sup> Theda Skocpol observes in her footnote concerning Ronald Rotunda's research that initially right-wing critics of the New Deal insisted upon calling themselves "the true liberals." However, beginning in the late 1930s they accepted the label "conservative" for their position.



It is from the New Deal that liberalism in its contemporary American usage has acquired its principal meaning. . . . The liberalism that has been a really significant power in American politics, both as a set of ideas and a social force, has been . . . the *practical liberalism* brought into existence by the New Deal. And the stress on economic balance and economic security that was characteristic of the New Deal remained essential to the meaning of liberalism in its later embodiments in Truman's Fair Deal and the programs of the Kennedy-Johnson administrations. (Beer 1965, 145-146)

FDR's marriage of convenience between practical and classical liberalism did not eliminate the distinct contradictions that exist between both interpretations. Practical liberalism's principle that the state has an obligation to provide for society's less fortunate is in direct contention with particular tenets of classical liberalism that form an integral part of the American political culture; the values of individual self reliance and work. Initially practical liberalism was able to avoid direct confrontation with the American cultural ethos on the political battlefield only because political and historical circumstances permitted the general populace to improve their personal financial condition. Specifically, during the 1940s through the early 1960s the state could finance a relative redistribution of wealth out of an expanding pool of resources so that no one would suffer an absolute decline in their standard of living (Lasch 1983, 105). As Christopher Lasch observes:

During World War II, at the height of the [practical] liberal era, the American government achieved a modest redistribution of income in a climate of rapid economic growth, not by setting a limit on earnings but by the simple expedient of allowing "the rich to get richer at a somewhat slower rate than it allowed the poor to get richer." As a result, the "share of national income held by the richest 5% of the people declined from 23.7% to 16.8%," while the number of families under \$2,000 fell by more than half. The political compromises available in a more expansive era are most vividly conveyed by the statistic that the poorest fifth increased its income by 68% between 1941 and 1945, while the income of the upper fifth increased by only 20%. (Lasch 1983, 105-106)

It is now commonly accepted that the New Deal failed to bring full national economic recovery to America. Recovery only came with the economic expansion attributable to World War II (Skocpol 1983, 90). However, FDR was all too happy to credit practical liberalism embodied in his New Deal policies for saving America from the economic quagmire. The perception of programmatic success represented by increased

personal wealth and income forged an alliance between middle, working, and lower class Americans which translated into a formidable electoral coalition. Any grievances brought to the ballot box by wealthy Americans who witnessed the growth of their incomes decline during Roosevelt's presidency were far outnumbered by the beneficiaries of the New Deal; the coalition of middle, working, and lower class Americans.

The alliance between middle, working, and lower class Americans continued as long as economic growth permitted personal wealth and income to increase for the vast majority of Americans. However, economic expansion is not permanent. The tenuous alliance between middle income and poor, nonprivileged groups, forged by economics, was under constant threat by the contradictions between practical liberalism and the values of American political culture embodied in the tenets of classical liberalism:

The point is that economic expansion helped to smooth over the underlying conflicts of a liberal society, between individual liberty and social justice, property and economic equality. . . . [Practical] liberals repeatedly had to face the possibility that a day of reckoning might be approaching in which the contradictions at the heart of [practical] liberal democracy could no longer be evaded. (Lasch 1983, 106)

The events of the 1960s and 1970s, both foreign and domestic, would herald the predicted day of reckoning for FDR's practical liberalism and the electoral coalition it forged.

### Modern Liberalism

No single event provided the catalyst to initiate the third transformation of the meaning of liberalism; the interpretation referred to as "modern" liberalism. Rather, several historical, social, and political events, occurring over a period of two decades, intertwined to contribute to the transformation of the term into the contemporary pejorative interpretation currently embraced by large segments of the American electorate. The impact the Vietnam war, economic stagnation, the civil and minority rights

movements, and President Lyndon Johnson's social program, known as the Great Society, had on the issues of taxes, rights, and race as they relate to values inherent in the American political culture would, in turn, have a profound effect on the meaning of liberalism.

The twenty years following World War II witnessed the most sustained period of economic growth in American history (Lasch 1983, 109). The only world power to escape the war with its domestic infrastructure unscathed, the United States dominated the post war global economy. However, by the 1970s, American economic strength was in question and the nation's dominance of the world economy was at risk. The expansive economy that had characterized the forties, fifties, and much of the sixties had begun to contract. In large measure, the economic downturn was attributable to the huge level of defense spending associated with the Vietnam war, increased foreign competition, and rising petroleum prices resulting from the Arab oil embargo of the early 1970s.

Practical liberalism's commitment to promote the rights and welfare of nonprivileged groups had, by the sixties, adopted the causes of civil and minority rights and the battle against domestic poverty. While the seeds of economic stagnation were being sown, President Lyndon Johnson, in the aftermath of his landslide 1964 election victory, launched an extensive domestic program, known as the Great Society, to address the nation's social problems. Johnson's Great Society included policies designed to eradicate domestic poverty through promoting social welfare programs, the broadening of the Social Security system, increased aid to education, and the adoption of the Medicare/Medicaid programs. The Great Society not only expanded the federal government's role in domestic affairs but increased the national government's domestic financial commitments.

The contracting economy spurred by increased foreign competition, the recession of 1973-74 that resulted from the Arab oil embargo, and the nation's extensive military commitments produced high inflation that shrank the national tax base creating a severe

strain on the federal government's ability to meet its financial obligations, both foreign and domestic. Ultimately, the financial burden of funding both the war effort and Johnson's expansive social programs fell upon the inflation strapped working and middle classes in the form of tax increases. Despite paying higher taxes, the working and middle classes received minimal benefit from the broad range of government policies they were being asked to finance:

[F]ederal spending placed a heavy burden on the taxpayers who could least afford to bear it, or in any case enjoyed the fewest measurable benefits from this spending. The working class and the lower middle class have been taxed to support programs that benefited the poor and the rich. (Lasch 1983, 110)

The perception among many working and middle class Americans that they were funding programs without receiving any direct benefit was compounded by a growing sentiment that the very programs for which they were paying advantaged people who were unwilling to contribute to their own economic well-being. The belief that many federal aid recipients were enjoying "something for nothing" fostered strong negative sentiments against the Great Society welfare programs among many "economically-strapped" working and middle class Americans. A large segment of the working and middle class felt that the legal and bureaucratic structure of the Great Society welfare-state encouraged the existence of a double standard. Many in the working and middle classes believed that they were unfairly expected to adhere to the cultural principles of individual initiative and hard work to get ahead, while others were exempt from them. The working and middle classes, through hard work and self-reliance, were creating wealth only to see it redistributed through excessive taxation for the benefit of those who they perceived to be unwilling to exercise individual initiative to get ahead; and they resented it.

The crux of working and middle class anger concerning the welfare state is embodied in the feelings of Louise Renaud, a teacher living in Detroit, Michigan. During the 1960s Louise worked as a secretary while attending college at night studying for her

degree in education. By 1972 she had graduated and was earning \$9,000 a year as a teacher, a 30 percent increase in her annual salary as compared to when she was employed as a secretary. Despite her pay increase Louise could not afford to purchase expensive designer jeans. Yet, in her classroom Louise taught students from welfare families wearing the same jeans she herself could not afford. "It was the straw that broke the camel's back," said Louise. "I would see the kids, whose families were on AFDC, walking around in designer jeans, silk shirts, alligator shoes. And I'm breaking my buns. What the hell is going on? I can't afford that" (Brown 1991, 14).

In the eyes of some voters, particularly those in the working and middle classes, the welfare policies of the Great Society benefited individuals who were increasingly seen as undeserving because they refused to help themselves. The perception among many working and middle class voters, particularly whites, that some in the United States were benefiting at the expense of others without adhering to the tenets of American political culture was further exacerbated by the civil and minority rights movements.

The roots of the modern civil rights movement can be traced to FDR's New Deal commitment to provide for those at the bottom of the economic and social ladder. Initially, the civil rights movement focused on government guarantees of fundamental citizenship rights for blacks such as the right to vote and the right to equal opportunity. However, following the dramatic events of 1964 the focus of civil rights shifted from one emphasizing equality of opportunity to the advancement of "broader goals emphasizing equal outcomes or results for blacks, often achieved through racial preferences" (Edsall & Edsall 1991, 7). It was this change in focus and the perceptions it fostered that would significantly impact the meaning of liberalism.

The torch of civil rights was carried by Roosevelt's practical liberal Democratic successors, Presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson. Influenced by the growing political clout of black Americans, the increasing opposition to segregation from large segments of northern whites, and the growing dependence of northern city political bosses

on the black vote, the Democratic party became the institutional vehicle for the promotion of civil rights.<sup>4</sup> By 1948 the national Democratic party had firmly committed itself to promoting the cause of civil rights. Over the objection of many southern Democrats, the 1948 Democratic convention platform consigned the party "to continuing efforts to eradicate all racial, religious, and economic discrimination" (Key 1949, 335). The national Democrats commitment to civil rights spanned the 1950s culminating in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the two strongest pieces of civil rights legislation ever enacted. At the time, the long term residual effects of the legislation may have been unseen. However, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 represented the clear demarcation between the concept of civil rights based on equal opportunity and civil rights premised on equal outcomes. Specifically, the landmark legislation declared entrenched segregation in the South illegal, provided the United States Attorney General with the power to file suit against segregated school systems, prohibited segregation in public facilities, barred discrimination in the work place based on race, and provided for the termination of federal funds to schools, hospitals, and other institutions that engaged in discriminatory practices (Edsall & Edsall 1991, 35).

The debate over rights was not limited strictly to eradicating social injustices associated with black Americans. Another feature of the rights movement included "the establishment of new rights and government guarantees for previously marginalized, stigmatized, or historically disenfranchised groups" such as homosexuals, advocates of "alternative life-styles," feminists, criminals, and ethnic minorities (Edsall & Edsall 1991, 8). Often unpopular with traditional constituencies, the advancement of the goals of many racial and minority groups could not be achieved through positive influence of public

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<sup>4</sup> Whites, particularly those residing in the north, were generally supportive of civil rights as long as it was perceived to be promoting equality of opportunity rather than economic equality. The non-southern white electorate in the early and mid-1960s strongly endorsed the non-violent civil rights movement. In both February 1964 and March 1965, the Gallup poll found that 72 percent of whites outside the South thought Johnson was pushing civil rights "about right" or "not fast enough," and only 28 percent who thought that the president was moving "too fast" (Edsall & Edsall 1991, 36).

opinion. "Women, blacks, the elderly, Mexican-Americans, homosexuals, single parents, advocates of 'alternative life-styles' all perceive, quite correctly, that the ends they seek are unpopular with the masses of voters" (Lasch 1983, 112). Unable to secure their goals in the court of public opinion, racial and minority groups pursued juridical and bureaucratic solutions to achieve their purposes. The court imposed solutions implemented by bureaucratic means, such as affirmative action, employment quotas, and laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, have not been warmly received by segments of the white working and middle class communities who perceive such solutions as counter to traditional methods of advancement based on hard work and individual initiative and traditional moral codes.

Before the enactment of the landmark civil rights legislation, the public perceived little difference between the two political parties on issues of race and rights. However, after 1964 the public's perception of the dissonance between the parties on issues of race grew dramatically:

As recently as 1962, when respondents were asked which party "is more likely to see to it that Negroes get fair treatment in jobs and housing?" 22.7 percent said Democrats, 21.3 percent said Republicans, and 55.9 percent said there was no difference between the two parties. . . . By late 1964, however, the public saw clear differences between the two parties. When asked which party was more likely to support fair treatment in jobs for blacks, 60 percent of the respondents said the Democratic party, 33 percent said there was no difference between the parties, and only 7 percent said the Republican party. (Edsall & Edsall 1991, 35-36)

One reason for the dramatic change in public opinion was the tenor of the 1964 presidential election. Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater firmly opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and made it a focal point of his campaign. In contrast, his practical liberal Democratic opponent, President Johnson, was a leading advocate of the landmark legislation. Polling data indicated that by the conclusion of the 1964 campaign 75% of the surveyed respondents were aware that Congress had passed the Civil Rights Act; and of those aware of the congressional action 96% knew that Johnson had

supported the civil rights bill while 84% knew Goldwater had opposed it (Edsall & Edsall 1991, 35).

Following the 1964 presidential campaign public perceptions of differences between the parties on the issues of taxes, race, and rights became more firmly established by the priming and framing of the term "liberal" by Republicans, particularly Richard M. Nixon and Ronald Reagan, and George Wallace, the Democratic governor of Alabama.

In his 1968 comeback presidential campaign and his 1972 reelection bid Richard Nixon strategically courted disgruntled working and middle class voters, particularly working and middle class white Democrats, by capitalizing on their grievances toward the domestic policies of the Great Society and the social and political unrest associated with the civil rights and anti-war movements. Referring to the forgotten working and middle class as the "silent majority," Nixon attempted to polarize the electorate by framing the problems of the working and middle classes as directly linked to the injustices of the "liberal" policies espoused by the Democratic administrations of the 1960s. Nixon's first vice president, Spiro Agnew, actively assumed the role of presidential "pit-bull" frequently attacking the public policies of what he called the "radical liberals."

Nixon and his Republican allies were not alone in their "mugging" of liberalism. The segregationist governor of Alabama, George Wallace, helped to galvanize the anger and resentment of working and middle class whites, particularly Democrats, into a formidable electoral coalition by his insurgent 1968 presidential campaign. Wallace's anti-liberal rhetoric, especially in regard to civil rights issues, helped to justify the feelings of many working and middle class white Democrats toward the Great Society and the civil and minority rights movements precisely because Wallace himself was a member of their party. According to Thomas and Mary Edsall:

Wallace provided a desperately sought-after moral justification to those whites who saw themselves as most victimized and most displaced by the black struggle for civil rights. . . . Wallace portrayed the civil rights issue not as the struggle of blacks to achieve equality--a goal increasingly difficult



to challenge on a moral basis--but as the imposition on working men and women of intrusive "social" policies by an insulated, liberal, elitist cabal of lawyers, judges, editorial writers, academics, government bureaucrats, and planners. (Edsall & Edsall 1991, 77)

The recent string of Republican successes at the presidential level was possible because George Wallace laid the foundation for what ultimately became the GOP's alliance with working and middle class white Democrats. As Nixon strategist Kevin Phillips noted, "Wallace served as a way station . . . for Democratic traditionalists following realignment into the Republican party" (Phillips 1970, 287). By attacking what he called the extremes of the "liberal social experiments," Democrat Wallace was able to establish common ground between working and middle class white Democrats and "their traditional Republican adversaries--corporate America, the well-to-do, and the very rich--a common bond in opposition to federal regulation and to high taxes" (Edsall & Edsall 1991, 79). Republicans were able to keep the coalition alive by cultivating the perception that the GOP was the institutional mechanism to stem and reverse the perceived economic, social, and political injustices of the Great Society and the civil and minority rights movements.

Ronald Reagan, more than any other recent political leader, solidified working and middle class whites into a winning Republican electoral coalition through the deliberate and calculated transformation of the meaning of liberalism into a pejorative metaphor. A formidable force in Republican politics during the late seventies and the dominant force during the eighties, Ronald Reagan and his Republican foot soldiers continued the Nixon and Wallace strategy of denigrating liberalism. Reagan unabashedly blamed the Great Society and the civil and minority rights policies enacted by practical liberals as responsible for the decay of the nation's moral fabric and the root cause for the vast majority of problems that beset working and middle class whites. To crack the New Deal electoral coalition and dislodge working and middle class white voters from their traditional allegiance to the Democratic party, Reagan and other Republican conservatives openly appealed to the resentment and anger among white voters by constantly linking

policies unpopular with many working and middle class whites, such as welfare, affirmative action, quotas, and homosexual rights, to "liberalism" as it was embodied in the programs of the Great Society and the civil and minority rights movements. As Jesse Jackson observed, "Reagan convinced whites the civil rights movement had taken advantage of them" (Brown 1991, 84).

Richard Nixon, George Wallace, and Ronald Reagan helped to transform the meaning of liberalism from a positive to a pejorative connotation by capitalizing on the growing resentment among working and middle class white Americans toward programs that they came to believe unfairly disadvantaged them. Remarks by Reagan, like his 1987 statement, "we waged war on poverty, and poverty won," captured the essence of white resentment and resonated throughout working and middle class America (Brown 1991, 84). Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, George Bush, and Republicans competing on all electoral levels during the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s benefited from the votes of working and middle class whites, many being registered Democrats, who ultimately accepted the argument that the liberal policies of the Great Society and the civil and minority rights movements were the causes of the economic, social, and political injustices that they had suffered. Nationally, the Democratic party validated Republican claims that their party was controlled by "liberals" by nominating candidates for president, like George McGovern, Walter Mondale, and Michael Dukakis, who either publicly supported or were perceived to support racial, rights, and tax policies that were counter to the interests of working and middle class whites. Presidential candidates like McGovern, Mondale, and Dukakis, who were perceived to be "liberal" in the pejorative sense of the term, only accelerated the exodus of working and middle class white Americans from the Democratic party.

American Political Culture Values and Modern Liberalism:  
A Fundamental Problem for the Democratic Party

The social and domestic policies of practical liberal Democrats, such as Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson, have inexorably linked the Democratic party with the advancement of civil and minority rights and a host of taxpayer-paid social welfare programs. Some scholars have argued that once the focus of civil and minority rights and social welfare issues shifted from one emphasizing equality of opportunity to the advancement of goals emphasizing economic equality and equal outcomes the Democrats' connection with these issues as they relate to rights, race, and taxes evolved into a fundamental dispute concerning values. According to Thomas and Mary Edsall, it is the "values barrier" that has proven the most problematic for national Democrats and is at the core of the party's negative image with its former core constituencies of working and middle class white Americans:

This barrier evolved, in complex and ironic ways, from one of the grand struggles of the twentieth century; a struggle between so-called traditional values and a competing set of insurgent values. "Traditional" values have generally been seen as revolving around commitments to a larger (if exclusive) community--to the family, to parental responsibility, to country, to the work ethic, to sexual restraint, to self-control, to rules, duty, authority, and to a stable social order. A competing or insurgent set of values--values that have been the focus of the rights revolution and of the civil rights movement--has been largely concerned with freedom from confinement, from hierarchy, from authority, from stricture, from repression, from rigid rulemaking, and from the status quo. Insofar as the post-war Democratic party has been geared toward the liberation of disenfranchised minorities, and towards an assault on hierarchy, on embedded privilege, and on the power of the strong over the weak--the party has allied itself with insurgent rather than traditional values. (Edsall & Edsall 1991, 262-263)

Other scholars join the Edsalls in arguing that the modern electoral misfortunes of the national Democratic party are linked to values, specifically symbolic values (Bell 1992; Brown 1991; Kusnet 1992; Kuttner 1987). These authors center their discussions on the Democratic party because each sees the recent decline in the presidential fortunes of the

nation's oldest political party as a direct result of symbolic politics based on values appeals. Written from an historical perspective, Jeffrey Bell, Peter Brown, David Kusnet, and Robert Kuttner trace the Democrats' long national level political exile, arguing that the party has been largely unsuccessful at winning the White House because they have allowed Republicans to make symbolic value issues the focal point of political debate thus turning elections into ideological referendums. What their arguments reflect is the contention that values matter--specifically, that the Democratic party no longer *shares* the values of working and middle class white voters. What Democrats have ignored, according to then Governor Bill Clinton, is that "values [and] symbolism matter" in the decision-making calculus of many voters (Brown 1991, 124). These authors place the blame for the party's lack of national level success upon the Democrats' perceptual association, among other things, with policies that promote wealth redistribution, criminal rights above victims' rights, minority rights at the expense of equal treatment, and weakness on matters of national defense.

These policies, the authors argue, are highly unpopular because they run counter to widely shared individual and community values of hard work, economic individualism, security, and egalitarianism, concepts which are the bulwark of "classical liberalism" and the foundation of the American political culture. The values-based priming and framing of civil and minority rights, taxes, and racial issues by conservative Republicans, such as Goldwater and Reagan, has transformed the meaning of the term liberal from its positive "classical" and "practical" interpretations to a radical pejorative connotation associated in the minds of many voters, particularly working and middle class whites, with a host of insurgent values and a fundamental departure from the principles of traditional American political culture. Today, "liberal" has become a codeword representing a set of values contrary to the principles of traditional American social, moral, and political culture. Bell, Brown, Kusnet, and Kuttner conclude that the Democrats' perpetual association with policies that promote wealth redistribution, criminal rights above victims' rights, racial and

minority rights at the expense of equal treatment, and weakness on matters of national defense is neatly summed-up in value-laden symbols which, today, elicit negative predispositions associated with the label "liberal" among many working and middle class whites.

Peter Brown argues in his book, *Minority Party*, that the unpopularity of policies that promote wealth redistribution, criminal rights above victims' rights, minority rights at the expense of equal treatment, and weakness on matters of national defense ultimately devolves into tensions between those whose constellation of values reflect faith in collective solutions to society's problems and those who see merit in the ethos of individual initiative. To the majority of working and middle class Americans modern liberals have abandoned them and their quest to realize the American Dream of a better standard of living, a good job at a fair wage, and advancement based on hard work and education. In the name of civil liberties and social justice, modern liberals are seen to be only interested in promoting aid to minorities, criminals, and other special interests even at the expense of others' rights or interests (Brown 1991, 28).

Brown further contends that part of the modern liberal social justice policy requires society to redistribute its wealth, reform criminals, and compensate aggrieved minorities for past injustices. While not disputing that government should help the underprivileged, many in the United States feel that the programs and policies associated with modern liberalism have gone too far. At issue for many working and middle class white citizens is the concept of fairness. Many working and middle class white Americans reject the liberal's faith in wealth redistribution and civil and minority rights because they see them as unfairly benefiting others at their expense. Economically, many among the working and middle classes believe that the current welfare system promotes "welfare queens" who freeload-off society while the working and middle class taxpayers foot-the-bill.

In addition, many working and middle class white Americans see civil and minority rights laws as unfairly jeopardizing their personal security and ability to advance in their chosen professions. In terms of criminal justice issues many working and middle class citizens believe that the rights movement has resulted in laws which have unjustifiably reduced the severity of criminal punishment and, in some instances, resulted in prison environments where criminals enjoy better living standards than many law-abiding citizens. Furthermore, many working and middle class white Americans believe affirmative action and employment quotas, which masquerading under the guise of equality of opportunity, provide minorities with a mechanism to bypass traditional methods of advancement based on experience and qualification.

In the eyes of many working and middle class whites, contemporary liberalism advances public policies that dispense with individual initiative as the means for providing personal well being. A large proportion of the population believes that the policy agenda embraced by modern liberalism runs counter to the shared American political and cultural values that dignify hard work and honest living (Brown 1991; Edsall & Edsall 1991). Because of the Democrats' historical association with the liberal label, perceptions of the party among working and middle class white Americans have been adversely affected because this former core constituency of FDR's New Deal coalition no longer sees liberalism in a positive, "practical" sense. Louise Renaud's observation concerning race and welfare issues best summarizes the sentiments many working and middle class white voters have toward the Democratic party: "If they [black welfare recipients] can wear Calvin Klein jeans and have babies by not working, then they say, 'Why should I go and flip hamburgers for \$4 an hour?' . . . They think someone, the government, will take care of them. The more babies, the more AFDC. And the Democrats have perpetuated that system. They [the Democrats] are going in a whole different direction than I am" (Brown 1991, 19). The problem for the Democratic party as it relates to working and middle class

white voters' perceptions of liberalism is neatly contained in the words of a contemporary bumper sticker: **"Vote Democrat, It Beats Working!"**

### Values and Ideology: Is There a Connection?

The focus of recent values related literature clearly suggests that there is a connection between values and ideology, particularly in regard to interpretations of certain shared American values like freedom, liberty, individualism, patriotism, and equality of opportunity. If this is true then it is logical to conclude that there is a relationship between values and ideology. However, as John Zaller points out, the failure to specify the nature of the theoretical relationship of different value continua to one another and to political ideology is a major shortcoming inherent in the values literature (Zaller 1992, 26).

Zaller attempts to remedy this shortcoming by arguing that values are linked together to form ideologies and that ideologies are composed of various values dimensions:

First, the various value dimensions are no longer conceptually independent; rather, each is one among several correlated dimensions of a master concept, ideology. Second, ideology is no longer the strictly unidimensional concept that many discussions have considered it to be, but a constellation of related value dimensions. (Zaller 1992, 26)

To support his contention Zaller cites the ability of people to exhibit fairly consistent "left" or "right" or "centrist" tendencies on such disparate value issues as economic individualism, opinions toward communists, tolerance of nonconformists, racial issues, sexual freedom, and religious authority.<sup>5</sup> Zaller explains the consistent dimensionality of ideology by analogy to human intelligence. Zaller contends that it is rare

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<sup>5</sup> Zaller operationalizes "liberal" and "conservative" as labels describing people that tend to be closer to the left or right pole of some particular value dimension, or closer to one or the other pole of the constellation of associated liberal-conservative values. In his research, values and ideology have exactly the same theoretical status: they are indicators of *predispositions* to accept or reject particular political communications (Zaller 1992, 27-28).

to find someone who is a brilliant mathematician yet a verbal illiterate. Conversely, it is rare to find someone who is simultaneously a gifted writer yet cannot perform simple mathematical functions. Similarly, Zaller contends, it is rare to find someone who is very conservative on one dimension and very liberal on the other.<sup>6</sup> "There is a tendency, which is clear but not overpowering, for people to stake out roughly comparable positions on a series of seemingly unrelated left-right value dimensions" (Zaller 1992, 27).

Zaller's observation on the consistent dimensionality of ideology is central to the discussion of the 1988 election. The Bush campaign organized a group of seemingly unrelated issues that represented a host of disparate value dimensions. Yet, embedded in each value dimension was a dominant frame or viewpoint which acted as a central organizing concept implying a particular ideological alternative. When understood in their totality the value dimensions symbolized by the issues were consistently linked with the ideological dimensionality associated with contemporary liberalism.

### Value Issues in Other Political Contexts: The 1992 Presidential Campaign

Political appeals using value issues that run counter to universally shared political culture orientations can often be unsuccessful. Recently, another values term, "traditional family values," has received extensive attention within the American political dialogue. The issue of family values achieved prominence as a theme in the 1992 Republican presidential campaign in response to perceived weaknesses in the personal and family life of Democratic presidential nominee Bill Clinton. Rumors of Clinton's marital infidelity symbolized by the Gennifer Flowers controversy allowed Republicans to raise personal character as an issue. Furthermore, Republicans made an issue of the role of women in society using Hillary Rodham Clinton as the focus of the debate. However, unlike most

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<sup>6</sup> Zaller notes the possible exception of libertarians who tend to be conservative on economic issues and liberal on social, life-style issues. However, he argues that they are sufficiently uncommon in the United States so ideological studies can safely ignore them.



shared values, family values have distinct personal and moral overtones which suggest how individuals should conduct their lives. Within the context of American political culture such an approach is incompatible with the cherished tenet of separation of church and state. In a 1981 Decision/Making/Information study 66% of those surveyed, despite concerns about pornography and lack of moral standards, believed that consenting adults ought to be able to do whatever they want in private (White 1989, 27). Political efforts perceived as imposing universal moral codes are as unappealing as those that emphasize consensual values are appealing because each sensitizes Americans to the tenets which underlie our political culture.

Furthermore, the extent that certain value issues can successfully impact political behavior depends on their degree of consensus among the American electorate (Rosenbaum 1975). For a value issue to significantly influence political behavior it must be an issue that achieves general public agreement as to its importance and/or harm to the society as a whole. In addition, the public must perceive that a clear distinction exists with one political candidate embracing the wrong or nonconsensual side of the value issue. The greatest potential for dramatic changes in political behavior exists when, in the context of political debate, a salient value issue is raised in which the public expresses a clear consensus and one candidate is perceived to embrace the minority position on the issue. Ben Wattenberg argues that one reason the Republicans did not win in 1992 was because the party, specifically Bush, did not focus debate on consensual symbolic value-based issues during the campaign:

Here are some items that were not presented forcefully in prime time in Houston [site of the Republican National Convention]: quotas, welfare, crime, educational discipline. These are all legitimate grist for political discourse, all harming America, all can be, arguably, laid at the feet of the recent liberal impulse in America, and all of which Bush had addressed at one time or another. (B. Wattenberg 1995, 64)

Wattenberg would categorize family value issues as cultural in nature because of the lack of consensus concerning what they represent. "Liberals often see the cultural

issues as related to liberty and leeway. Conservatives often see them as related to license and libertinism" (B. Wattenberg 1995, 98). Issues that can potentially impact traditional family life such as pornography, abortion, sex education, and promiscuity are often issues which lack a high degree of consensus. The lack of consensus concerning the impact on society of family value issues limits the extent that these issues can potentially influence political behavior.

If the goal of Republican operatives in 1992 was to attract the more socially conservative working class Democrats based on a campaign emphasizing traditional family values, for the most part, their efforts failed. They failed not only because family value issues lack a high degree of consensus, but because the Democrats had successfully focused debate on the economy. Economic issues have always been the glue holding together the diverse Democratic "New Deal" coalition. The recession of the early 1990s overshadowed all other issues in importance. Despite value-laden appeals, economic issues, more than any other single factor, were responsible for bringing many conservative Democrats, who had previously strayed from the fold, back under the party banner. The saliency among the electorate of economic and value issues raised together within the context of the same political environment is another avenue of inquiry which deserves appropriate attention. However, such an inquiry is beyond the scope of this research.

#### Value Issues and the 1988 Presidential General Election Campaign

Unlike the symbolic value issues used by Republicans in 1992, the symbolic value issues raised by Bush in 1988 and addressed in this research reflect the widely shared political culture orientations held by most Americans. In the context of the 1988 election the Pledge of Allegiance issue is symbolic of patriotism; national defense issues are symbolic of American prestige and the nation's readiness, willingness, and commitment to protect freedom and liberty; the prison furlough and the death penalty issues are symbolic

of the concern for personal security; and the tax issue is symbolic of individual merit and initiative to create wealth and ascend the economic ladder of success.<sup>7</sup> Even though the meanings of each are subject to idiosyncratic interpretations, respect for and love of country, a willingness to defend our nation to protect liberty, concern for personal safety and freedom from fear, and a universal commitment to equal opportunity and individual initiative to get ahead are values rooted in classical liberalism and shared by most Americans.

While the Pledge issue, prison furloughs, the death penalty, and taxes symbolize a set of values shared by a majority of Americans, they also symbolize the differences the majority perceives to exist between their values and the values embraced by those they consider to be outside the mainstream: the liberal elite. "If Reagan's values strategy represented a photograph, then Bush's was a photographic negative" (White 1989, 157). In the political arena Reagan and his strategists chose to frame issues which symbolized widely shared values to elicit positive predispositions from the electorate. Bush and his strategists chose to frame issues which symbolized similar widely shared values, but to have the opposite effect; elicit negative predispositions based on the electorate's understanding of the term "liberal."

The Bush campaign's use of issues which symbolized widely shared values to elicit negative predispositions from segments of the electorate based on their understanding of the term liberal is succinctly summarized by Thomas and Mary Edsall:

In 1988, the Bush campaign assembled and deployed a range of symbols and images designed to tap into . . . submerged concerns [crime, welfare, family dissolution, an eroding work ethic, and global retreat] . . . often clustering around the nexus of racial, ethnic, cultural, and "values"

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<sup>7</sup> Some have argued that the decision by an independent political committee, *Americans for Bush*, to produce and air television commercials during the 1988 general election campaign highlighting William J. (Willie) Horton, Jr., a black man who committed murder and rape while on furlough from a Massachusetts prison, transformed the prison furlough issue from a social value issue symbolizing crime and contemporary liberalism to one symbolizing race. The Republican campaign has consistently denied that it intended to link the furlough issue to race citing that Horton, in either name or photograph, did not appear in any Bush campaign sanctioned media advertising.

anxieties that had helped to fuel the conservative policies of the post-civil rights era. The symbols of the Bush campaign--Willie Horton, the ACLU, the death penalty, the Pledge of Allegiance, the American flag, "no new taxes," the "L-word," and "Harvard boutique liberal"--conjured up the criminal defendants' and prisoners' rights movements, black crime, permissive liberal elites, a revenue-hungry state, eroding traditional values, tattered patriotism, and declining American prestige. Themes and symbols tapping these issues became for the Republican party the means of restoring the salience of associations damaging to Democrats, and the means of maintaining the vitality of the majority conservative coalition. . . . [The] Bush campaign strategy essentially looked backwards, organized around the conflicts and schisms of the previous twenty-five years. The campaign was fought on the battleground of civil rights and the broader rights movements, focusing on the liabilities that had accumulated around the liberal wing of the national Democratic party. (Edsall & Edsall 1991, 215-216)

## RESEARCH ON THE 1988 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Much of the contemporary research conducted on the 1988 presidential election is of a distinctly qualitative nature. Symbolic value issues are central to the qualitative literature discussing the 1988 presidential campaign (Abramson et al. 1990; Black & Oliphant 1989; Blumenthal 1990; Cramer 1992; Drew 1989; Germond & Witcover 1989; Goldman & Mathews 1989; Moreland, Steed, & Baker 1991; Morrison 1988; Nelson 1989; Pomper 1989; Runkel 1989; Taylor 1990). These analyses treat symbolic values in an historical context, merely referring to the Pledge issue, prison furloughs, national defense, and the death penalty as pieces in the electoral puzzle which, in their totality, worked against Dukakis. With the exception of Pomper, who does provide some longitudinal polling data to demonstrate the saliency of the values message with the national electorate, the other authors do not provide any substantive quantitative data to support their conclusions that the Pledge of Allegiance, prison furloughs, national defense, the death penalty and other value-based issues were important factors that had a significant impact on voting behavior. Their only contribution to the present discussion is an acknowledgment that Bush's value-based strategy was effective in driving a wedge in the Democratic coalition.

Despite their predilection to present their research in qualitative form, these analyses of the 1988 campaign set the stage for the current research. Each author clearly acknowledges the significance of the Republican's value-based strategy in determining the ultimate electoral outcome and discusses the critical importance of the focus group research conducted by the Bush campaign in determining the saliency level of the Pledge of Allegiance, prison furlough, death penalty, and tax issues among certain segments of

the Democratic coalition, notably working and middle class Democrats who had previously supported Ronald Reagan.

The pool of quantitative research discussing the impact symbolic value issues had on the 1988 electorate is not as broad as that of qualitative research. However, some of the research that is available suggests that issues with distinct shared-values appeals were successful in achieving electoral movement with some segments of the 1988 electorate.

A recent study of the Pledge of Allegiance issue demonstrated that Bush's strategy affected the voting behavior of those within the electorate who viewed the issue of patriotism in strictly symbolic and emotional terms (Sullivan, Fried, & Dietz 1992).

To arrive at their conclusion Sullivan and his associates used *Q* methodology to identify five categories of patriotism: (1) *iconoclastic patriots*--those who reject purely symbolic and emotional appeals and instead express their love of country through working towards economic and political change and engaging in civic and community activities; (2) *symbolic patriots*--those who distinguish their love of country by strong emotional reverence to traditional patriotic symbols, rituals, and slogans; (3) *instinctive environmental patriots*--those who distinguish their love of country through deep respect for the preservation of the nation's natural resources for the enjoyment of future generations; (4) *capitalistic patriots*--those who blend love of country with economic growth so that future generations may enjoy a more productive nation; and (5) *symbolic national patriotism*--those who view America as infallible, first among nations, and God's chosen country.

Using panel studies conducted in May/June 1988 and November 1988, Sullivan and company employed *R* methodology to analyze the effects the Pledge issue had on

candidate choice in a subnational universe of Minnesota voters.<sup>1</sup> The evidence suggests that symbolic and instinctive environmental patriots were the categories most positively influenced by Bush's campaign strategy. Bush experienced a 15% gain among symbolic patriots and a 17% gain among instinctive environmentalists. Sullivan admits that Bush's emphasis during the campaign on Governor Dukakis' lack of attention toward the environmental problems that beset Boston harbor, rather than the Pledge issue itself, may have enhanced the vice president's appeal among the latter group.

Other quantitative research concludes that issues, rather than image considerations, propelled Bush to victory (Gopoian 1993). Using ANES 1988 election data and a logistic regression model J. David Gopoian argues that redistributive issues, not Dukakis' image, played a critical role in Bush's success.


What Gopoian's analysis fails to address is Zaller's contention that various values dimensions, when linked together, form ideologies. Many voters perceive an inherent relationship between redistributive value-based issues and the popular image of liberalism. For many voters candidates who support wealth redistribution policies are liberals. This relationship is conversely true. If a candidate is perceived as a liberal then it is easy for voters to identify that candidate with redistributive policies.

Voters who said they supported Bush on the basis of redistributive policy considerations (according to Gopoian, 65.2% of the 27.5% of the electorate that based their decisions on redistributive issues) may have done so because they cognitively

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<sup>1</sup> At first the analysts used *Q* methodology to identify alternative understandings of patriotism. This methodology is used to maximize diversity, however at the expense of randomness and sample size. In this study  $n=43$ . To solve this problem so generalizations could be made regarding individuals' subjective conceptualizations and their other political attitudes and behaviors, Sullivan and associates used an *R* methodology survey ( $n=400$ ) of the broader community. A questionnaire was designed which asked people to respond to the statements that best distinguished the respective patriotism perspectives elicited from the *Q* analysis. They assigned survey respondents to a particular patriotism perspective based on the match between their response profile and each of the five perspectives. The survey also included items designed to validate the strategy for assigning respondents to patriotism perspectives, compared results obtained using *R* methodology with those obtained by a more traditional patriotism scale, explored the extent to which varying reactions to current political issues had their roots in differing views about patriotism, and assessed the political consequences, particularly in the 1988 election, of the diversity of patriotism perspectives (Sullivan, Fried & Dietz 1992, pp. 217-219).

perceived an image of Dukakis as a liberal. How could these voters have arrived at the conclusion that Dukakis was a liberal? Because of the Bush campaign's efforts at using the Pledge issue, prison furloughs, the death penalty, national defense, and taxes in defining Dukakis as a dangerous "radical" liberal who did not share the mainstream values of a majority of Americans. The following model explains the logic:



Further analysis needs to be conducted to clarify whether voters citing redistributive issues considerations in making their electoral choice supported Bush because of his position on these issues or because of their perceptions of Dukakis as a liberal. If evidence shows voters who chose Bush on the basis of redistributive issues did so because of possessing a liberal image of Dukakis then Gopoian needs to reassess his model allowing for the possibility that additional intervening variables may have influenced the electorate's ideological image of the Democratic candidate which in turn may have affected voting behavior.



## THE 1988 PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN: THE GENESIS OF THE REPUBLICAN STRATEGY

The 1988 presidential election was Michael Dukakis' to lose. Following a universally acclaimed convention performance, the Democratic nominee surged to a 17 point lead in national polls. Dukakis' only obstacle on the road to the White House was his Republican opponent, George Bush. Bush, a two term incumbent vice president, entered the general election campaign with major handicaps. Even as Bush reached the pinnacle of American political power, there remained much public and private skepticism about him. A 1987 poll completed by Reagan pollster Richard Wirthlin confirmed this feeling. More than a third of Republicans said, "there is just something about Bush that bothers me (Goldman & Mathews 1989, 26). To further complicate matters for the vice president, the media had successfully characterized him as a "wimp." The result, after eight faithful years of service to Ronald Reagan, George Bush was perceived to be a weak, indecisive leader without an agenda or an ideology. On the road to the Oval Office, George Bush's major liability was himself. Even history seemed to be against him. No incumbent vice president since Martin Van Buren in 1836 had succeeded in winning the White House.

Unlike Bush, Dukakis was generally unknown to much of the electorate. However, detailed polling had shown that despite the public's lack of familiarity with the Democratic nominee they preferred Dukakis over Bush precisely because of what they did not like about the vice president. An *ABC News Washington Post* poll found that 57% of Dukakis supporters said that they planned to vote for him mainly because they were against Bush (Germond & Witcover 1989, 156). Furthermore, a *CBS News New York Times* poll found that two-thirds of the conservatives surveyed did not perceive the

Massachusetts Democrat as a liberal and among this electoral subgroup Dukakis was running even with Bush (Germond & Witcover 1989, 157). And polls showed that conservative Democrats, the electoral group that formed an integral part of Ronald Reagan's coalition and was vital to Bush's success, were returning home and supporting Dukakis (White 1989, 152). In essence, the Massachusetts governor enjoyed the electoral benefit of doubt associated with anonymity.

At the outset of the general election campaign Bush's negative ratings hovered near 40% (Goldman & Mathews 1989, 299). Roger Ailes, Bush's media consultant, believed that they could lower the vice president's negatives; however, in order to win, the campaign would have to raise public doubts about Dukakis. Realizing that many voters perceived Dukakis as a "tabula rasa" or blank slate, Bush strategists theorized that they could persuade specific segments of voters to choose Bush if they could define Dukakis to the electorate in such a way as to give them a reason to dislike the Democratic nominee even more. With this in mind Bush campaign manager Lee Atwater enlisted the help of Jim Pinkerton, the campaign's director of research, to uncover issues which would mortally wound the Massachusetts governor. In a testament to the era of "sound-bite" politics Atwater's only instructions to Pinkerton were that his findings and their explanations had to fit in a space no larger than a 3 x 5 index card!

A 26 year political veteran, Dukakis' record naturally became the focal point of Pinkerton and his staff's efforts to find and identify issues that could be used against the Massachusetts governor. Dukakis began his political career in 1962 when he was elected to the state legislature. During his subsequent years in the political arena Dukakis had only lost a contest for elective office once; his bid for renomination in the 1978 Democratic gubernatorial primary.<sup>1</sup> It was through careful analysis of Dukakis' 1978

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<sup>1</sup> As a single candidate or the head of a team ticket Dukakis was defeated only once (the 1978 Democratic gubernatorial primary) prior to his 1988 loss to George Bush (losses during the 1988 presidential primary season excluded). The only exception was in 1970 when Michael S. Dukakis was the Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor on a tandem ticket headed by then Boston Mayor Kevin H. White. The

defeat and the reasons for his loss that would provide the Bush team with the framework and direction to formulate their strategy against the Democratic nominee.

The 1978 Massachusetts Democratic Gubernatorial Primary:  
A King Dethrones the Duke

As the 1978 election year dawned, Governor Dukakis appeared to be well-positioned for reelection. Nature even cooperated with the governor. An unusually potent February ice storm paralyzed a large portion of Massachusetts. Schools, mass transportation, and other vital public and municipal services, were shut-down. A massive power failure left many Bostonians without heat. In response to the crisis Dukakis summoned the National Guard. While citizens were buried under 27 inches of snow with nothing to do but watch television they witnessed a governor in control. Dukakis, casually dressed in slacks and a sweater, calmed and reassured the public, explained developments, and informed people of what was being done to bring relief to those in need. A more effective kickoff for the reelection campaign could hardly have been imagined. Estimates of the amount of free television media accorded Dukakis during the natural disaster were placed at \$2 million (Buchanan 1978). In a post-blizzard poll conducted in March 56% of the surveyed voters rated Dukakis' performance as governor as "good" or "excellent."<sup>2</sup>

The results of the post-blizzard poll were encouraging to the Dukakis reelection effort. Equally encouraging was that Dukakis had not drawn any primary opposition that was perceived to be serious. In his bid for renomination, Dukakis had two seemingly innocuous challengers. The more notable threat to the incumbent came from the right in the person of Edward J. King. King, a conservative, Irish Catholic Democrat, was the

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White/Dukakis ticket was defeated in the November general election by incumbent Republican Governor Francis W. Sargent and Lieutenant Governor Donald R. Dwight.

<sup>2</sup> Clark University, Public Affairs Research Center, press release, 9 March 1978.

former Director of the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport) and President of the New England Council, a public relations firm designed to promote business interests in the region. A six foot, 225 pound ex-professional football player, King was a political newcomer who had never before sought public office. King's reasons for seeking the Democratic gubernatorial nomination were more personal than political. A pro-business advocate, King's tenure at Massport was notable for his aggressive development program and expansion of Boston's Logan International Airport. When Dukakis was elected governor in November of 1974, environmental activists in the governor-elect's inner circle, appalled by King's policies and tactics at Massport, successfully ousted him as the Port Authority Director. Motivating himself for the coming campaign, King reportedly said, "Can you imagine that little Greek firing me, Ed King?" (Gaines & Segal 1987, 158) In October of 1977 King announced his candidacy for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination during a press conference staged on the steps of the State House on Beacon Hill.

Dukakis' second primary challenger, former Cambridge mayor Barbara Ackermann, attacked Dukakis from the left. An ideological, progressive liberal, Ackermann was running to protest what she perceived was Dukakis' sell-out of the liberal agenda that he was supposed to represent. Liberal dissatisfaction with Dukakis stemmed from events early in his administration. Upon entering office in January of 1975 Dukakis was unexpectedly faced with a severe state financial crisis which threatened to bankrupt the Commonwealth. Attempting to avoid fiscal insolvency Dukakis authorized deep cuts in social services, particularly welfare. Incensed by his "meat cleaver" approach to balancing the state budget the estrangement between liberals and Dukakis was further exacerbated by the governor's advocacy of workfare and his signing of a 1977 redistricting bill which eroded the support base of many of the legislative members of a liberal policy organization known as the Democrat Study Group (Gaines & Segal 1987, 158).

At the outset of the campaign the political community regarded neither of Dukakis' two primary opponents as much of a threat. Both lacked significant statewide recognition. In a poll conducted for the *Boston Globe* in May, four months before the primary, 44% and 48% of the respondents had not heard of either King or Ackermann respectively.<sup>3</sup>

Initially Edward J. King campaigned as a pro-business Democrat concentrating on promoting economic issues and themes. However, after several months of campaigning King's position relative to Dukakis had not significantly changed in the polls. A survey conducted for the King campaign in February of 1978 projected Dukakis winning 64% of the vote to King's 11% and Ackermann's 3%, the remaining 22% being undecided.<sup>4</sup> It was in the late winter that the King campaign attempted to redefine their primary election strategy. In March the King campaign sponsored a survey exclusively targeted at those Democrats favoring Dukakis' reelection. The purpose of the survey was to attempt to isolate specific issues which could be used to break Democratic voters' allegiance to Dukakis. The results of the survey proved conclusive (table 1). Forty-two percent of those surveyed said that under no circumstances could they support a candidate for governor who opposed minimum mandatory jail sentences for persons guilty of committing violent crimes; 36% said that they could not support a candidate who opposed the death penalty; and an amazing 60% said they could not support a candidate who favored abortion.

During his term as governor, Michael Dukakis was on record opposing minimum mandatory sentences and capital punishment and in support of tax funded abortions. The survey also showed that voters were seeking tax relief and supported an increase in the drinking age. According to King's campaign manager, George Fratlaroli, "That's when we discovered we could get significant defections from Dukakis if we could let people know

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<sup>3</sup> Survey taken for the *Boston Globe*, 9 May through 15 May 1978.

<sup>4</sup> Survey taken for Edward J. King by Baraff, Morris, and Mercurio Associates, March 1978.

TABLE 1

## Pre-Primary Survey of Self-Described Supporters of Governor Michael S. Dukakis

SURVEY QUESTION	PERCENTAGE ANSWERING "NO"
Are there any circumstances under which you would vote for a candidate for governor who <i>opposed</i> minimum jail sentences for violent crimes?	42% ( <i>N</i> = 155)
Are there any circumstances under which you would vote for a candidate for governor who <i>opposed</i> the death penalty?	36% ( <i>N</i> = 136)
Are there any circumstances under which you would vote for a candidate for governor who <i>avored</i> abortion?	60% ( <i>N</i> = 62)

SOURCE: Baraff, Morris, and Mercurio, survey conducted for Edward J. King, March 1978.

where he stood and where we stood on the issues" (Woodlief 1978). As a result of the survey, the King campaign adopted a strategy designed to define Dukakis as a radical liberal by focusing attention on Dukakis' positions on specific social and cultural value issues such as capital punishment, taxes, and abortion. The principle goal of the strategy was to prime Dukakis-leaning voters who did not share the governor's positions on certain social and cultural issues to conclude that the incumbent did not share their values and thus reject his candidacy. King would become the direct beneficiary as these voters would find him to be more closely aligned with their values therefore more acceptable. The slogan adopted by the King campaign succinctly defined their strategy, "You have a clear choice!"<sup>5</sup>

During the remainder of the summer and early fall King concentrated on defining Dukakis as a radical liberal through consistent and constant attempts at increasing public awareness of his and Dukakis' positions with respect to the issues of capital punishment, mandatory sentences, abortion, taxes, and the drinking age. Unlike Barbara Ackermann, Edward J. King had the means to deliver his message to the voters. Of the three

<sup>5</sup> King campaign advertisement, *Boston Globe*, 18 September 1978.

gubernatorial contestants in the Democratic field King was clearly the most successful fund-raiser. Relying on his broad support from the business and labor communities King was able to effectively compete with Dukakis. In a statewide campaign, television and other forms of mass communication are essential to effectively convey a candidate's message. In this respect Dukakis all but surrendered. In media advertising King spent \$280,000 compared to \$75,000 by the Dukakis campaign (Kenney & Turner 1988, 132).

On August 31st, four weeks before the primary, the three contestants, Dukakis, King, and Ackermann, competed in the only pre-primary televised debate. From the outset King was clearly on the offensive. Regardless of the question asked by the moderators, King reiterated his positions with respect to his five hand picked issues. During his closing remarks, with Dukakis conveniently at his side, a defiant Edward J. King summarized his positions:

Clearly I stand for a Proposition 13 for Massachusetts. I'm for capital punishment for premeditated felony murders, which are on the rise in this state. I'm for mandatory jail sentences for those who break and enter into our homes in the nighttime. Clearly jail is the place for them. I'm unalterably opposed to taxpayer funds being used for abortion. I think the practice is abhorrent. And I'm for raising the drinking age to age twenty-one. Those are my positions. Ask Dukakis his. If you like my platform, I hope you vote for me. If you don't, vote for Dukakis. (White 1982, 649)

During the primary contest Dukakis did not attempt to alter the dialogue of the campaign. The incumbent governor, instead of stressing "pocket book" issues which tend to unite Democrats, allowed King to draw him into a debate on social and cultural value issues. Citing his "fundamentally different views" Dukakis explained his positions on King's issues. In regard to capital punishment, Dukakis stated, "I do not believe that capital punishment is an essential or even valuable tool in the fight against crime."<sup>6</sup> Responding to a reporter's question on how he (Dukakis) thought the voters would react to a Massachusetts version of Proposition 13, the California initiative to rollback property

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<sup>6</sup> Context of quote from Massachusetts Democratic gubernatorial candidates' debate, 31 August 1978.

taxes, the governor remarked, "Massachusetts voters were too smart to fall for a gimmick like that" (Gaines & Segal 1987, 161).<sup>7</sup>

Dukakis' explanations of his positions on the social and cultural value issues raised by King reinforced King's argument that Dukakis was too liberal for mainstream Democrats. In response to a reporter's exit poll question on why he was voting for King, Thomas Long, a blue collar Democrat, said, "Dukakis is too liberal on some items . . . and I've voted for Dukakis before" (Anderson 1978). Walter J. Ryan, an Irish union leader backing King, responded in a similar fashion when queried about the King-Dukakis contest, "The way I see it . . . the liberal intelligentsia, the refugees of academia who have been manipulating our lives with the bureaucracy are now on the defensive, and that's the way we like it."<sup>8</sup>

Dukakis' responses also served to focus attention on controversial and often unpopular aspects of his record. In 1975 Dukakis had vetoed a death penalty bill and several bills authorizing minimum mandatory sentences for certain crimes approved by the Massachusetts legislature, the General Court. As governor, Dukakis was on record favoring public funding for abortion. In 1977 he had vetoed a bill which would have eliminated state-funded abortions for the poor. Finally, Dukakis' position on taxes was well-known. After reneging on his 1974 campaign pledge of no new taxes, the public, aggravated by what they perceived as an already excessive tax burden and agitated by the growing "Proposition 13 fever," was in no mood to forgive and forget.

In King's opinion, Dukakis regarded his opponent's strategy as "simplistic buzzwords designed to confuse the electorate."<sup>9</sup> Dukakis believed that based on his competence and integrity the voters would reward him with renomination. Instead, on

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<sup>7</sup> In 1980, two years after Dukakis' defeat, Massachusetts voters adopted a similar tax cut measure, known as Proposition 2 1/2, by a two-to-one margin.

<sup>8</sup> "The Campaign Quotes," *Boston Globe*, 5 November 1978.

<sup>9</sup> Shaun P. Herness, interview with Edward J. King.



primary election day, September 19, 1978, the voters unceremoniously "dumped the Duke." In a stunning political upset, Edward J. King, businessman turned politician, won 51% of the vote to Dukakis' 42% and Ackermann's 7%. In the November general election, King bested Republican candidate Francis W. Hatch, Jr. to become the only man this century to be elected the governor of Massachusetts in his first try for public office.

Post election analyses of the primary attributed Dukakis' surprise defeat to King's strategy of dividing the electorate by injecting social and cultural value issues into the campaign dialogue. Reflecting on the primary outcome *Boston Herald* political columnist Wayne Woodlief commented, "A dogged repetition of gut-level, emotional themes--anti-taxes, anti-abortion, pro-capital punishment--propelled Edward J. King to his stunning upset of Governor Michael S. Dukakis" (Woodlief 1978).

An October survey of those Democrats and Independents who voted in the September 19th Democratic primary provided evidence to support Woodlief's observation.<sup>10</sup> The poll showed that three issues, the death penalty, property tax reductions, and taxpayer paid abortions, provided King with handsome electoral dividends (table 2). Seventy-four percent of those who *opposed* taxpayer paid abortions, 63% of those who *favored* the death penalty for first degree murderers, and 59% of those who *favored* a large scale property tax reduction voted for King. Similarly, those who took different positions from King consistently supported Dukakis. Sixty-eight percent of those who *favored* state funds for abortion, 67% of those who *opposed* the death penalty, and 61% of those who *opposed* a large scale property tax reduction voted for Dukakis. Unfortunately for Dukakis, with the exception of the abortion issue, large majorities of Democrats and Independents voting in the primary did not embrace his positions on the death penalty and property tax reductions. Only 35% were opposed to the death penalty

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<sup>10</sup> Under Massachusetts law unaffiliated voters may cast ballots in either the Democratic or Republican primaries.

TABLE 2

**Post-Primary Survey Measuring Level of Support for  
Edward J. King and Michael S. Dukakis Based on Support or Opposition  
to State Funded Abortions, the Death Penalty, and Property Tax Reductions**

SURVEY QUESTIONS	FAVOR	OPPOSE	FAVOR VOTE KING	OPPOSE VOTE KING	FAVOR VOTE DUKAKIS	OPPOSE VOTE DUKAKIS
Do you <i>favor</i> or <i>oppose</i> the use of state funds for abortion for women who cannot afford to pay for it themselves?	52% <i>N</i> = 130	48% <i>N</i> = 122	32% <i>N</i> = 42	74% <i>N</i> = 90	68% <i>N</i> = 88	26% <i>N</i> = 32
Do you <i>favor</i> or <i>oppose</i> the death penalty for first degree murder?	65% <i>N</i> = 169	35% <i>N</i> = 90	63% <i>N</i> = 106	33% <i>N</i> = 30	37% <i>N</i> = 63	67% <i>N</i> = 60
Do you <i>favor</i> or <i>oppose</i> a large scale property tax reduction in Massachusetts similar to California's Proposition 13?	63% <i>N</i> = 162	37% <i>N</i> = 97	59% <i>N</i> = 96	39% <i>N</i> = 38	41% <i>N</i> = 66	61% <i>N</i> = 59

SOURCE: Public Affairs Research Center, Clark University, survey conducted October 1978

and 37% were against property tax reductions.

A political environment where the electorate maintains clear preferences on divisive issues can prove problematic to a candidate who is an advocate for policy preferences embraced by a minority of the public. This is particularly true when divisive issues such as the death penalty, taxes, and abortion dominate the campaign dialogue. This was the case in the 1978 Massachusetts Democratic gubernatorial primary campaign. Dukakis, stymied by King's aggressive strategy, did not attempt to alter the focus of the campaign away from the challenger's social and cultural values agenda. Because Dukakis was on the wrong side of a majority of public opinion on many of the social and cultural value issues raised by King the incumbent's level of support was bound to be adversely affected.

The October survey also indicated that King's strategy of tarring Dukakis with the liberal label by emphasizing his and the incumbent's differences on certain social and cultural value issues worked to isolate Dukakis from moderate Democrats. Evidence suggests that among the major contestants, King and Dukakis, the challenger won because he was able to forge a coalition of moderates and conservatives which more than offset Dukakis' two-to-one win among self-described liberals.<sup>11</sup> King defeated Dukakis among self-described moderates in all but one of the demographic categories analyzed. Only among white collar voters did Dukakis outperform King. King's largest margins over Dukakis among moderates were male voters (16%), blue collar voters (18%), voters with a high school education or less (24%), and voters with incomes less than \$15,000 a year (30%).

Among self-described conservatives King consistently beat Dukakis by margins of near two-to-one or better. In only two categories of conservatives, white collar voters and women, did King outpoll Dukakis by a 10% margin or less. Overall the poll indicates that among primary voters requesting a Democratic ballot King won 70% of self-described conservatives, 56% of self-described moderates, and 35% of self-described liberals. Between the two candidates, this translated into King winning 53% of the overall primary ballots cast by Democrat and Independent voters who participated in the primary.

The analysis of the results indicates that King was particularly successful at winning support from low income, less educated, blue collar, male Democrats and Independents; voters who shared demographic characteristics similar to those voters who after 1980 became known in political circles as Reagan Democrats. Also, King was successful at muting any perceived Dukakis advantage among women voters. Dukakis

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<sup>11</sup> For complete statistical data concerning the relationship between voter ideology and candidate preferences please refer to the section of the appendix entitled, "Self-Described Ideological Tendencies & Candidate Preferences Among Demographic Subgroups of Massachusetts Voters Who Participated in the 1978 Democratic Gubernatorial Primary."

could not offset King's 14% advantage among men as both he and his challenger received approximately 50% of the primary vote cast by women.

The type and tone of the campaign King waged against Dukakis did not fall on deaf political ears. The events surrounding the 1978 Massachusetts gubernatorial primary campaign provided clues to the Bush research team on the normative features of an election strategy that would successfully influence certain segments of the electorate, particularly Reagan Democrats, to vote against Dukakis.

#### The "Negative Cluster": The Republicans Find Their Silver Bullets

Jim Pinkerton and, as Atwater often referred to them, his group of "thirty-five excellent nerds" performed their research work admirably (Black & Oliphant 1989, 222). The group's inquiries into Dukakis' record and the 1978 Democratic gubernatorial primary campaign produced seven key issues which Bush strategists believed could cripple Dukakis' presidential ambitions. Several issues were recycled from Edward J. King's successful 1978 campaign; Dukakis' public positions in support of higher taxes and taxpayer paid abortions and the Democratic nominee's opposition to the death penalty and mandatory drug sentences. Pinkerton's research uncovered other issues not used by King but potentially as lethal. These issues included Massachusetts' prisoner furlough program, the pollution of Boston Harbor, Dukakis' gubernatorial veto of a bill mandating the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools, and Dukakis' opposition to a host of military weapons systems. Each one of these issues by itself was not enough to permanently damage Dukakis. But it was believed that as a collective the "negative cluster," as they became known, provided enough evidence that Dukakis was a McGovern-style liberal whose positions on these issues reflected values fundamentally different from those held by a

majority of Americans, particularly Democrats who had previously supported Ronald Reagan.<sup>12</sup> According to Atwater:

The swing vote in almost every state or certainly in enough states to get over 270 electoral votes was conservative, populist—to use a cliché, Reagan Democrats. And if they didn't see any differences or particular differences between the two candidates, guess what? They would have gone back and been Democrats again. They're always looking for an excuse to be, because they are Democrats. (Runkel 1989, 112)

Recent scholarly research suggests that Atwater was correct. Edward G. Carmines and Michael Berkman argue that conservative Democrats retain their partisan affiliation because of the political ethos which developed between the Democratic party and those working-class institutions and groups victimized by the Great Depression with which conservative Democrats identify:

Not only did the experience of the Great Depression forge a close link between the Democratic party and socially and economically disadvantaged groups but it also created a distinct and lasting image of the party to its identifiers and activists alike. The political ethos of the modern Democratic party, in other words, should have its roots in the experiences of those groups who were the main victims of the Great Depression and who came together to form Roosevelt's Democratic coalition. [Therefore] what unites the diverse ideological factions of the Democratic party is their belief that their party represents less privileged groups like the less-well-off, working people, and the common man and woman as opposed to the Republicans' core groups of business, the wealthy, and Wall Street. (Carmines & Berkman 1994, 210 & 216)

Given this situation, some scholars advise that to appeal to conservatives within their own party Democratic candidates should emphasize class-based issues and populist themes while portraying Republicans as economic elitists from privileged backgrounds. Conversely, Republicans should seek ways to make ideology the focal point of political decision-making so as to divide the Democratic coalition (Carmines & Berkman 1994; Carmines & Stanley 1990; and Carmines & Stimson 1989).

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<sup>12</sup> The term "negative cluster" is used to identify the host of symbolic value issues used by Bush and the Republicans to define Dukakis as a liberal.

Carmines and Berkman's analysis reflects Maddox and Lilie's assessment of the economic and ideological cleavages present within the modern Democratic party--cleavages that were successfully exploited by Edward J. King in his 1978 attempt to oust Dukakis from the governor's office. Carmines and Berkman demonstrate that when conservative Democrats are compared to liberal and moderate Democrats and Republicans with respect to economic-based demographic characteristics such as education, income, and class status conservative Democrats are quite similar to their partisan counterparts and dissimilar to GOP partisans. Only on ideology and issues with distinct ideological appeal, such as social and cultural value issues, do conservative Democrats display similar predilections as Republicans. The polarization between economic and ideological identifications has become so pronounced that conservative Democrats can now be regarded as "persuadable" voters. The campaign that is successful at winning a majority of conservative Democrat support depends on what issues, economic or ideological, achieve saliency with this key electoral subgroup. For this reason former president Richard M. Nixon believed that if used properly "the Dukakis positions on [the ideological "negative cluster"] issues could prove to be neuralgic for Reagan Democrats" (Nixon 1988). Therefore, Bush's campaign operatives believed that the "negative cluster" issues would provide the strategic means to differentiate the vice president from Dukakis among this key electoral subgroup.

To test the saliency of the "negative cluster" issues the Bush campaign assembled a series of focus groups composed of moderate to conservative working and middle class Democrats who had previously voted for Ronald Reagan but had stated that they were supporting Dukakis in 1988. The most celebrated of these focus groups was held in late May in Paramus, New Jersey. Peering through a two-way mirror the Bush high command composed of pollster Robert Teeter, Lee Atwater, Roger Ailes, and Bush friend and confidant Nicholas Brady witnessed an extraordinary political about face:

When asked how they planned to vote in 1988, a majority answered "Dukakis," even though most were dimly aware of his background. . . . Because these were representative target voters whom Bush had to win, the moderator began probing for issues that would bring them to Bush. Each thrust was parried until the moderator asked, "What if I told you that Dukakis vetoed a bill requiring schoolchildren to say the Pledge of Allegiance? Or that he was against the death penalty? Or that he gave weekend furloughs to first-degree murderers?" One exclaimed, "He's a liberal!" Another retorted, "If those are really his positions, I'd have a hard time supporting him." (White 1989, 153)

Following the conclusion of the session the participants were polled again regarding their 1988 presidential preference. In one group 40% changed their support from Dukakis to Bush. In another, 60% switched to Bush. When averaged together, Dukakis' support level dropped by 50%, a staggering fall-off given that it usually takes repeated exposure to negative information for voters to abandon even weakly held preferences (Taylor 1990, 203). In response, a delighted Roger Ailes exclaimed, "That little computer heart from Massachusetts isn't going to know what hit him" (Morrison 1988, 223). Atwater commented, "After those sessions, I knew we had the wherewithal to win. I realized right then and there that the sky was the limit on Dukakis' negatives" (Taylor 1990, 203). When shown a video tape of the Paramus interviews the vice president reportedly remarked, "They don't know this guy's record" (White 1989, 154). Thus was born the strategy to use the "negative cluster" issues framed in the context of widely shared social and cultural values as a mechanism to elicit negative predispositions associated with the label "liberal."

### The Psychology of the Republican Strategy

The success of the Bush strategy relies on what psychologists have identified as the ability to influence individuals' cognitive structures and processes that in turn influences the complexity level of their political reasoning. Psychologists refer to these influence-susceptible cognitive structures as *schemas*. Schemas organize both memory

and cognition into specific thematic structures. When an individual obtains new information, specific cognitive schemas filter, select, encode, and integrate it into new or existing cognitive structures (Milburn 1991, 73).

Four different types of schemas have been identified and developed: person, self, role, and event (Fiske & Taylor 1991). The category appropriate for discussion concerning the 1988 Bush campaign is the person schema. Person schemas contain knowledge and beliefs about typical people, their characteristics, and their intentions. The decision by the Bush campaign and its surrogates to "educate" voters on Governor Dukakis' veto of a bill requiring school children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, the Massachusetts prison furlough program and Willie Horton, and the Democratic nominee's public record and positions on the death penalty, taxes, mandatory sentencing, and national defense issues provided the necessary stimuli for voters, particularly ideological conservatives, to associate Dukakis with their pre-existing cognitive structures concerning the label "liberal."

The ability to influence individuals' schemas or cognitive structures of candidates is often done in the context of "priming" and "framing." To engage in the act of influencing a person's cognitive structure or schema is to engage in the act of priming. To prime is to instruct or prepare someone or something beforehand. In the psychological context, to prime someone would require the "presentation of an attitude object(s) toward which the individual processes a strong evaluative association that would automatically activate that evaluation" (Fazio 1989, 157). In the 1988 campaign the "negative cluster" issues served as attitude objects which when processed activated individual evaluations associated with the label "liberal."

"Activating an accessible construct through priming should increase its impact over other attitudes, judgments, and behaviors" (Sears 1993, 138). The available literature concerning the 1988 presidential campaign suggests that Bush and his strategists were



quite successful at using priming to associate Dukakis, first and foremost in the minds of many voters, with the label "liberal."

The act of priming is often done through what is referred to as framing-- packaging ideas so that within each idea is embedded a dominant frame or viewpoint which acts as a central organizing concept or story line implying a particular policy alternative (Sears 1993, 128) According to David O. Sears:

The frame is displayed in "signature elements" that invoke the whole package through condensing symbols. Which frame dominates in the communications media may change overtime as the political battle goes on. The persuasive success of any given frame depends on the "cultural resonances" or larger cultural themes it invokes. All this can be put in the language of symbolic politics. each frame presents a different symbolic meaning of the attitude object, including different symbolic elements, and its relative success depends on the symbolic predispositions it evokes. (Sears 1993, 128)

Clearly the "signature elements" of George Bush's 1988 campaign which helped to frame the perception that Dukakis was a liberal were the "negative cluster" issues. But what is important to note is that Bush's strategy was successful only because of the framing of the term "liberal" itself which presaged the 1988 campaign.

## HYPOTHESES, DATA SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY

### The Hypotheses

The practical elements of the 1988 Republican presidential general election strategy are theoretically based on the tenets posited by the theory of symbolic politics and schema theory. Specifically, George Bush employed issues with distinct symbolic meaning (the "negative cluster") to evoke affective predispositions based on shared values inherent to the American political culture.

In social-psychological terms, voters' shared value predispositions were activated by Republican efforts to influence individuals' cognitive knowledge structures relating to their person schemas of Michael Dukakis and their attribute structures of both candidates. To influence voters' person schemas of Dukakis, the Bush campaign and its surrogates "educated" voters on Governor Dukakis' veto of a bill requiring school children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, the Massachusetts prison furlough program and Willie Horton, and the Democratic nominee's record and public positions on the death penalty, taxes, mandatory sentencing, and national defense issues. To influence voters' candidate attribute structures Bush often publicly contrasted his positions on the "negative cluster" issues with those of Dukakis.

The purpose of the Republican's education exercise was to frame the "negative cluster" issues in a manner where voters would infer that Dukakis did not subscribe to shared American political and cultural values and as such could be classified as a liberal. By framing the symbolic "negative cluster" issues to stimulate affective predispositions associated with shared American values, the Bush campaign provided the necessary

stimuli for voters, particularly ideological conservatives, to associate Dukakis with their pre-existing cognitive knowledge structures concerning the label "liberal." Therefore, the symbolic "negative cluster" issues served as attitude objects which, when processed, activated individual evaluations (ideological schemas) associated with the label "liberal."

David O. Sears, in his discussion of priming and framing, states that "the frame is displayed in 'signature elements' that invoke the whole package through condensing symbols" (Sears 1993, 128). Clearly the "signature elements" of George Bush's 1988 campaign which helped to frame the perception that Dukakis was a liberal were the symbolic "negative cluster" issues. But it is important to note that Bush's strategy was predicated on the framing of the term "liberal" itself which presaged the 1988 campaign. "Which frame dominates in the communication media may change overtime as the political battle goes on" (Sears 1993, 128). George Bush was able to use the symbolic "negative cluster" issues to stimulate negative value-based predispositions associated with the label "liberal" because voters' understanding of the meaning of the term had undergone a major transformation during the 20 years before George Bush and Michael Dukakis met on the political battlefield.

The purpose of the current research is to use quantitative techniques to examine and measure the impact of symbolic value issues on voting behavior. Quantitative evidence supporting the theoretical framework of this analysis as it relates to the practical strategy employed by the Republican general election campaign will be gathered to test the following hypotheses:

### The Primary Hypotheses

The inquiry seeks to answer two questions. First, did the Republican strategy of using the symbolic "negative cluster" value issues in the 1988 presidential general election campaign succeed in creating a perception among the electorate that Michael Dukakis was

too liberal? Second, were the symbolic "negative cluster" value issues employed by the Bush campaign significant in influencing vote choice in 1988?

The first hypothesis to be tested is as follows:

*H<sub>1</sub>: During the course of the general election campaign the strength of association between vote choice and perceptions that Michael S. Dukakis was too liberal increased among the electorate.*

The second hypothesis to be tested is as follows:

*H<sub>2</sub>: The symbolic "negative cluster" value issues used by the Bush campaign to frame Michael S. Dukakis as a liberal were significant factors influencing vote choice against the Democratic presidential nominee.*

### The Subsidiary Hypotheses

Other factors may have influenced vote choice. Two issues in particular, the economy and experience, deserve attention as both scholars and political experts claim each had an impact on the election results.

Paul Abramson et al. claim that voters used assessments of past performance to make comparative judgments on how each candidate, Bush and Dukakis, would conduct themselves as president (Abramson et al. 1990). Basing their conclusions on the theory of retrospective voting, they argue in their study of the 1988 election that "Bush won in large part because Reagan was seen as having performed well--and people thought Bush would stay the course (Abramson et al. 1990, 195). Retrospective voting, according to V. O. Key, Jr., is a process in which voters come to electoral decisions based on evaluations of past incumbent performance (Key 1964, 1966). Key argues that when citizens cast their ballots they engage in an act of reward or punishment based on their perceptions of changes in their own and the nation's welfare.

However, Key's concept of retrospective voting seems inadequate to explain the type of performance evaluations Abramson et al. claim took place among the electorate in

1988. Key's understanding of retrospective voting only accounts for voters evaluating the past performance of the incumbent, not the expected future performance. Anthony Downs and Morris Fiorina offer a different perspective that accounts for Abramson's contention that voters engaged in comparative judgments of how Bush and Dukakis would act as president. Along with evaluations of past performance, prospective assessments of future performance are included in Downs' and Fiorina's understanding of retrospective voting. Downs and Fiorina contend that it is also important to assess how the evaluation of past performance compares to the alternative offered by the opposition in estimating future performance. In this way retrospective voters evaluate not only what has been done, but what might be done in the future (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981).

A wealth of scholarly research has been devoted to analyzing economic effects on voting behavior (Powell & Whitten 1993; MacKuen, Erikson, & Stimson 1992; Sigelman, Sigelman, & Bullock 1991; Jacobson 1990; Erikson 1989; Kinder, Adams, & Gronke 1989; Abramowitz, Lanoue, & Ramesh 1988; Lewis-Beck 1988; Markus 1988; Radcliff 1988; Feldman 1982, 1985; Kiewiet 1983; Mackuen 1983; Fiorina 1981; Lau & Sears 1981; Tufte 1978; Key 1964, 1966). Scholars have asserted that economic considerations figure prominently in an individual's retrospective assessments. Economic issues, more than any others, have received attention as retrospective issues (Abramson et al. 1990, 186). Morris Fiorina acknowledges the importance of retrospective economic assessments to the electoral fortunes of political candidates:

A familiar special case of retrospective voting is the widespread belief that members of the incumbent party enjoy electoral success during periods of economic improvement and, correspondingly, suffer electoral losses during periods of economic decline. (Fiorina 1981, 25)

Abramson et al. argue that voter assessments of prevailing economic conditions played a major role in the outcome of the 1988 election. They conclude that voters thought Reagan performed well on economic matters and thus rewarded his vice president with the presidency in the belief that Bush would continue the economic prosperity

achieved during the preceding eight years. If Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde are correct, the robust strength of the U.S. economy both preceding and during the 1988 election cycle should have benefited the candidate of the incumbent party, Republican George Bush. To ascertain the effects of the economy on voting behavior the research will attempt to determine if the economy was a significant factor that influenced vote choice. Therefore, the third hypothesis to be tested is as follows:

*H<sub>3</sub>: The economy was a significant factor influencing voters to choose George Bush.*

In addition to the economy, candidate experience may have been a salient voting issue. The Bush campaign placed great emphasis on the vice president's experience, particularly as it related to foreign affairs. Bush's positive paid media advertising underscored the vice president's impressive résumé and years of service in a variety of domestic and international positions. Several commercials highlighted Bush's career and showcased the vice president with a host of prominent international figures including Soviet leader Gorbachev, British Prime Minister Thatcher, and Polish Solidarity Union leader Lech Walesa. A commercial tag line summarized the campaign's experience theme: "The more you learn how George Bush came this far, the more you realize that perhaps no one this century is better prepared to be President of the United States."<sup>1</sup>

However, the Republican campaign also used the vice president's perceived advantage in another fashion. They asked voters to make an assessment of how Bush and Dukakis would perform their duties as chief executive based on comparing the two candidate's past national political and governmental experience. "Experienced leadership for America's future," the visual tag line for many Bush commercials, invited voters to make assessments of future performance based on comparing past performance and

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<sup>1</sup> The quote was used in the Bush commercials entitled "Oath of Office", "Family/Children", and "Youngest Pilot."

probable performance, a schema similar to the form of retrospective assessment Abramson et al. claim underscored voter decisions concerning evaluations of the candidates with respect to the economy.

Sidney Blumenthal claims that "George Bush won the presidency by arousing fear about the future," suggesting that on matters of presidential responsibility, particularly in foreign policy, the vice president framed the choice as between an expert with an acknowledged record of past achievement and an unqualified and unprepared novice (Blumenthal 1990, 319).

The differences between the two candidates were more pronounced with respect to foreign rather than domestic policy experience. Bush's stature, reputation, and résumé in the foreign arena stood in stark contrast to Governor Dukakis' lack of familiarity with international matters. To capitalize on this distinguishing feature, the Republicans focused their efforts on raising public awareness of differences between Bush's and Dukakis' experience in foreign affairs. To emphasize that the vice president was the better choice to handle such matters, the Bush campaign tied Dukakis' lack of foreign policy expertise to softness on national defense issues. Framed as a "risk America can't afford to take," the Bush campaign used the now famous "Tank-ride" commercial to exploit their candidate's experience in foreign affairs by implying that the Democratic nominee's positions on national defense issues demonstrated his naiveté and unsuitability to handle American foreign policy.

Therefore, to ascertain if Bush's emphasis on experience was a significant factor in influencing voters to choose him instead of his Democratic opponent the fourth hypothesis to be tested is as follows:

*H<sub>4</sub>: Experience was a significant factor influencing voters to choose George Bush.*

## Data Sources and Methodology

### The Primary Hypotheses

To test the primary hypotheses data from both *ABC News Washington Post* and *CBS News New York Times* cross-national surveys conducted periodically throughout the 1988 general election cycle will be evaluated. Data from four *ABC News Washington Post* surveys are used with the first having been completed in July, the second in August during the Republican National Convention, the third in September and October, and the fourth an exit poll survey conducted on election day, Tuesday November 8th.<sup>2</sup> Data from eight *CBS News New York Times* surveys are used with the first having been completed in May and the final survey an election day exit poll.<sup>3</sup>

Two methodological approaches are used to conduct the research. To test the first primary hypothesis which attempts to measure the extent that perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal affected vote choice, an interrupted time series will be developed composed of Kendall's tau-b statistics and ridit scores. The tau-b statistic is used to test the strength of association between electoral choice and voters' perceptions of Michael Dukakis as too liberal. Ridit scores test the probability that a Bush supporter, when compared to a Dukakis supporter, thought that Dukakis was too liberal. To generate the tau-b statistics and the ridit scores data from the *ABC News Washington Post* surveys are used.

In examining the relationship between the electorate's perceptions of Michael Dukakis' views and their vote choice, it is useful to identify important events which

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<sup>2</sup> The July survey had a sample size of 1,539; the August survey had a sample size of 1,396; the September and October survey had a sample size of 16,898; and the November 8th election day exit poll had a sample size of 95,167.

<sup>3</sup> 1988 *CBS News/New York Times* surveys used in this research include: May 9-12, sample size 1,382; September 8-11, sample size 1,606; September 21-23, sample size 1,195; September 25, sample size 1,195; October 1-3, sample size 1,530; October 5, sample size 1,530; November 2-4, sample size 1,977; and November 8th election day exit poll, sample size 11,645.



occurred during the general election campaign that may have influenced how voters perceived Dukakis. Therefore, a chronological summary of the political environment around the time each survey was conducted will be provided in conjunction with reporting the appropriate tau-b statistics and ridit score results.

It can be argued that the 1988 general election campaign began once it was clear who would be the major party candidates. By June it was apparent that Bush and Dukakis would be competing in the November finale. Therefore, the July survey serves as a pre-test and the September/October survey a post-test since the general election cycle began and Bush's value-based strategy was implemented within the confines of this time frame.

The August survey is particularly important because of the emphasis the media places on presidential nomination acceptance speeches and the actual tenor of Bush's address itself. With national media attention focused on the acceptance address the event becomes a forum for the electorate to get a sense of the candidates. The acceptance address is the first opportunity a presidential candidate has to speak to the nation as the official nominee of his or her party. The address allows the candidate the opportunity to define him or herself to the nation as well as a chance to define the opponent. In addition, the speech permits the nominee to preview which issues will be emphasized in the general election contest. For the purposes of this research, the significance of the event itself and Bush's decision to delineate his positions with those of his opponent on the symbolic "negative cluster" value issues provides an opportunity to assess how the electorate as a whole, its partisan and gender subclassifications, and Democrats who had voted for Reagan reacted to the speech, and media coverage and commentary of it, in terms of their perceptions of Michael Dukakis.

In addition, to confirm or refute the contention that the Bush campaign successfully defined Dukakis as a liberal, data from the *CBS News New York Times* surveys will be used to show the percentage of voters who perceived Dukakis to be a liberal and how that perception changed as a percentage of the electorate across time.

To test the second primary hypothesis data from the *ABC News Washington Post* election day exit poll survey is used. The research will employ probit to test the significance of the symbolic "negative cluster" value issues on vote choice. The model is developed from a survey question that asked respondents to choose from a predetermined list of items those issues that had an influencing effect on their presidential vote choice.<sup>4</sup>

The probit technique will be used on the following multivariate regression model to test the significance of the 20 issues from which respondents could select that were important in making their presidential vote choice:

$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \dots \beta_i x_i$  where  $Y$  = vote choice,  $x_1$  = abortion,  $x_2$  = the death penalty,  $x_3$  = the Pledge of Allegiance issue,  $x_4$  = the ACLU,  $x_5$  = prison furloughs,  $x_6$  = the Dukakis Bush presidential debates,  $x_7$  = the Bentsen Quayle vice presidential debate,  $x_8$  = party affiliation,  $x_9$  = presidential candidate's personality,  $x_{10}$  = college costs,  $x_{11}$  = health care,  $x_{12}$  = the environment,  $x_{13}$  = drugs,  $x_{14}$  = education,  $x_{15}$  = the Iran Contra scandal,  $x_{16}$  = social security,  $x_{17}$  = capital gains tax,  $x_{18}$  = foreign competition,  $x_{19}$  = Bush's choice of Dan Quayle for vice president, and  $x_{20}$  = Dukakis' choice of Lloyd Bentsen for vice president.

In this model the variables  $x_1$  through  $x_5$  correspond to the social and cultural value-based symbolic "negative cluster" issues.<sup>5</sup>

The first primary hypothesis will be tested for the electorate in general, its partisan subgroups, gender, region, and the Republican's target audience, Democrats who voted for Ronald Reagan.<sup>6</sup> The analyses of Reagan Democrats will be conducted controlling for income, education, and class. The gender-based analyses will be conducted controlling for race.<sup>7</sup> In addition to those categories the second hypothesis will be also tested for specific subnational electorates, principally California, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey,

<sup>4</sup> The survey question considered in the probit analyses is reproduced in the appendix.

<sup>5</sup> The survey question used in the research had responses corresponding to only five of the "negative cluster" issues used by Bush: The Pledge of Allegiance, abortion, the death penalty, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and prison furloughs.

<sup>6</sup> Reagan Democrats are defined to be those Democrats who voted for Ronald Reagan in the 1984 election.

<sup>7</sup> The sample sizes of the *ABC News Washington Post* and *CBS News New York Times* polls used in the analyses measuring changes in voter perceptions of Michael Dukakis are insufficient to permit

Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. These eight states are chosen for analysis because each has a large number of electoral votes or figured prominently in both the Bush and Dukakis strategies to achieve an electoral vote majority.

### The Subsidiary Hypotheses

The model developed from the survey question and its responses included in the *ABC News Washington Post* election day exit poll suffers in one respect. Four potentially significant variables, two of which are from the symbolic "negative cluster" value issues category, are absent from the model. The question analyzed does not include responses for four issues: experience, national defense, taxes, and the economy. Each of these issues may have had an effect on vote choice. To test the subsidiary hypotheses and assess the extent to which taxes and national defense influenced vote choice, a new model will be constructed and analyzed using data from the *CBS News New York Times* election day exit poll survey. The model will include eighteen variable responses from a combination of two survey questions in which respondents could select those issues or factors which mattered most in deciding their presidential vote.<sup>8</sup> The probit technique is again used to test variable significance in the following multivariate regression model:

$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \dots \beta_i x_i$  where  $Y$  = vote choice.  $X_1$  = crime.  $X_2$  = taxes.  $X_3$  = abortion.  $X_4$  = Dukakis' liberal views.  $X_5$  = patriotic values.  $X_6$  = defense issues.  $X_7$  = relations with the Soviet Union.  $X_8$  = helping the Middle Class.  $X_9$  = the environment.  $X_{10}$  = economic prosperity and jobs.  $X_{11}$  = The budget deficit.  $X_{12}$  = the vice presidential candidates.  $X_{13}$  = political party.  $X_{14}$  = helping the poor.  $X_{15}$  = likeability.  $X_{16}$  = Jesse Jackson's role.  $X_{17}$  = the presidential debates.  $X_{18}$  = experience

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statistically significant results controlling for black men and black women. However, the sample sizes of the exit poll surveys used in the probit analyses are sufficient to include control categories for black men and black women.

<sup>8</sup> The survey questions considered in the probit analyses are reproduced in the appendix.

In this model variables  $x_1$  through  $x_6$  correspond to the social and cultural value-based symbolic "negative cluster" issues. The death penalty and the prison furlough issues are reflected in the crime variable and the Pledge of Allegiance issue is represented by the patriotic values variable. This model will not only test the significance of the economy, experience, taxes, and national defense on vote choice but will provide additional statistical evidence to support or refute the results of the probit tests conducted for the model testing the second primary hypothesis.

The subsidiary hypotheses will be tested for the electorate in general, its partisan subgroups, gender controlling for race, region, Reagan Democrats controlling for income and education, and among voters residing in the electorally strategic states of California, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas..

### The Problem of Multicollinearity

When quantitatively analyzing social science data it is important to be aware of the potential problems resulting from a condition known as multicollinearity. As Michael Lewis-Beck observes, "With nonexperimental social science data, the independent variables are virtually always intercorrelated, that is, multicollinear. When this condition becomes extreme, serious estimation problems arise" (Lewis-Beck 1980, 58). A procedure outlined by Lewis-Beck was employed to determine if multicollinearity posed a problem in the current research. To ascertain the effects, if any, of multicollinearity on the probit results the bivariate Pearson correlations among the independent variables were examined. The correlations for each of the *ABC News/Washington Post* and *CBS News New York Times* models were analyzed. In those instances where the correlations were greater than the model coefficient of multiple determination an ordinary least squares regression was performed. Each independent variable whose bivariate correlation was greater than the model  $R^2$  was regressed as the dependent variable on the other

independent variables. In no instance did the resulting  $R^2$  significantly approach unity at 1.0 (Lewis-Beck 1980, 58-62). Therefore, it can be assumed that multicollinearity does not significantly impact the validity of the partial slope estimates of the models analyzed in the present research. The results of this analysis are included in the appendix.

### Can Voters Accurately Report the Reasons for Their Behavior? The Controversy Concerning Voluntary Recall Measures

The validity of the methodology employed in the current research relies on the assumption that voters, when surveyed, can accurately recall the motives for their electoral behavior. However, universal consensus is absent among researchers, particularly in the field of social psychology, concerning the validity of recall measures as accurate representations of factors that determine voluntary individual actions:

Although it seems relatively straightforward to ask why a voluntary action was undertaken, some psychologists warn that we must treat retrospective reconstructions of reasons or motivations with caution. They argue that people may not be able to identify the factors that influenced them. (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995, 105-106)

The argument that people may not accurately recall the motives for their behavior was initially advanced by Richard Nisbett and Timothy DeCamp Wilson. In their influential work entitled, *"Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes,"* Nisbett and Wilson review evidence which suggests that when considering individual's thought patterns there may be minimal direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Individuals are sometimes (1) unaware of the existence of a stimulus that was significant in influencing a response, (2) unaware of the existence of a response, and (3) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. When reporting on their cognitive processes, Nisbett and Wilson argue, individuals do not engage in true introspection. Their reports are based on "a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response"

(Nisbett & Wilson 1977, 231). Nisbett and Wilson's argument suggests that people may accurately report the motives for their responses despite being unable to observe directly their mental cognition. Accurate verbal reports will occur, they claim, only when influential stimuli are; (1) available and (2) plausible causes of the response, and when (3) few or no plausible but non-influential factors are available" (Nisbett & Wilson 1977, 253).

Nisbett and Wilson's argument that people do not have access to cognitive processes that cause behavior has generated a high degree of controversy among social psychology scholars. Analysis and research conducted by other students of mental processes challenge the arguments advanced by Nisbett and Wilson (Smith & Miller 1978; White 1980; Ericsson & Simon 1980; Sabini & Silver 1981; Wright & Rip 1981; Kraut & Lewis 1982; Gavanski & Hoffman 1987).

Eliot Smith and Frederick Miller question the findings of Nisbett and Wilson criticizing their research on theoretical and methodological grounds. Smith and Miller argue that Nisbett and Wilson state their argument in a nonfalsifiable fashion. "Nisbett and Wilson regard both correct and incorrect reports as illustrating their position. This means that their hypothesis cannot be falsified simply by demonstrating that there are occasions when peoples' verbal self-reports on their mental processes are correct" (Smith & Miller 1978, 356).

Smith and Miller also criticize Nisbett and Wilson for defining "causality" in a fashion that denies subjects under study access to information. Smith and Miller observe that Nisbett and Wilson's claim that subjects generally did not report that their responses to various experimental tests using word pairings were influenced by memorizational tasks implicitly employs "an impossible criterion for introspective awareness: that subjects be aware of what we systematically and effectively hide from them by our experimental designs" (Smith & Miller 1978, 356). In essence, the word *cause* could have different meanings to an experimenter and a subject under evaluation. "Subjects may not

understand the experimenter's questions in the sense that the experimenter intended them and so may give unexpected answers" (Smith & Miller 1978, 359).

In addition to criticizing Nisbett and Wilson with regard to causality Smith and Miller argue that additional flaws in their analysis include; (1) the lack of an adequate description of the mental processes on which subjects cannot report and (2) inadequate statistical tests more appropriate for testing hypotheses at the group rather than the individual level. Reanalyzing data from a study conducted by Nisbett and his associates Smith and Miller, using tests appropriate for individual-level analysis, report that "there is substantial and certainly significant evidence for introspective self-awareness" on the part of the individuals participating in the study. Smith and Miller conclude that while Nisbett and Wilson's research is "important and stimulating . . . we view their argument for the inaccessibility of mental process as sound in its application to some situations, but their claim that access is almost never possible is overstated" (Smith & Miller 1978, 361).

Other scholars embrace Smith and Miller's conclusions (White 1980; Wright & Rip 1981; Kraut & Lewis 1982; Gavanski & Hoffman 1987). Each conducted experiments designed to test the ability of subjects to retrieve valid measures of prior judgments of preference. While their experiments did not refute Nisbett and Wilson's original hypothesis, they did find instances where subjects accurately recalled reasons for their judgments and preferences suggesting that some motives may be more accessible in memory than are others. As Kraut and Lewis suggest, "We have shown that people have a moderate amount of knowledge about the factors influencing their judgments of other people. Our data and the parallel research by White (1980) renders highly implausible the null hypothesis that people have no introspective awareness about their higher order cognitive processes" (Kraut & Lewis 1982, 459). Wright and Rip caution that it would be irresponsible to conclusively determine that people do not have access to cognitive processes that cause behavior because the sophistication of available research methodology is limited. "Within the limits of the simplistic designs and measures that are

available, the current results call for moderation of the sweeping conclusion of no awareness or retrieval abilities reached by Nisbett and Wilson" (Wright & Rip 1981, 613).

Even though evidence exists which suggests that people do have access to cognitive processes which cause behavior, it is important to recognize that when discussing how people decide, particularly with regard to political issues or candidates, that certain external influences or biases may inject themselves into individuals' decision-making processes. As Smith and Miller note:

Verbal self-report has many shortcomings as an index of access to mental process. A failure of verbal self-report need not indicate a lack of introspective access. Verbal responses are subject to various outside influences, such as social desirability, evaluation apprehension, and demand characteristics. (Smith & Miller 1978, 359)

In politics, racial biases have often been cited as influencing people's decision-making processes and thus affecting their vote choices. The 1989 Virginia gubernatorial race provides the perfect example. Afro-American Lieutenant Governor L. Douglas Wilder was selected as the Democratic candidate. If successful in the general election, Wilder would become the first black person elected governor of an American state. On election day, November 7th, exit polls conducted by Mason-Dixon Opinion Research reported Wilder winning by 10 percentage points over his Republican opponent, Marshall Coleman. However, when the ballots were tallied Wilder defeated Coleman by a meager 6,741 vote margin out of a record 1,787,131 cast; the closest election in Virginia's history. Wilder's plurality equated to fewer than three votes per precinct (Edds 1990, 237).<sup>9</sup>

The closeness of the election has been attributable to white Democrats defecting from Wilder. The issue of race has been identified as the reason for the huge discrepancy between the exit poll figures and the actual election results:

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<sup>9</sup> Margaret Edds' book, *Claiming the Dream*, provides the most complete and comprehensive discussion and qualitative analysis of the 1989 Virginia gubernatorial election.



[A] factor that might have tipped the polls in Wilder's favor is the widely recognized difficulty in getting honest answers to racially sensitive questions when the race of the interviewer and the respondent differ. This is less a problem, poll takers say, when blacks are being questioned by whites. But there is a decided difference in the way whites respond to a white questioner and a black one on matters involving race. Apparently, many whites supply answers they think the black interviewer wants to hear. (Edds 1990, 243)

A poll conducted by two University of Virginia professors during the general election campaign found whites less supportive of Wilder when interviewers were white than when the interviewers were black. In addition, pollsters say that some voters, particularly white Democrats, who did not intend to vote for Wilder on the basis of race may have lied to interviewers in both pre-election and exit polls. Brad Coker, president of Mason-Dixon Opinion Research, believed that such deception was the primary reason for the miscalculation in his exit poll (Edds 1990, 243). The circumstances surrounding the 1989 Virginia gubernatorial election suggest that a two minute exit poll survey may be inadequate to assess the ability of respondents to access cognitive processes which cause certain behavior, particularly if external influences, such as racial biases, are present.

Political science scholars often use recall measures in their research. The basis for much of their analyses uses data gathered from ANES and other survey-based studies which rely on respondents' abilities to recount motives for their own political behavior. However, in light of the controversy surrounding recall measures as accurate indicators of individuals' cognitive decision-making processes, it is important to note in research that employs such measures that a conclusive determination of their validity remains elusive. Comprehensive studies, such as the ANES surveys, are format extensive permitting the use of various probing techniques to help facilitate the elicitation of valid recall measure responses. Environmental circumstances associated with exit polls, such as time constraints and interviewer characteristics, may compromise the validity of recall measures by either not permitting a thorough probing of behavior motives or allowing personal

biases to influence respondents' decision-making processes. The ability to probe for deeper understanding of why an individual acted in a particular fashion is severely limited by the nature of the exit poll itself.

## LONGITUDINAL DATA ANALYSIS: MEASURING CHANGES IN VOTER PERCEPTIONS OF MICHAEL S. DUKAKIS

July 1988

The political environment. During the late spring and early summer when it became apparent that the general election contest would cast George Bush against Michael Dukakis the vice president began to weave into his public speeches references to those issues that the Republican researchers had found were successful in moving their targeted audiences away from Dukakis and toward Bush. The vice president's first pointed attack on Dukakis using the "negative cluster" issues that would later dominate the general election dialogue occurred during his address to the Texas Republican state convention held in Houston on June 9th. Prominent in Bush's speech was his first public reference concerning the Massachusetts prison furlough program. Criticizing Dukakis for being overly sympathetic to criminals, in favor of high taxes, and a "Harvard boutique liberal," the vice president commented, "His [Dukakis'] values are too often, in my judgment, out of the mainstream" (Black & Oliphant 1989, 223). Four days later in Louisville, Kentucky Bush first mentioned the name of Willie Horton in an address to the National Sheriffs' Association. In the speech the vice president again derided Dukakis as soft on crime. "Clint Eastwood's answer to crime is 'go ahead. Make my day,'" said Bush. "My opponent's answer is slightly different: 'Go ahead. Have a nice weekend'" (Black & Oliphant 1989, 225).

However, the lack of public attention focused on the general election and the Democrat's monopoly of the media during July resulting from the continued challenge by

TABLE 3

**THE ELECTORATE, PARTISAN CLASSIFICATIONS,  
GENDER/RACE, AND REGION**

**Strength of Association Between Vote Choice and Perceptions of  
Michael S. Dukakis as Too Liberal and the Probability that a Bush Supporter,  
When Compared to a Dukakis Supporter, Thought that Dukakis was Too Liberal.**

Month	July 88		August 88		Sept/Oct 88		Difference Sept/Oct-July	
Statistic <sup>a</sup>	$\tau_b$	rs	$\tau_b$	rs	$\tau_b$	rs	$\tau_b$	rs
All Voters	.529	.786	.651	.843	.714	.876	+.185	+.090
Democrats	.183	.627	.448	.805	.615	.874	+.432	+.247
Republicans	.412	.761	.581	.820	.450	.862	+.038	+.101
Independents	.527	.790	.665	.852	.591	.816	+.064	+.026
Reagan Democrats	.484	.758	.483	.764	.714	.874	+.230	+.116
Men	.494	.773	.630	.834	.660	.852	+.166	+.079
Women	.576	.804	.662	.847	.768	.888	+.192	+.084
White Men	.523	.787	.659	.849	.666	.855	+.143	+.068
White Women	.596	.814	.662	.846	.747	.888	+.151	+.074
Northeast <sup>b</sup>	.356	.695	.610	.825	.646	.845	+.290	+.150
South <sup>c</sup>	.653	.842	.658	.848	.748	.890	+.095	+.048
Midwest <sup>d</sup>	.461	.751	.686	.857	.673	.854	+.212	+.103
West <sup>e</sup>	.660	.857	.645	.840	.715	.878	+.055	+.021

*Note:* Question analyzed in the July, August, and September/October surveys: "Are Michael Dukakis' views too liberal for you, just about right, or too conservative for you?"

<sup>a</sup>  $\tau_b$  is the Kendall's tau-b statistic and rs is the ridit score. Tau-b is used instead of the gamma statistic to determine strength of association because it is more precise as it uses tied pairings in addition to both concordant and discordant pairs in its calculation. Please see the appendix for a more thorough discussion of ridit scores.

<sup>b</sup> *Northeastern states* include Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, & District of Columbia.

<sup>c</sup> *Southern states* include Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Texas, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, & Louisiana.

<sup>d</sup> *Midwestern states* include Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, & Oklahoma.

<sup>e</sup> *Western states* include Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, & Hawaii.


**TABLE 4**  
**REAGAN DEMOCRATS**

**Strength of Association Between Vote Choice and Perceptions of  
Michael S. Dukakis as Too Liberal and the Probability that a Bush Supporter,  
When Compared to a Dukakis Supporter, Thought that Dukakis was Too Liberal.**


Month	July 88		Sept/Oct 88		Difference Sept/Oct-July	
Statistic <sup>a</sup>	$\tau_b$	rs	$\tau_b$	rs	$\tau_b$	rs
Democrats who voted for Reagan	.484	.758	.714	.874	+.230	+.116
Working Class Democrats who voted for Reagan	.609	.860	.576	.810	-.033	-.050
Middle Class Democrats who voted for Reagan	.326	.682	.844	.930	+.518	+.248
Democrats who voted for Reagan less than \$30,000/year	.228	.615	.631	.836	+.403	+.221
Democrats who voted for Reagan greater than \$30,000/year	.702	.879	.785	.900	+.083	+.021
Democrats who voted for Reagan high school graduates or less	.521	.751	.640	.845	+.119	+.094
Democrats who voted for Reagan some college education or more	.464	.758	.820	.910	+.356	+.152

*Note:* Question analyzed in the July, August, and September/October surveys: "Are Michael Dukakis' views too liberal for you, just about right, or too conservative for you?"

<sup>a</sup>  $\tau_b$  is the Kendall's tau-b statistic and rs is the ridit score. Tau-b is used instead of the gamma statistic to determine strength of association because it is more precise as it uses tied pairings in addition to both concordant and discordant pairs in its calculation. Please see appendix for a more thorough discussion of ridit scores.



**FIGURE 1/The Electorate and Its Partisan Classifications**



**FIGURE 2/The Electorate and Its Partisan Classifications**




FIGURE 3/Gender and Race




FIGURE 4/Gender and Race




FIGURE 5/Region






FIGURE 6/Region





**FIGURE 7/Classifications of Reagan Democrats**



**FIGURE 8/Classifications of Reagan Democrats**

Jesse Jackson for the nomination and the coverage accorded the Democratic National Convention left George Bush's references to tax hikes, prison furloughs, the death penalty, and the Pledge of Allegiance issues largely unreported and thus unheard by the electorate. Following what many political observers believed to be a highly successful nomination acceptance speech on July 21st, Dukakis surged to a 17 point lead over Bush in most post-convention polls.

The electorate and its partisan classifications. In the aggregate, the Kendall's tau-b statistic indicates that at the conclusion of the primary season and the outset of the general election campaign there was a moderate degree of association (.529) between vote choice and voters' perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal (table 3 and figure 1). However, this statistic reflects the electorate as a whole which includes Republicans that would be predisposed by the nature of their partisanship to be more inclined to regard Dukakis as being too liberal. In addition, Independent voters exhibited a similarly moderate degree of association (.527) between their vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal. Among Republicans the association was somewhat weaker (.412). However, despite Bush's initial attempts at defining Dukakis as a liberal by invoking the "negative cluster" issues, the test indicates that in July there was a weak association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal among Democrats in the aggregate (.183). A plausible reason for the weak association among Democrats at this stage could be the result of media attention being focused on the nomination contest between Dukakis and his sole remaining primary opponent, Jesse Jackson. When Democrat voters compared Dukakis to the Afro-American minister, the Massachusetts governor certainly must have appeared more politically moderate, particularly in light of Dukakis' insistence during his convention address that "this election is not about ideology; it's about competence" (Maloney 1989, 136).

The ridit scores for this period reflect the tau-b statistical findings (table 3 and figure 2). In the electorate as a whole the probability that a Bush supporter thought that Dukakis was too liberal compared to a Dukakis supporter is .786. Like the tau-b statistic this association decreases among Democrats (.627). However, it increases for the subcategories of Republicans (.761), Independents (.790), and Democrats who voted for Reagan (.758).

Gender and race. Among men a moderate degree of association (.494) existed between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal (table 3 and figure 3). The association was stronger among women (.576). When controlling for race, the degree of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal were slightly higher among white men (.523) and white women (.596).

A similar relationship existed between the ridit score estimates (table 3 and figure 4). Among men and women the probability that a Bush supporter, when compared to a Dukakis supporter, thought that the Democratic nominee was too liberal was .773 and .804 respectively. When controlling for race the probabilities increased slightly to .787 among white men and .814 among white women.

Region. The strongest degree of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal were recorded in the South and West, .653 and .660 respectively (table 3 and figure 5). A moderately weak association existed for voters in the Northeast (.356) while voters residing in the Midwest exhibited a moderate degree of association (.461).

A similar pattern is reported for the ridit scores (table 3 and figure 6). The probability that a Bush supporter, when compared to a Dukakis supporter, thought that the Massachusetts governor was too liberal was highest in the South (.842) and West

(.857). The probability, though high, was less for voters in the Northeast (.695) and Midwest (.751) when compared to those in the South and West.

Reagan Democrats. Among Democrats who voted for Reagan a moderate degree of association (.484) existed between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal (table 4 and figures 1 & 7). Controlling for class, there was a greater degree of association among self-described working class Democrats who voted for Reagan (.609) than among self-described middle class Democrats who voted for Reagan (.326). When income is considered, Reagan Democrats who made \$30,000 a year or more were inclined to exhibit a higher degree of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal (.702) than Democrats who voted for Reagan who made less than \$30,000 a year (.228). Controlling for education, Reagan Democrats with a maximum of a high school diploma were found to have a moderate degree of association (.521) between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal. College educated Reagan Democrats also exhibited a moderate, though somewhat less, degree of association (.464).

The probability that a Bush supporter thought the Democratic nominee was too liberal compared to a Dukakis supporter among Reagan Democrats was .758 (table 4 and figures 2 & 8). The probability was greater among working class Democrats who voted for Reagan (.860), and Reagan Democrats with incomes greater than or equal to \$30,000 a year (.879), yet the same among Reagan Democrats with at least some college education (.758). The probability was less among middle class Democrats who voted for Reagan (.682), Democrats who voted for Reagan with incomes less than \$30,000 a year (.615), and Reagan Democrats with high school education levels or less (.751).

### August 1988

The political environment. Following his successful convention performance Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis retired to his home state and essentially adopted a self-imposed moratorium on national campaigning for the month opting instead to spend the greater part of August in western Massachusetts. While busying himself in the affairs of state, the Massachusetts governor allowed Bush and the Republicans to dominate the national political dialogue. The Republican National Convention met in New Orleans during the week of August 15th. And like the Democrats the previous month, the media accorded full attention to the party's activities. President Ronald Reagan delivered his valedictory address on August 15th, the evening the convention opened, with a resounding endorsement of Bush and then slipped quietly back to Washington to allow his vice president to dominate the convention's proceedings. On the evening of the 18th Bush delivered what would later be heralded as one of his most memorable speeches. Accepting the Republican nomination, the vice president clearly delineated his differences with Dukakis on a host of social and cultural value issues. Outlining his support for capital punishment, prayer in schools, recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools, mandatory sentences and his opposition to prison furloughs and tax increases Bush contrasted his positions with those of Dukakis. Challenging Dukakis on the ideological playing field, Bush submitted before the voters the argument that he, not Dukakis, was the protector of the values held by a majority of Americans. The Republican nominee painted a portrait of his opponent as a dangerous liberal who was out-of-touch with mainstream America and as such a political risk the nation could not afford. Post-convention polls gave Bush the lead for the first time in the campaign.

The electorate and its partisan classifications. Statistical analysis indicates that Bush's convention strategy was successful in influencing the electorate that Dukakis was a

liberal. For the electorate as a whole the tau-b statistic increased .122 to .651 indicating a stronger association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as being too liberal (table 3 and figure 1). Increases were also apparent among each of the electorate's partisan components. Among Republicans the increase was .169. Among Independents the increase was .138. However, the greatest increase in strength of association was with Democrats as a whole. Among all Democrats the tau-b statistic increased to .448, a .265 increase from the previous month. With Dukakis touring western Massachusetts ignoring Bush's ideological attacks and allowing the vice president to monopolize the attention of the national media it is not surprising that the findings indicate an increase in the strength of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal among the electorate as a whole and each of its partisan components.

Similar to the results recorded for July, the ridit scores mirror the tau-b statistics (table 3 and figure 2). In the aggregate the probability that a Bush supporter thought that Dukakis was too liberal compared to a Dukakis supporter increased to .843. The association among all Democrats also increased, but by a more significant margin (.178) to .805. Among Democrats who voted for Ronald Reagan the ridit score essentially remained the same as the score recorded for the previous month indicating no significant change in probability. Ridit scores increased for both Republicans and Independents to .820 and .852 respectively.

Gender and race. Among men in the aggregate, the tau-b statistic increased .136 to .630. Among women the strength of association experienced a more moderate increase (.086) resulting in a tau-b statistic of .662 (table 3 and figure 3). Controlling for race, the strength of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal increased by the same amount (.136) among white men to .659. Among white women the increase over the July tau-b statistic was .066 which translated into a tau-b statistic of .662.

Ridit scores also increased among all gender and race categories analyzed (table 3 and figure 4). Ridit scores among men and women increased .061 and .043 respectively to .834 and .847. Ridit scores also increased among white men (.062) and white women (.032) to .849 and .846 respectively.

Region. The greatest increase in the strength of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal occurred among voters in the Northeast (table 3 and figure 5). Among this subgroup the tau-b statistic increased .254 to .610 changing from a moderately weak to a moderately strong degree of association. The tau-b statistic also increased among Midwestern voters (.225) to .686. When compared to results recorded for July, the strength of association between vote choice and perceptions of the Democratic nominee as too liberal remained essentially unchanged in the South (.658) and West (.645).

Similar to the pattern observed for the tau-b statistic, the ridit scores increased among voters in the Northeast (.130) and Midwest (.106) to .825 and .857 respectively (table 3 and figure 6). The probability that a Bush supporter, when compared to a Dukakis supporter, thought the Governor of Massachusetts was too liberal remained essentially unchanged among Southern (.848) and Western (.840) voters.

Reagan Democrats. The strength of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as being too liberal among Democrats who supported Ronald Reagan remained static (table 3 and figure 1). No significant increase or decrease was found. Similarly, the probability that a Bush supporter thought Dukakis was too liberal compared to a Dukakis supporter remained relatively static only increasing .006 to .764 (table 3 and figure 2). Unfortunately, the August survey instrument did not include demographic categories for economic, income, or education classifications. Therefore it

was not possible to calculate Kendall's tau-b and ridit score statistics for these controlling factors.

### September and October 1988

The political environment. Enjoying the momentum gained from the convention, George Bush accelerated his offensive assault on his Democratic opponent. On Labor Day, the traditional date for the fall campaign kick-off, Bush, campaigning in California, railed Dukakis' record on crime shouting, "No more furloughs for people to rape, pillage, and plunder in the United States" (Black & Oliphant 1989, 225). To underscore the issues of patriotism and crime the Republicans staged media events with the vice president visiting flag factories and accepting the endorsements of various law enforcement officials and police unions.

In addition to staged events designed to generate free media exposure, the vice president's paid media campaign began in earnest. On September 13th the Bush campaign launched their television ad, "The Harbor," which questioned Dukakis' alleged competence by highlighting his environmental record with respect to the clean-up of the Boston bay area. The now famous "Revolving-door" spot criticizing the Massachusetts prison furlough program and Dukakis' record on crime began broadcast on October 3rd. The highly effective ad, featuring actors dressed as prisoners passing through a revolving prison door, ran through the general election in targeted media markets in strategic electoral states. Later, on October 19th, the Bush campaign introduced a spot designed to question Dukakis' commitment to a strong national defense. The ad featured a helmeted Dukakis riding in a tank while screen scrolling his support for a nuclear freeze and his opposition to many of the weapons systems supported by the Reagan/Bush administration.

The Dukakis campaign, despondent after witnessing their candidate squander a 17 point lead, was in disarray. The candidate refused to listen to advice urging him to



respond to Bush's attacks and instead concentrated on outlining programmatic specifics on policies he would implement as president. The Democratic nominee's paid media campaign was in shambles lacking both direction and message. In desperation, John Sasso, the Dukakis campaign manager deposed after exposing Senator Joe Biden as a plagiarist, was recalled from exile. However, by the time Sasso rejoined the Dukakis campaign a sufficient amount of irreparable damage had been done.

To have any chance of regaining the momentum Dukakis needed to outperform the vice president in their two televised debates. In their first debate, held on September 25th in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, Dukakis was generally given the edge. Dukakis clearly won on substance but Bush scored points on the Pledge of Allegiance issue and tied Dukakis to the liberal mantra by invoking the Democratic candidate's association with the ACLU. Dukakis' win was not regarded as a "knock-out" punch largely because among the two Bush was able to project himself as the more "likeable" candidate.

In the second debate held on October 13th in Los Angeles, California, Bush was the clear victor not so much because of what he said, but what his opponent did not say. Dukakis' failure to respond with emotional feeling to a question concerning the death penalty transcended any remarks Bush made for the remainder of the debate. An *NBC News Wall Street Journal* post debate poll gave Bush a 17 point lead over Dukakis.

Following the second debate, political pols and pundits were no longer handicapping who was going to win but speculating on the size of the Bush victory. However, the closing weeks of the campaign witnessed an unexpected metamorphosis by Dukakis. Finally responding to pleas to "get tough" with Bush the Democratic candidate railed Bush's attacks as "trash" saying, "this isn't a campaign about furloughs and flag factories; it's about America's future" (Maloney 1989, 151). Admitting that he was a liberal, Dukakis returned to his party's traditional populist message emphasizing that he and the Democrats were on the side of the middle-class while Bush and the Republicans were out-of-touch with the economic hardships faced by everyday Americans. His efforts

began to show a dividend. By the last week in October national polls showed that Dukakis had cut Bush's lead in half.

For his part, Bush continued to tar Dukakis with the "L-word" drawing parallels between himself and Dukakis on those issues which had, for the most part, dominated the campaign dialogue; prison furloughs, the death penalty, taxes, the ACLU, the Pledge of Allegiance, and national defense. During the final weeks of the general election campaign an independent expenditure committee, *Americans for Bush*, began to air the now infamous Willie Horton ad attacking Dukakis' record on crime. Whether or not it was the intent, the ad had the effect of heightening racial fears and prejudices among certain subgroups of the electorate. With Democrats and Afro-Americans charging racism, the Bush campaign moved quickly to distance themselves from the ad. However, Horton himself entered the campaign dialogue adding credibility to Republican charges that criminals in Massachusetts support Dukakis. On October 19th, in an interview with a Gannett News Service reporter writing for the *USA Today*, Horton, replying to a question asking which of the presidential candidates he would vote for if he could responded, "Obviously, I'm for Dukakis" (Black & Oliphant 1989, 225).

In spite of his momentum in the closing weeks of the campaign, Dukakis lost the general election taking 46% of the national vote compared to 54% for Bush. The popular vote translated into an electoral college wipe-out with Bush garnering 426 electors to Dukakis' 112.<sup>1</sup>

The electorate and its partisan classifications. The precipitous decline in the electoral fortunes of the Dukakis campaign reached its nadir in September and October. Immobilized by Bush's attacks that painted him as a dangerous, radical liberal and unable to resurrect his faltering campaign as a result of his mediocre debate performances the

<sup>1</sup> When the electoral college convened in December Dukakis actually received 111 votes. One West Virginia Democratic elector, Margaret Leach, cast her vote for Lloyd Bentsen for President and Michael S. Dukakis for Vice President.

association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal increased to .714 among the electorate as a whole (table 3 and figure 1). This increase is primarily the result of a significant increase in the strength of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal among Democrats. Between August and September/October the strength of positive association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal among Democrats increased .167 to .615. Using the July statistic as a benchmark, the increase in positive association over the four month period was .432. Among Republicans and Independents the strength of association declined from August to September/October.

The rdit scores again demonstrate that voters supporting George Bush were growing more likely to think that Dukakis was too liberal when compared to the feelings about the Massachusetts governor held by his supporters (table 3 and figure 2). In the aggregate, the probability that a Bush supporter thought that Dukakis was too liberal as compared to a Dukakis supporter increased slightly to .876. The September/October rdit score reflects a .090 overall increase when compared to the July score. Similar rdit scores were generated among the electoral subgroups analyzed. The probabilities among Democrats and Reagan Democrats increased to .874. Among Republicans the probability increased .042 to .862. However, among Independents the probability decreased .036 to .816.

Gender and race. The strength of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal increased to .660 among men and .768 among women (table 3 and figure 3). Compared to the July tau-b statistic the overall increase in the strength of association amounted to .166 among men and .192 among women. Similar increases were recorded among white men and white women. The tau-b statistic increased between July and September/October .143 among white men and .151 among white women. Among white men, the tau-b statistic increased to .666 and among white women to .747.

The probability that a Bush supporter, when compared to a Dukakis supporter, thought Dukakis was too liberal increased slightly among the four analyzed categories (table 3 and figure 4). Overall, the ridit scores increased between July and September/October .079, .084, .068, and .074 among men, women, white men, and white women respectively.

Region. With the exception of the Midwest, the September/October tau-b statistic, when compared to the August result, increased among voters in the Northeast, South, and West (table 3 and figure 5). Overall, between July and September/October each analyzed region of the nation recorded an increase in the strength of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal. The largest increases in the tau-b statistic occurred among voters in the Northeast (.290) and Midwest (.212). The overall increases in the South (.095) and West (.055) were not as significant.

Increases in the ridit score results mirrored the pattern reflected in the tau-b statistics (table 3 and figure 6). With the exception of the Midwest, ridit scores for the Northeast, South, and West showed an increase in September/October when compared to the scores recorded for August. Overall, the greatest increase in the probability that a Bush supporter, when compared to a Dukakis supporter, thought the Democratic presidential candidate was too liberal occurred among voters in the Northeast (.150) and the Midwest (.103). Comparing September/October and July ridit score results, increases of a lesser degree were recorded among voters in the South (.048) and West (.021).

Reagan Democrats. Between July and September/October the strength of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal increased among all the various categories of Reagan Democrats analyzed with the exception of self-described working class Reagan Democrats whose tau-b statistic remained relatively unchanged at .576 (table 4 and figures 1 & 7). In all probability the increase in strength of

association among the various categories of Reagan Democrats accounts for most of the increase associated with partisan Democrats as a whole. Among the umbrella category, Democrats who voted for Reagan, a .231 increase was measured between August and September/October. For the September/October period the strongest degree of association was found among middle class Reagan Democrats (.844). This subcategory also registered the greatest positive movement in strength of association. The tau-b statistic indicates that among middle class Reagan Democrats the strength of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal increased .518 between July and September/October. A large increase in the strength of association also occurred among Reagan Democrats with incomes less than \$30,000 a year (.403) and Reagan Democrats with some college education or greater (.356). Democrats who voted for Reagan with incomes equal to or over \$30,000 a year also exhibited a strong degree of association but the increase over the tau-b statistic recorded for July was only .083. Similarly, the increase in strength of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal among Reagan Democrats with a high school education or less was a modest .119.

Mirroring the tau-b results, the ridit score probabilities increased for all subcategories with the exception of those self-described working class Reagan Democrats whose probability decreased .050 between July and September/October (table 4 and figures 2 & 8). Among Democrats who voted for Reagan, the probability that a Bush supporter thought Dukakis was too liberal compared to a supporter of the Massachusetts governor increased to .874. This translated into an overall .116 increase between July and September/October. As with the tau-b statistic, the largest increases in probability during the July and September/October period were associated with middle class Reagan Democrats and Democrats who voted for Reagan with incomes less than \$30,000. Among the former group the probability increased .248 to .930. Among the latter the increase was .221 to .836. When education is controlled, increases of a lesser degree were

measured. For those Reagan Democrats with at least some college education the rdit score probability increased .152 to .910. Among Reagan Democrats with a high school education or less the increase was .094 to .845. A small increase in probability (.021) was measured for Reagan Democrats who earned \$30,000 a year or more.

### Discussion

The results of the current research indicate that the Bush campaign was highly effective in defining Dukakis as a liberal. The longitudinal analysis of the *ABC News Washington Post* surveys supplies evidence which supports the first hypothesis. During the course of the general election campaign perceptions that Michael S. Dukakis was too liberal increased among the electorate. During the four month period between July and October the strength of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal generally increased among the entire electorate, including all partisan, gender, race, and regional categories analyzed (table 3 and figures 1, 3, 5, & 7). The most significant increases occurred among the entire electorate (+.185), women (+.193), voters living in the Midwest (+.212), Democrats who had voted for Ronald Reagan (+.230), voters living in the Northeast (+.290), and Democrats (+.432). In fact, among Bush's target audience of Reagan Democrats each of the subgroups analyzed, with the exception of working class Reagan Democrats, demonstrated an increase in the strength of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal.

The effectiveness of the Bush strategy is further supported by the overall increase in the probability that a Bush supporter, when compared to a Dukakis supporter, thought that Dukakis was too liberal. Like the tau-b statistics, the rdit scores generally increased between July and October for each electoral category analyzed (table 3 and figures 2, 4, 6, & 8). The most significant increases were reported among Democrats (+.247), voters

living in the Northeast (+.150), Reagan Democrats (+.116), voters living in the Midwest (+.103), and Republicans (+.101). Mirroring the increasing trend associated with the tau-b statistics, among each subgroup of Reagan Democrats, with the exception of working class Reagan Democrats, the probability that a Bush supporter, when compared to a Dukakis supporter, thought the Democratic nominee was too liberal increased between July and October.

An analysis of the *CBS News New York Times* surveys conducted from May to November 1988 provides further evidence to indicate that Bush was successful in creating the perception among the electorate that Dukakis was a liberal. The longitudinal data compiled from the *CBS News New York Times* surveys indicate a consistent and positive trend in the growth of public perceptions that Michael Dukakis was a liberal (table 5 and figures 9, 11, & 13). Comparing the data from the final poll conducted between November 2-4 with the initial poll conducted May 9-12, each of the partisan, gender, racial, and regional groups analyzed recorded a net gain in the percentage of surveyed voters who thought Dukakis was a liberal.

Among those who thought the Massachusetts governor was a liberal, Bush consistently received a plurality of their votes (table 6 and figures 10, 12, & 14). The only exception was among self-described Democrats. However, the vice president's margin among the analyzed subgroups reached its zenith in mid to late September and then experienced a degree of erosion. The erosion in the vice president's margins recovered slightly in early October but continued to decline during the weeks immediately preceding the election. Only among two groups of voters who thought Dukakis was a liberal, Republicans and voters living in the Midwest, did the vice president's margin increase.

Despite a general positive growth trend in voters perceiving Dukakis to be a liberal the probable cause for the decline in the vice president's support among those who thought Dukakis was a liberal can be traced to a "fourth quarter" change in the Dukakis campaign strategy. For much of the general election campaign Bush and his "Dukakis is a liberal"

TABLE 5

**Percentage of Voters Who Thought Michael S. Dukakis Was a Liberal,  
May - November 1988**

SURVEY	MAY 9-12	SEPT 8-11	SEPT 21-23	SEPT 25	OCT 1-3	OCT 5	NOV 2-4	Difference Nov - May
ALL VOTERS	34%	39%	37%	49%	47%	50%	51%	+17%
DEMOCRATS	29%	26%	22%	36%	30%	35%	46%	+17%
REPUBLICANS	38%	53%	59%	55%	65%	69%	61%	+23%
INDEPENDENTS	28%	38%	35%	38%	46%	47%	54%	+26%
REAGAN DEMOCRATS	20%	28%	19%	28%	45%	58%	49%	+29%
MEN	37%	45%	44%	51%	51%	58%	56%	+19%
WOMEN	22%	34%	32%	34%	44%	45%	50%	+28%
WHITE MEN	39%	48%	46%	50%	53%	58%	60%	+21%
WHITE WOMEN	22%	37%	32%	35%	45%	46%	49%	+27%
NORTHEAST <sup>a</sup>	27%	42%	30%	34%	43%	47%	45%	+18%
SOUTH <sup>b</sup>	27%	38%	40%	40%	46%	51%	54%	+27%
MIDWEST <sup>c</sup>	23%	30%	39%	39%	41%	40%	63%	+40%
WEST <sup>d</sup>	29%	40%	41%	42%	49%	51%	65%	+36%

*Note:* Data from CBS News/New York Times surveys were used to calculate percentages. Question analyzed in each survey, "In politics do you think of Michael Dukakis as a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative?"

<sup>a</sup> Northeastern states include Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, & District of Columbia.

<sup>b</sup> Southern states include Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Texas, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, & Louisiana.

<sup>c</sup> Midwestern states include Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, & Oklahoma.

<sup>d</sup> Western states include Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, & Hawaii.



TABLE 6

**Presidential Candidate Choice Among Voters  
Who Thought Michael S. Dukakis Was a Liberal,  
May - November 1988**

<b>SURVEY</b>	<b>MAY 9-12</b>	<b>SEPT 8-11</b>	<b>SEPT 21-23</b>	<b>SEPT 25</b>	<b>OCT 1-3</b>	<b>OCT 5</b>	<b>NOV 2-4</b>	<b>Difference Nov - May</b>
<b>ALL VOTERS</b>								
BUSH	50%	70%	73%	88%	70%	66%	60%	
DUKAKIS	37%	24%	17%	10%	21%	23%	36%	
BUSH MARGIN	(13%)	(46%)	(56%)	(78%)	(49%)	(43%)	(24%)	+11%
<b>DEMOCRATS</b>								
BUSH	22%	19%	20%	28%	28%	28%	16%	
DUKAKIS	69%	71%	57%	69%	57%	57%	77%	
BUSH MARGIN	(-47%)	(-52%)	(-37%)	(-41%)	(-29%)	(-29%)	(-61%)	-14%
<b>REPUBLICANS</b>								
BUSH	72%	97%	95%	98%	94%	87%	95%	
DUKAKIS	16%	0%	2%	1%	3%	6%	3%	
BUSH MARGIN	(56%)	(97%)	(93%)	(97%)	(91%)	(81%)	(92%)	+36%
<b>INDEPENDENTS</b>								
BUSH	61%	67%	74%	79%	64%	64%	58%	
DUKAKIS	33%	25%	14%	15%	22%	26%	38%	
BUSH MARGIN	(28%)	(42%)	(60%)	(64%)	(42%)	(38%)	(20%)	-8%
<b>REAGAN DEMOCRATS</b>								
BUSH	56%	44%	60%	75%	60%	63%	46%	
DUKAKIS	44%	44%	10%	17%	20%	16%	37%	
BUSH MARGIN	(12%)	(0%)	(50%)	(58%)	(40%)	(47%)	(9%)	-3%
<b>MEN</b>								
BUSH	61%	73%	82%	90%	73%	68%	69%	
DUKAKIS	31%	23%	14%	9%	18%	22%	29%	
BUSH MARGIN	(30%)	(50%)	(68%)	(81%)	(55%)	(46%)	(40%)	+10%
<b>WOMEN</b>								
BUSH	48%	66%	65%	69%	67%	65%	51%	
DUKAKIS	45%	24%	21%	25%	24%	24%	41%	
BUSH MARGIN	(3%)	(42%)	(44%)	(44%)	(43%)	(41%)	(10%)	+7%

TABLE 6 (continued)

SURVEY	MAY 9-12	SEPT 8-11	SEPT 21-23	SEPT 25	OCT 1-3	OCT 5	NOV 2-4	Difference Nov - May
<b>WHITE MEN</b>								
BUSH	64%	75%	86%	90%	78%	76%	74%	
DUKAKIS	29%	22%	11%	9%	14%	14%	20%	
BUSH MARGIN	(35%)	(53%)	(75%)	(81%)	(64%)	(62%)	(54%)	+19%
<b>WHITE WOMEN</b>								
BUSH	49%	70%	68%	70%	70%	73%	60%	
DUKAKIS	43%	21%	17%	23%	20%	20%	32%	
BUSH MARGIN	(6%)	(49%)	(51%)	(47%)	(50%)	(53%)	(28%)	+22%
<b>NORTHEAST<sup>a</sup></b>								
BUSH	41%	66%	76%	76%	61%	58%	57%	
DUKAKIS	50%	30%	14%	19%	29%	32%	36%	
BUSH MARGIN	(-9%)	(36%)	(62%)	(57%)	(32%)	(26%)	(21%)	+30%
<b>SOUTH<sup>b</sup></b>								
BUSH	67%	80%	75%	80%	71%	71%	69%	
DUKAKIS	28%	15%	17%	15%	23%	19%	24%	
BUSH MARGIN	(39%)	(65%)	(58%)	(65%)	(48%)	(52%)	(45%)	+6%
<b>MIDWEST<sup>c</sup></b>								
BUSH	47%	63%	64%	70%	68%	65%	70%	
DUKAKIS	47%	28%	27%	18%	20%	27%	23%	
BUSH MARGIN	(0%)	(35%)	(37%)	(52%)	(48%)	(38%)	(47%)	+47%
<b>WEST<sup>d</sup></b>								
BUSH	59%	78%	73%	70%	67%	71%	58%	
DUKAKIS	30%	17%	16%	25%	25%	22%	29%	
BUSH MARGIN	(29%)	(61%)	(57%)	(45%)	(42%)	(49%)	(29%)	+0%

Note: Data from CBS News New York Times surveys were used to calculate percentages. Question analyzed in each survey. "In politics do you think of Michael Dukakis as a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative?"

<sup>a</sup> Northeastern states include Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, & District of Columbia.

<sup>b</sup> Southern states include Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Texas, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, & Louisiana.

<sup>c</sup> Midwestern states include Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, & Oklahoma.

<sup>d</sup> Western states include Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, & Hawaii.




FIGURE 9/Percentage of Voters (By Partisan Classification) Who Thought Michael S. Dukakis Was a Liberal, May - November 1988




FIGURE 10/Bush Margin Among Voters (By Partisan Classification) Who Thought Michael S. Dukakis Was a Liberal, May - November 1988




FIGURE 11/Percentage of Voters (By Gender and Race) Who Thought Michael S. Dukakis Was a Liberal, May - November 1988






FIGURE 12/Bush Margin Among Voters (By Gender and Race) Who Thought Michael S. Dukakis Was a Liberal, May - November 1988



**FIGURE 13/Percentage of Voters (By Region) Who Thought Michael S. Dukakis Was a Liberal, May - November 1988**



**FIGURE 14/Bush Margin Among Voters (By Region) Who Thought Michael S. Dukakis Was a Liberal, May - November 1988**

message dominated the political dialogue. Without an effective response from Dukakis the Bush message resonated uncontested with the electorate. However, once Dukakis admitted he was a liberal and began to respond to Bush's ideological attacks with an "on your side" economic populist theme conventional wisdom suggests that the Democratic nominee began to blunt some of the effectiveness of the vice president's value-based strategy. Once Dukakis began to emphasize positive aspects associated with practical liberalism his dramatic slide in the polls stalled and then began to recover. Polls conducted late in the campaign showed the Democratic nominee cutting Bush's double-digit lead suggesting an eleventh hour Dukakis surge. As demonstrated with the data furnished from the *CBS News New York Times* surveys, between October 5 and November 2-4 Bush's margins among those who thought Dukakis was a liberal declined among all analyzed categories with the exception of Republicans (who were probably returning to the party banner) and Midwesterners. The largest declines occurred among Reagan Democrats (-38%), Independents (-18%), women (-31%), white women (-25%), and voters residing in the West (-20%).

The longitudinal results provided by the *CBS News New York Times* surveys are particularly interesting as they relate to Reagan Democrats and Carmines and Berkman's argument regarding the connection between the partisan loyalty of conservative Democrats and appeals to class-based economic populism. The fact that Bush's support began to decline among Reagan Democrats who thought Dukakis was a liberal during the period that Dukakis began to weave class-based economic themes into his campaign rhetoric suggests that Reagan Democrats may have been positively influenced to return to the party fold as a result of the Democratic nominee's new found economic populism. Changes in the tau-b statistic and ridit scores could not be measured during the final weeks of the campaign since the *ABC News Washington Post* November exit poll survey was not consistent with its predecessors because it did not include a question exclusively addressing voter perceptions of Michael Dukakis' ideology.

The results of the longitudinal analyses examining both across time changes in voters' ideological perceptions of Michael Dukakis and the strength of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal provide strong evidence that the Bush campaign was generally successful in defining the Massachusetts governor as a liberal. George Bush may have succeeded in isolating himself from potential liberal voters by his attacks on liberalism. However, strategically this was a cost-effective policy for the vice president. As Barbara Farah and Ethel Klein observe, "In launching an attack on liberals, George Bush was picking on a relatively small group in the electorate (15-20%) and an even smaller segment of his own political party (less than 10%)" (Pomper 1989, 110). In a political environment that was growing considerably more hostile to the types of public policies associated with liberalism Bush stood more to gain than to lose.

## ANALYSIS MEASURING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE "NEGATIVE CLUSTER" ISSUES ON VOTE CHOICE

The strategy of the Bush campaign was predicated on convincing voters that Michael Dukakis was a liberal. To create the image that Dukakis was a liberal the Republican nominee sought to define his opponent by applying a litmus test composed of a host of value-based symbolic issues. Bush's strategy relied on using the "negative cluster" issues, both in stump speeches and paid media, to stimulate affective negative predispositions attached to the "liberal" label among specific segments of the electorate.

To assess whether or not the "negative cluster" issues were significant factors that influenced vote choice, the probit technique was used to measure the significance level of five of the "negative cluster" issues; abortion, the death penalty, the Pledge of Allegiance, the ACLU, and prison furloughs. The same groups analyzed in the across time analyses were analyzed in the probit analyses.<sup>1</sup> Data from the exit poll conducted by *ABC News Washington Post* were used in the analyses. In the analyses many of the variables in the model achieve significance ( $\pm 2.576$  for  $p \leq .01$  or  $\pm 1.960$  for  $p \leq .05$ ) as the data set has an overall sample size of more than 34,000 observations.<sup>2</sup> In drawing conclusions from the results it is important to consider both the degree of potency of the t-values and the strength of the coefficients as they relate to their counterparts in the various control categories for each of the 20 independent variables in the model. The findings are outlined in tables 7 through 10.

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<sup>1</sup> The only exception being Reagan Democrats controlling for class. The *ABC News/Washington Post* exit poll did not contain working and middle class demographic classifications.

<sup>2</sup> The *ABC News/Washington Post* exit poll data set contains a total of 95,167 cases. This figure includes long and short form versions of the exit poll survey. The data used to conduct this research is contained in the long form version. A total of 34,361 cases were completed of the long form version of the survey.



## Results

The electorate and its partisan subclassifications. The probit analyses indicate that the value-based symbolic issues, the death penalty, the Pledge of Allegiance, and prison furloughs, were all factors that were highly significant on influencing vote choice against Dukakis among the electorate and its partisan subgroups of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents (table 7). Of the seven variables with t-values greater than  $\pm 20$  three were values-based "negative cluster" issues. Of the five "negative cluster" issues in the model the death penalty was consistently the most strongly significant. Among the total electorate the death penalty achieved a potent t-value of over -37, greater than any other variable considered in the model. Similarly, both the t-values for the Pledge of Allegiance and prison furlough issues consistently proved strongly significant on influencing vote choice against Dukakis. While these issues were significant among Republicans, the coefficients suggest that Democrat and Independent voters were more strongly influenced by the death penalty, the Pledge, and the prison furlough issues.

Abortion was a significantly negative factor against Dukakis among all groups analyzed except Republicans. This is somewhat surprising since Bush was a pro-life candidate. One point of interest is the apparent benefit Dukakis received from his choice of Texas senator Lloyd Bentsen to be his running mate. Among the analyzed variables Bentsen posted the strongest positive t-values among the electorate as a whole, Republicans, and Independents. Only among Democrats did party affiliation achieve a higher level of positive significance on influencing vote choice in favor of Dukakis than did the Massachusetts governor's selection of Bentsen. However, holding all variables constant the coefficients indicate that Bentsen was the strongest positive reason for the electorate, Democrats, Republicans, and Independents to select Dukakis.

TABLE 7

**THE ELECTORATE AND ITS PARTISAN CLASSIFICATIONS,  
ABC NEWS/WASHINGTON POST DATA SET**

**The Effects of Model Independent Variables on Vote Choice**

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ALL VOTERS	DEMOCRATS	REPUBLICANS	INDEPENDENTS
ABORTION	-.1896 .0216 (-8.778)	-.3215 .0405 (-7.938)	.0224 .0462 (0.485)	-.1428 .0505 (-2.828)
THE DEATH PENALTY	-.9271 .0250 (-37.084)	-.9008 .0478 (-18.845)	-.5501 .0537 (-10.244)	-.7991 .0579 (-13.801)
THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE	-.8680 .0362 (-23.978)	-.9213 .0685 (-13.450)	-.4752 .0743 (-6.396)	-.8400 .0847 (-9.917)
THE ACLU	.0303 .0382 (0.793)	.1269 .0810 (1.567)	-.1918 .0861 (-2.228)	.1326 .0822 (1.613)
PRISON FURLOUGHS	-.9196 .0382 (-24.073)	-1.0393 .0714 (-14.556)	-.3941 .0746 (-5.283)	-.8885 .0853 (-10.416)
Dukakis/Bush Debates	.1506 .0190 (7.926)	.1867 .0336 (5.557)	.0733 .0438 (1.674)	-.0543 .0491 (-1.105)
Bentsen/Quayle Debates	.3975 .0310 (12.823)	.4054 .0596 (6.802)	.3299 .0681 (4.844)	.4356 .0746 (5.839)
Party Affiliation	-.0812 .0196 (-4.143)	.8646 .0491 (17.609)	-.6173 .0509 (-12.127)	-.0956 .0761 (-1.256)
Presidential Candidate Personality	-.2550 .0285 -8.947	-.3112 .0532 (-5.850)	.0187 .0601 (.0311)	-.1710 .0700 (-2.443)
College Costs	.6508 .0325 (20.025)	.5714 .0630 (9.070)	.4282 .0730 (5.866)	.5906 .0737 (8.014)

TABLE 7 (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ALL VOTERS	DEMOCRATS	REPUBLICANS	INDEPENDENTS
Health Care	.6429 .0259 (24.822)	.5581 .0480 (11.627)	.3605 .0598 (6.028)	.6648 .0610 (10.898)
The Environment	.3727 .0278 (13.406)	.4141 .0559 (7.407)	.1555 .0631 (2.464)	.4597 .0611 (7.524)
Drugs	-.0687 .0245 (-2.804)	.0026 .0460 (0.057)	-.0212 .0557 (-0.381)	-.0855 .0567 (-1.508)
Education	.2375 .0262 (9.064)	.2342 .0502 (4.665)	.1565 .0593 (2.639)	.2153 .0600 (3.588)
The Iran Contra Affair	.8608 .0352 (24.455)	.8521 .0737 (11.562)	.4493 .0783 (5.738)	.9515 .0785 (12.121)
Social Security	.1059 .0257 (4.121)	.0846 .0461 (1.835)	-.0290 .0609 (-0.476)	-.0375 .0636 (-0.589)
Capital Gains Tax	-.3937 .0399 (-9.867)	-.1034 .0841 (-1.229)	-.2449 .0873 (-2.805)	-.4796 .0907 (-5.288)
Foreign Competition	-.2525 .0313 (-8.067)	-.2740 .0607 (-4.514)	-.0888 .0688 (-1.291)	-.0793 .0685 (-1.158)
Dan Quayle	.4468 .0295 (15.146)	.2854 .0578 (4.938)	.5295 .0595 (8.899)	.8464 .0666 (12.709)
Lloyd Bentsen	1.5240 .0433 (35.196)	1.1431 .0755 (15.140)	1.4885 .0942 (15.801)	1.2838 .0952 (13.485)
Auxiliary Statistics <sup>a</sup>	N = 33,986* Bush = 17,528 Dukakis = 16,458 Log = -17,500.99 R <sup>2</sup> = .51	N = 14,597* Bush = 2,391 Dukakis = 12,206 Log = -4,932.41 R <sup>2</sup> = .40	N = 12,266* Bush = 11,231 Dukakis = 1,035 Log = -2,886.62 R <sup>2</sup> = .32	N = 5,850* Bush = 3,274 Dukakis = 2,576 Log = -2,822.42 R <sup>2</sup> = .49

*Note:* The statistical results were produced using the probit technique. The dependent variable in the model is vote choice: Michael S. Dukakis (1) or George Bush (2). Estimated probit coefficients and standard errors precede t-values shown in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> See appendix for discussion of the Aldrich-Nelson Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> calculation.

\*  $p \leq .01$  for  $N \geq 1,000$

**TABLE 8**  
**REAGAN DEMOCRATS,**  
**ABC NEWS/WASHINGTON POST DATA SET**

**The Effects of Model Independent Variables on Vote Choice**

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ALL DEMOCRATS WHO VOTED FOR REAGAN	LESS THAN \$30,000/YEAR	GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO \$30,000/YEAR	HIGH SCHOOL OR LESS EDUCATION	COLLEGE EDUCATED
ABORTION	-.2420 .0628 (-3.852)	-.4527 .0875 (-5.173)	.0002 .0943 (0.002)	-.4971 .1004 (-4.951)	-.0574 .0822 (-0.698)
THE DEATH PENALTY	-.8269 .0743 (-11.127)	-.6857 .1022 (-6.704)	-1.0469 .1171 (-8.939)	-.8047 .1152 (-6.981)	-.8291 .0993 (-8.348)
THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE	-.9689 .1082 (-8.953)	-.9016 .1420 (-6.345)	-1.1185 .1815 (-6.162)	-1.0342 .1626 (-6.360)	-.9526 .1494 (-6.376)
THE ACLU	-.4987 .1508 (-3.308)	.0182 .2167 (0.084)	-1.0325 .2475 (-4.173)	-.4087 .3062 (-1.335)	-.5242 .1789 (-2.929)
PRISON FURLOUGHS	-.7982 .1125 (-7.095)	-.9366 .1643 (-5.700)	-.7953 .1679 (-4.736)	-.6710 .1889 (-3.551)	-.8889 .1444 (-6.153)
Dukakis/Bush Debates	.1666 .0550 (3.029)	.1980 .0732 (2.704)	.1299 .0870 (1.493)	.3548 .0820 (4.327)	.0095 .0759 (0.126)
Bentsen/Quayle Debates	.5129 .0824 (9.390)	.3334 .1225 (2.721)	.7385 .1310 (5.639)	.5089 .1528 (3.330)	.5699 .1096 (5.199)
Party Affiliation	.7732 .0824 (9.390)	.7230 .1219 (5.930)	.9127 .1160 (7.871)	.6966 .1247 (5.585)	.8474 .1112 (7.614)
Presidential Candidate Personality	-.2944 .0841 (-3.501)	-.2714 .1213 (-2.237)	-.2372 .1219 (-1.946)	-.2508 .1286 (-1.949)	-.2877 .1127 (-2.553)
College Costs	.7325 .1029 (7.121)	.8064 .1521 (5.300)	.7121 .1515 (4.701)	.6627 .1819 (3.643)	.7888 .1283 (6.147)

TABLE 8 (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ALL DEMOCRATS WHO VOTED FOR REAGAN	LESS THAN \$30,000/YEAR	GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO \$30,000/YEAR	HIGH SCHOOL OR LESS EDUCATION	COLLEGE EDUCATED
Health Care	.5480 .0776 (7.066)	.5127 .1037 (4.942)	.6071 .1219 (4.979)	.5547 .1172 (4.733)	.5522 .1065 (5.183)
The Environment	.2596 .0869 (2.988)	.1570 .1222 (1.284)	.4189 .1289 (3.248)	.0325 .1475 (0.220)	.3883 .1101 (3.525)
Drugs	.1636 .0723 (2.264)	.2619 .0987 (2.652)	.0476 .1126 (0.423)	.2664 .1109 (2.400)	.1239 .0975 (1.270)
Education	.1861 .0795 (2.342)	.1147 .1095 (1.046)	.3095 .1216 (2.544)	.1204 .1348 (0.893)	.2284 .1004 (2.274)
The Iran Contra Affair	.6965 .1182 (5.892)	.3764 .1568 (2.400)	1.1757 .1904 (6.173)	.6262 .2097 (2.985)	.7135 .1462 (4.877)
Social Security	.0913 .0732 (1.247)	-.0086 .0921 (-0.094)	.1592 .1272 (1.251)	.1318 .1029 (1.280)	.0543 .1083 (0.502)
Capital Gains Tax	.0601 .1253 (0.480)	.2765 .2055 (1.346)	.0603 .1687 (0.357)	.3390 .2210 (1.534)	-.0730 .1556 (-0.469)
Foreign Competition	-.3588 .0941 (-3.811)	-.1839 .1298 (-1.417)	-.6285 .1488 (-4.223)	-.2061 .1552 (-1.328)	-.4453 .1213 (-3.671)
Dan Quayle	.3858 .0845 (4.568)	.0310 .1159 (0.268)	.8045 .1301 (6.181)	.2182 .1379 (1.583)	.4739 .1092 (4.336)
Lloyd Bentsen	1.5155 .1244 (12.183)	1.2512 .1562 (8.011)	1.9554 .2213 (8.835)	1.3796 .1872 (7.368)	1.6294 .1702 (9.571)
Auxiliary Statistics <sup>a</sup>	N = 3,634* Bush = 1,682 Dukakis = 1,952 Log = -1.864.46 R <sup>2</sup> = .51	N = 1,904* Bush = 806 Dukakis = 1,098 Log = -1,020.80 R <sup>2</sup> = .52	N = 1,730* Bush = 876 Dukakis = 854 Log = -785.16 R <sup>2</sup> = .48	N = 1,631* Bush = 728 Dukakis = 903 Log = -861.39 R <sup>2</sup> = .51	N = 2,003* Bush = 954 Dukakis = 1,049 Log = -978.84 R <sup>2</sup> = .49

Note: The statistical results were produced using the probit technique. The dependent variable in the model is vote choice; Michael S. Dukakis (1) or George Bush (2). Estimated probit coefficients and standard errors precede t-values shown in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> See appendix for discussion of the Aldrich-Nelson Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> calculation.

\* p ≤ .01 for N ≥ 1,000

**TABLE 9**  
**GENDER AND RACE, ABC NEWS/WASHINGTON POST DATA SET**

**The Effects of Model Independent Variables on Vote Choice**

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	MEN	WOMEN	WHITE MEN	WHITE WOMEN	BLACK MEN	BLACK WOMEN
<b>ABORTION</b>	-.2199 .0341 (-6.449)	-.1855 .0285 (-6.509)	-.1464 .0365 (-4.011)	-.0712 .0307 (-2.319)	-.7237 .1553 (-4.660)	-.3550 .1501 (-2.365)
<b>THE DEATH PENALTY</b>	-.9946 .0371 (-26.809)	-.8518 .0345 (-24.690)	-.9665 .0401 (-24.102)	-.8235 .0374 (-22.019)	-.7963 .1875 (-4.247)	-.7546 .1755 (-4.300)
<b>THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE</b>	-.6890 .0546 (-12.619)	-1.0142 .0493 (-20.572)	-.6562 .0582 (-11.275)	-1.0333 .0534 (-19.351)	-.9736 .2850 (-3.416)	-1.0051 .2801 (-3.588)
<b>THE ACLU</b>	-.0219 .0522 (-0.420)	.1602 .0582 (2.753)	.0219 .0551 (0.397)	.1550 .0614 (2.524)	-.4525 .2788 (-1.645)	-.0986 .3316 (-0.297)
<b>PRISON FURLOUGHS</b>	-.9499 .0576 (-16.491)	-.9164 .0522 (-17.556)	-.9630 .0626 (-15.383)	-.9372 .0571 (-16.413)	-.6985 .2666 (-2.620)	-.5485 .2748 (-1.996)
Dukakis/Bush Debates	.1715 .0284 (6.039)	.1250 .0260 (4.808)	.0982 .0317 (3.098)	.0325 .0294 (1.105)	.4029 .1193 (3.377)	.2226 .1097 (2.029)
Bentsen/Quayle Debates	.4849 .0454 (10.681)	.3169 .0431 (7.353)	.5410 .0492 (10.996)	.3908 .0466 (8.386)	.4591 .2316 (1.982)	.1463 .2157 (0.678)
Party Affiliation	-.0541 .0284 (-1.905)	-.0979 .0275 (-3.560)	-.0567 .0310 (-1.829)	-.0887 .0301 (-2.947)	.1571 .1271 (1.236)	.1679 .1360 (1.235)
Presidential Candidate Personality	-.2985 .0431 (-6.926)	-.2291 .0385 (-5.951)	-.2662 .0463 (-5.749)	-.1750 .0416 (-4.207)	-.0531 .2192 (-0.242)	-.2751 .1942 (-1.417)
College Costs	.6433 .0504 (12.764)	.6478 .0432 (14.995)	.6048 .0551 (10.976)	.6240 .0467 (13.362)	.6908 .2424 (2.850)	.1337 .1926 (0.694)

TABLE 9 (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	MEN	WOMEN	WHITE MEN	WHITE WOMEN	BLACK MEN	BLACK WOMEN
Health Care	.6438 .0403 (15.975)	.6250 .0345 (18.116)	.6497 .0437 (14.867)	.6397 .0370 (17.289)	.3902 .1801 (2.167)	.5782 .1876 (3.082)
The Environment	.3681 .0413 (8.913)	.3824 .0383 (9.984)	.4454 .0439 (10.146)	.4605 .0411 (11.204)	.1802 .2274 (0.792)	-.1168 .1967 (-0.594)
Drugs	-.0764 .0370 (-2.065)	-.0648 .0333 (-1.946)	-.1033 .0404 (-2.557)	-.0858 .0364 (-2.357)	.0733 .1705 (0.430)	.1984 .1724 (1.151)
Education	.2153 .0410 (5.251)	.2389 .0347 (6.885)	.1645 .0449 (3.664)	.2269 .0377 (6.019)	.5172 .1984 (2.607)	.4132 .1897 (2.178)
The Iran Contra Affair	.8676 .0509 (17.045)	.8470 .0496 (17.077)	.9218 .0540 (17.070)	.9049 .0523 (17.302)	.1010 .2315 (0.436)	.3061 .2961 (1.034)
Social Security	.1217 .0398 (3.058)	.0890 .0345 (2.580)	.1043 .0432 (2.414)	.0971 .0372 (2.610)	.3327 .1907 (1.745)	.0444 .1766 (0.251)
Capital Gains Tax	-.4212 .0542 (-7.771)	-.3249 .0604 (-5.379)	-.3987 .0580 (-6.874)	-.3627 .0654 (-5.546)	-.2419 .3015 (-0.802)	.1647 .3324 (0.495)
Foreign Competition	-.1764 .0441 (-4.000)	-.3174 .0452 (-7.022)	-.1378 .0471 (-2.927)	-.2700 .0482 (-5.602)	-.4126 .2209 (-1.868)	-.0998 .2689 (-0.371)
Dan Quayle	.4660 .0426 (10.939)	.4523 .0416 (10.873)	.5565 .0446 (12.475)	.5433 .0435 (12.490)	.3540 .2760 (1.283)	.0676 .2609 (0.259)
Lloyd Bentsen	1.4791 .0635 (23.293)	1.5670 .0607 (25.815)	1.4922 .0673 (22.172)	1.6297 .0638 (25.544)	.8815 .2733 (3.225)	.9407 .3168 (2.969)
Auxiliary Statistics <sup>a</sup>	N = 15,890* Bush = 8,853 Dukakis = 7,037 Log = -8,058.83 R <sup>2</sup> = .50	N = 17,452* Bush = 8,377 Dukakis = 9,075 Log = -8,992.18 R <sup>2</sup> = .51	N = 13,729* Bush = 8,364 Dukakis = 5,365 Log = -6,637.72 R <sup>2</sup> = .49	N = 14,825* Bush = 8,041 Dukakis = 6,784 Log = -7,319.91 R <sup>2</sup> = .50	N = 1,400* Bush = 173 Dukakis = 1,227 Log = -426.94 R <sup>2</sup> = .38	N = 1,889* Bush = 128 Dukakis = 1,761 Log = -412.21 R <sup>2</sup> = .30

Note: The statistical results were produced using the probit technique. The dependent variable in the model is vote choice; Michael S. Dukakis (1) or George Bush (2). Estimated probit coefficients and standard errors precede t-values shown in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> See appendix for discussion of the Aldrich-Nelson Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> calculation.

\*  $p \leq .01$  for  $N \geq 1,000$

**TABLE 10**  
**REGION, ABC NEWS/WASHINGTON POST DATA SET**

**The Effects of Model Independent Variables on Vote Choice**

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	NORTHEAST <sup>a</sup>	SOUTH <sup>b</sup>	MIDWEST <sup>c</sup>	WEST <sup>d</sup>
ABORTION	-.0553 .0421 (-1.314)	-.2606 .0395 (-6.597)	-.3702 .0404 (-9.163)	.0115 .0607 (0.189)
THE DEATH PENALTY	-.9448 .0456 (-20.719)	-.9269 .0456 (-20.327)	-.8407 .0497 (-16.915)	-1.1004 .0716 (-15.369)
THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE	-.7259 .0674 (-10.770)	-.8832 .0629 (-14.041)	-.9044 .0729 (-12.406)	-.8702 .1129 (-7.708)
THE ACLU	-.0085 .0718 (-0.118)	.0416 .0686 (0.606)	.0514 .0743 (0.692)	.0502 .1127 (0.445)
PRISON FURLOUGHS	-1.0211 .0744 (-13.724)	-.7931 .0686 (-11.561)	-.9462 .0725 (-13.051)	-.9168 .1078 (-8.505)
Dukakis/Bush Debates	.0545 .0365 (1.493)	.2625 .0338 (7.766)	.1264 .0357 (3.541)	.1121 .0545 (2.057)
Bentsen/Quayle Debates	.5005 .0591 (8.469)	.3115 .0563 (5.532)	.3391 .0583 (5.816)	.4404 .0912 (4.829)
Party Affiliation	-.1618 .0393 (-4.117)	-.0200 .0344 (-0.581)	-.0993 .0368 (-2.698)	-.0503 .0543 (-0.926)
Presidential Candidate Personality	-.2536 .0542 (-4.679)	-.3157 .0526 (-6.002)	-.1998 .0528 (-3.784)	-.2679 .0832 (-3.220)
College Costs	.5875 .0600 (9.792)	.6632 .0587 (11.298)	.6893 .0630 (10.941)	.6432 .0995 (6.464)
Health Care	.6926 .0488 (14.193)	.5934 .0473 (12.545)	.5857 .0486 (12.051)	.7130 .0781 (9.129)
The Environment	.2553 .0510 (5.006)	.3346 .0527 (6.349)	.3436 .0534 (6.434)	.6747 .0794 (8.497)
Drugs	-.0269 .0455 (-0.591)	-.1291 .0448 (-2.882)	-.0439 .0471 (-0.932)	-.0306 .0729 (-0.420)



TABLE 10 (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	NORTHEAST <sup>a</sup>	SOUTH <sup>b</sup>	MIDWEST <sup>c</sup>	WEST <sup>d</sup>
Education	.3299 .0507 (6.507)	.1913 .0468 (4.088)	.2392 .0504 (4.746)	.1557 .0762 (2.043)
The Iran Contra Affair	.8666 .0676 (12.820)	.8208 .0632 (12.987)	.8580 .0677 (12.674)	.9711 .1046 (9.284)
Social Security	.1361 .0487 (2.795)	.0862 .0453 (1.903)	.1136 .0490 (2.318)	.2080 .0810 (2.568)
Capital Gains Tax	-.4494 .0731 (-6.148)	-.3619 .0710 (-5.097)	-.3844 .0778 (-4.941)	-.3630 .1229 (-2.954)
Foreign Competition	-.3181 .0597 (-5.328)	-.2491 .0570 (-4.370)	-.1575 .0587 (-2.683)	-.3059 .0917 (-3.336)
Dan Quayle	.6489 .0577 (11.246)	.3168 .0531 (5.966)	.3117 .0554 (5.626)	.6325 .0883 (7.163)
Lloyd Bentsen	1.4753 .0893 (16.521)	1.7008 .0757 (22.468)	1.5350 .0823 (18.651)	1.1928 .1135 (10.509)
Auxiliary Statistics <sup>e</sup>	N = 9,203* Bush = 4,396 Dukakis = 4,807 Log = -4,669.61 R <sup>2</sup> = .50	N = 11,286* Bush = 6,569 Dukakis = 4,717 Log = -5,690.29 R <sup>2</sup> = .50	N = 9,177* Bush = 4,537 Dukakis = 4,640 Log = -4,819.36 R <sup>2</sup> = .51	N = 4,320* Bush = 2,026 Dukakis = 2,294 Log = -2,136.06 R <sup>2</sup> = .50

*Note:* The statistical results were produced using the probit technique. The dependent variable in the model is vote choice; Michael S. Dukakis (1) or George Bush (2). Estimated probit coefficients and standard errors precede t-values shown in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> *Northeastern states* include Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, & District of Columbia.

<sup>b</sup> *Southern states* include Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Texas, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, & Louisiana.

<sup>c</sup> *Midwestern states* include Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, & Oklahoma.

<sup>d</sup> *Western states* include Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, & Hawaii.

<sup>e</sup> See appendix for discussion of the Aldrich-Nelson Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> calculation.

\*  $p \leq .01$  for  $N \geq 1,000$

Among the electorate as a whole it is estimated that the model explains approximately 51% of the variance in the dependent variable. Furthermore, the  $R^2$  figure estimates that 40%, 32%, and 49% of the variance is explained among Democrats, Republicans, and Independents respectively.

Reagan Democrats. The results among Democrats who voted for Reagan (table 8) mirror the results for the electorate-at-large and its partisan subgroupings. Among all analyzed groups of Reagan Democrats the death penalty, the Pledge of Allegiance, and prison furloughs achieved significance as influencing vote choice against Dukakis. Again, as in the analysis of the electorate and its partisan subgroups, the death penalty was consistently the most significant issue against the selection of Dukakis among Reagan Democrats. Comparing coefficients it appears that among Reagan Democrats in general and the specific subgroups analyzed the Pledge issue had the strongest impact. The crime issues, the death penalty and prison furloughs, had an equally strong impact on vote choice against Dukakis among Reagan Democrats in general. However, the prison furlough issue more strongly affected Reagan Democrats who made less than \$30,000 a year (-.9366) and those with greater than a high school education (-.8889). The death penalty was a stronger issue for Reagan Democrats who made \$30,000 a year or more (-1.0469) and those with a high school education or less (-.8047).

Abortion and the ACLU achieved significance among all Reagan Democrats. However, when income and education are controlled abortion was significant among lower income and less educated Reagan Democrats. Conversely, the ACLU issue was significant against the selection of Dukakis among wealthier and college educated Reagan Democrats. Among Reagan Democrats the selection of Bentsen was a strongly significant factor influencing the selection of Dukakis. In the model the coefficients indicate that the selection of Bentsen was a stronger positive factor influencing the selection of Dukakis than party affiliation among all categories of Reagan Democrats.

The  $R^2$  figure estimates that the model explains approximately 51% of the variance in the dependent variable among Reagan Democrats in the aggregate and Reagan Democrats with a high school education or less. In addition, it is estimated that the model explains 52% of the variance among Reagan Democrats who made less than \$30,000 a year, 48% of the variance among those with incomes equal to or greater than \$30,000 a year, and 49% of the variance among college educated Reagan Democrats.

Gender and race. The t-values indicate that among all analyzed categories the death penalty and the Pledge of Allegiance were significant influences against voters selecting Dukakis (table 9). The coefficients indicate that the death penalty was a stronger issue among men (-.9946) than women (-.8518). However, the Pledge issue was more salient for women (-1.0142) than men (-.6890). Similarly, the death penalty was stronger among white men than white women while the effect of the Pledge issue was exactly the opposite. Among black men and black women the death penalty was a less strong of an influence. Yet, unlike white men, the strength of the Pledge issue among black men more closely mirrored the effect exhibited on white women. When compared to white women, the Pledge issue affected black women in a fairly similar fashion.

When considering gender and race the prison furlough issue was potentially the most volatile among the "negative cluster." The volatility of the issue rests in its connection to Willie Horton, a black man released under the Massachusetts furlough program, who escaped and raped a white woman after stabbing her husband repeatedly. Commenting on the use of the furlough issue by the Bush campaign and Willie Horton, specifically, by independent expenditure committees on behalf of Bush, Susan Estrich, Dukakis' campaign manager, believed that the furlough issue discussed in the context of Willie Horton was a direct attempt to heighten racial fears and prejudices:

I happen to have been a rape victim. . . . My sense . . . is that it was very much an issue about race and racial fear. . . . Whether it was intended or not, the symbolism was very powerful. It was, at least on my viewing it, very strong—look, you can't find a stronger metaphor for racial hatred in this country than a black man raping a white woman. And that's what the Willie Horton story was. (Runkel 1989, 113-114)

Estrich further argued that the issue affected whites, both men and women, in a fairly equal fashion:

I talked to people afterward, men and women. Women said they couldn't help it, but it [Willie Horton and the furlough issue] scared the living daylights out of them. . . . I talked to men who said they couldn't help it either, but when they saw the leaflets later and the ads and the like, they couldn't help but thinking about their wives and feeling scared and crazy. (Runkel 1989, 114)

The results of the probit tests indicate that Estrich was correct in her assumptions. Among men and women without any racial subdivision, the furlough issue achieved significance. The coefficients indicate that the strength of the issue was fairly uniform among men (-.9499) and women (-.9164). With the exception of black women, the *t*-values indicate that the prison furlough issue also achieved saliency status among the gender groups controlling for race. However, comparing coefficients it is clear that the issue had a stronger effect on white men (-.9630) and white women (-.9372) than black men (-.6985) and black women (-.5485). While the surveys used in this research do not provide an adequate measure to analyze the effects of race on vote choice in 1988, under the circumstances, it must be acknowledged that whether or not it was the intent of the Bush campaign, or independent expenditure committees working on behalf of the vice president, to heighten racial fears and prejudices, they appear to have been factors influencing vote choice.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Surveys, particularly exit polls, often do not adequately measure the influence of race on electoral outcomes. Focus groups are a more appropriate technique to adequately assess the extent of race as an influence on individual-level political decision-making. Instances where race appears to have been an influence on electoral outcomes but was not adequately measured in the polling data include the 1989 gubernatorial race in Virginia between black Democrat L. Douglas Wilder and Republican Marshall Coleman and the 1982 gubernatorial campaign in California between black Democrat Tom Bradley and Republican George Deukmejian.

Abortion was an issue that also worked to Dukakis' disadvantage among some groups. Abortion achieved voting issue significance among all categories except white and black women. Comparing coefficients the issue was strongest among black men (-.7237). Party affiliation was a voting issue against Dukakis among women in general and white women. Dukakis' personality was also a liability among men and women in general, and white men and white women specifically. The ACLU achieved significance as a voting issue favoring the selection of Dukakis among women in general (2.753) and was border-line significant among white women (2.524).

Lloyd Bentsen was the strongest reason to vote for Dukakis. The Democratic vice presidential candidate posted the highest positive t-values and coefficients among men and women in general and their specific racial subdivisions. The model explained approximately 50% of the variance in the dependent variable among men and white women. Among women and white men the model explained approximately 51% and 49% of the variance respectively. The model had less explanatory power among blacks. Among black men it explained only 38% of the variance and among black women 30%.

Region. On the eve of the general election campaign one senior Bush strategist suggested that the Pledge issue alone would be worth 150 electoral votes, mainly in the South (Goldman & Mathews 1989, 356). The strategist's assessment was correct. In fact, the only region of the country in which the Democratic candidate did not win a single electoral vote was in the South (table 20). The probit test indicates that among the four regional categories the Pledge of Allegiance issue achieved the strongest t-value potency (-14.041) in the South (table 10). The Pledge issue was also significant in the other three regions. Comparing the coefficients, the Pledge issue was a stronger negative against voters choosing Dukakis in the South (-.8832), Midwest (-.9044), and West (-.8702) than the Northeast (-.7259).

The death penalty and the prison furlough issues also achieved significance as voting issues against Dukakis in all four regions. The coefficients indicate that the death penalty was a stronger issue in the West (-1.1004), Northeast (-.9448), and South (-.9269) than in the Midwest (-.8407). The prison furlough issue was strongest in the Northeast (-1.0211), followed by the Midwest (-.9462), West (-.9168), and South (-.7931) respectively. Abortion was a significant factor against voters selecting Dukakis in the South and Midwest. The issue did not achieve statistical significance in the Northeast or West. Likewise, the ACLU issue did not attain significance in any of the four regions.

The results indicate that the strongest issue in Dukakis' favor was again his Democratic running mate. The most potent positive t-values and the highest positive coefficients recorded in each region for Dukakis were with regard to Bentsen. The  $R^2$  figure indicates that the model explains approximately 50% of the variance in the dependent variable for the Northeast, South, and West and 51% of the variance for the Midwest.

### Discussion

The analysis measuring the significance of the "negative cluster" issues on vote choice provides evidence to support the second primary hypothesis: the symbolic "negative cluster" value issues used by the Bush campaign to frame Michael Dukakis as a liberal were significant factors influencing vote choice against the Democratic nominee. However, it is important to observe that those "negative cluster" issues emphasized by the Bush campaign were more consistent in their effects than similar issues which were employed less frequently. The three "negative cluster" issues primarily used by Bush during the general election campaign, the death penalty, prison furloughs, and the Pledge of Allegiance, were consistently found to influence vote choice against Dukakis among the electoral categories examined in the analysis. The only exception was the prison furlough

issue which was found not to be a significant factor influencing vote choice among black women.

Two other "negative cluster" issues which received less attention during the campaign, the ACLU and abortion, were less consistent in their significance as influences on vote choice. Surprisingly, abortion was not a significant factor among traditionally pro-life Republicans despite Dukakis' pro-choice stand on the issue. Among Reagan Democrats, the significance of abortion as a salient vote choice issue varied with education and income. Abortion was a significant issue among less educated and lower income Reagan Democrats. The result is probably attributable to the populist tendencies of the traditional working class who believe government should engage in some degree of regulation of social and moral issues (Maddox & Lilie 1984). Among the gender and racial categories analyzed abortion was a stronger issue against the selection of Dukakis among white and black men than white and black women. This is not an unexpected result as women tend to be more pro-choice in their attitudes toward abortion than men. Regionally, abortion was a significant issue against Dukakis in the South and Midwest. The fact that abortion worked against Dukakis in the South is not surprising since Dixie is the most conservative region in the nation. Similarly, compared to the Northeast and West, particularly the Pacific west coast, the Midwest is a more conservative region. In addition, several Midwestern states, notably Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio, are home to large segments of working class populations who reside in older cities developed around traditional "rust-belt" industries.

The ACLU was an issue not employed in a consistent fashion during the campaign being overshadowed by the death penalty, prison furloughs, and Pledge issues. The most significant media use of the issue by Bush came during the first presidential debate when the vice president referred to Governor Dukakis as a "card-carrying member" of the organization. The significance of the issue appeared to vary with education and income levels. As control variables, education and income were only used among Reagan

Democrats. However, the significance of the ACLU among the higher educated and greater income categories of Reagan Democrats suggests that the issue was more salient among voters with a higher socioeconomic status who would be more intellectually predisposed to understand the organization's mission. The ACLU was a significant factor influencing women in general to support Dukakis. This is not surprising as the organization is closely associated with promoting the rights of minorities. What is surprising is that the issue was not a significant positive influence to choose Dukakis among black men and women. If the saliency of the issue is related to education levels, as suggested by the results of the analysis of Reagan Democrats, then the fact that blacks, when compared to whites, tend to be less educated may have influenced the results. Regionally, the ACLU was not a significant factor influencing vote choice.



THE EFFECTS OF OTHER VARIABLES ON VOTE CHOICE:  
DID EXPERIENCE, THE ECONOMY, TAXES,  
AND NATIONAL DEFENSE MATTER?

Other factors besides the symbolic "negative cluster" value issues may have influenced vote choice. Two issues in particular, the economy and experience, deserve attention as both scholars and political experts claim each impacted the 1988 general election results.

To test the significance of the economy and experience as factors influencing vote choice in favor of George Bush, a model was created and tested using data from the *CBS News New York Times* exit poll survey. The survey not only permits a test of the effects of the economy and experience on vote choice, but includes responses to taxes and national defense, two "negative cluster" variables absent from the *ABC News/Washington Post* survey instrument analyzed in the previous section. The model also provides additional statistical evidence concerning the effect on vote choice of three other "negative cluster" issues. In the current model the death penalty and prison furlough issues are reflected in the crime variable and the Pledge of Allegiance issue is represented by the patriotic values variable.

The same groups analyzed in the longitudinal analyses and the analysis measuring the effects of the "negative cluster" issues on vote choice were analyzed in the current model using the *CBS News/New York Times* exit survey instrument and data set.<sup>1</sup> The probit technique was again employed to test variable significance. In the analyses many of

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<sup>1</sup> The only exceptions are among Reagan Democrats controlling for income and class. Because the *CBS News/New York Times* and the *ABC News/Washington Post* exit surveys did not have a uniform income code the break for the model using the *CBS News/New York Times* data set was \$25,000 a year rather than the \$30,000 a year used in the model created with *ABC News/Washington Post* data. In regard to class status, the *CBS News/New York Times* exit poll, like the *ABC News/Washington Post* exit poll, did not contain working and middle class demographic classifications.

the model variables achieve significance ( $\pm 2.576$  for  $p \leq .01$  or  $\pm 1.960$  for  $p \leq .05$ ) as the *CBS News New York Times* exit survey data set has an overall sample size of more than 11,600 observations. As previously mentioned, in drawing conclusions from the results it is important to consider both the degree of potency of the t-values and the strength of the coefficients as they relate to their counterparts in the various control categories for each of the 18 independent variables in the model. The findings are outlined in tables 11 through 14.

### Results

The electorate and its partisan classifications. Among all voters and each partisan subgrouping, experience was the most potent influence against voters choosing Michael Dukakis (table 11). The t-values and the coefficients for the experience variable were the strongest among the anti-Dukakis variables in the model. Comparing coefficients, experience was a more influencing factor among Democrats (-1.297) and Independents (-1.288) than Republicans (-.8320). The economy did not achieve statistical significance among the electorate as a whole or its partisan subcategories.

Taxes and national defense, two "negative cluster" issues not among the variables included in the model using *ABC News Washington Post* data, achieved mixed results. Taxes achieved significance as a salient issue influencing vote choice against Dukakis among the general electorate. However, examining the partisan breakdown taxes achieved significance among Republicans (-3.959) and Independents (-7.136) and not among Democrats (-1.657). Comparing coefficients, taxes were a stronger influence among Independents (-.6936) than among Republicans (-.4228) and Democrats (-.1347). National defense was statistically significant among all voters (-4.130) and Democrats (-2.909). According to the results, national defense was not a significant influence on vote choice among Republicans and Independents.

Crime and patriotic values, variables representative of "negative cluster" issues, achieved significance as voting issues against Dukakis among the electorate in general and its partisan classifications. Comparing coefficients, both issues were stronger influences among Democrats and Independents than Republicans. Abortion, while significant among the general electorate, only achieved voting issue status among Democrats (-2.831).

Dukakis' liberal views proved to be a significant factor influencing voters in favor of the Democratic nominee. The variable achieved positive significance among the general electorate (7.085) and Democrats (5.637). While it is not surprising that Dukakis' liberalism may have been viewed positively among Democrats in the aggregate, it is somewhat surprising that the variable did not test as a significant influence against Dukakis among Republicans, and to a lesser degree Independents. Survey methodology may be responsible for this unexpected result. *CBS News New York Times* exit poll respondents, when answering the questions used in this research, could only select a maximum of two responses from those provided, forcing individuals to engage in systematic prioritizing. Voters opposing Dukakis on the basis of his perceived liberalism may have been more inclined to select response choices that represented the specific "negative cluster" issues or issue categories Bush used against Dukakis. Therefore, when confronted with an imposed limit on response choices, someone concerned about Dukakis' perceived liberal positions on prison furloughs or the death penalty, two issues emphasized by Bush during the general election campaign, may have been more likely to select the crime response than the Dukakis' liberal views response.

Question format may also have had an effect on responses. A *CBS News New York Times* poll conducted October 8-10 asked voters "regardless of how you intend to vote, what worries you most about electing Michael Dukakis as President in 1988?" The single phrased open-ended responses were coded into 51 possible categories. A probit analysis conducted using data from the poll found that none of the "negative cluster" issues listed among the possible coded responses achieved statistical significance

**TABLE 11**  
**THE ELECTORATE AND ITS PARTISAN CLASSIFICATIONS,**  
***CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES* DATA SET**

**The Effects of Model Independent Variables on Vote Choice**

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ALL VOTERS	DEMOCRATS	REPUBLICANS	INDEPENDENTS
CRIME	-.5678 .0369 (-15.399)	-.5798 .0708 (-8.189)	-.2213 .0850 (-2.604)	-.7056 .0782 (-9.023)
TAXES	-.3934 .0410 (-9.588)	-.1347 .0813 (-1.657)	-.4228 .1068 (-3.959)	-.6936 .0972 (-7.136)
ABORTION	-.3172 .0579 (-5.483)	-.3128 .1105 (-2.831)	-.1594 .1330 (-1.198)	-.2911 .1206 (-2.414)
DUKAKIS' LIBERAL VIEWS	.2361 .0333 (7.085)	.3732 .0662 (5.637)	.1562 .0831 (1.880)	.1047 .0682 (1.535)
PATRIOTIC VALUES	-.6956 .0560 (-12.418)	-.6455 .1119 (-5.769)	-.5049 .1320 (-3.825)	-.5360 .1034 (-5.184)
DEFENSE	-.2298 .0556 (-4.130)	-.3290 .1131 (-2.909)	-.3559 .1541 (-2.310)	-.0475 .1047 (-0.454)
Helping the Middle Class	.6122 .0336 (18.229)	.3144 .0639 (4.920)	.5523 .0842 (6.559)	.5045 .0699 (7.217)
The Environment	.4490 .0480 (9.352)	.3203 .0999 (3.206)	.4892 .1151 (4.250)	.5299 .0890 (5.954)
THE ECONOMY	-.0286 .0337 (-0.850)	.1167 .0699 (1.670)	-.0800 .0841 (-0.950)	-.0997 .0703 (-1.418)
Budget Deficit	.2854 .0443 (6.446)	.1367 .0888 (1.539)	.2920 .1074 (2.719)	.3746 .0849 (4.412)

TABLE 11 (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ALL VOTERS	DEMOCRATS	REPUBLICANS	INDEPENDENTS
Relations with the Soviet Union	-.7441 .0723 (-10.296)	-.8425 .1416 (-5.950)	-.3197 .1577 (-2.027)	-.5935 .1384 (-4.288)
Vice Presidential Candidates	.6686 .0402 (16.209)	.4458 .0792 (5.629)	.6710 .0956 (7.019)	.9149 .0814 (11.240)
Party Affiliation	.1699 .0402 (4.226)	.9319 .1007 (9.254)	-.7125 .1269 (-5.615)	.1545 .1214 (1.273)
Helping the Poor	1.107 .0470 (23.545)	.8517 .0865 (9.846)	.9223 .1135 (8.126)	1.073 .1000 (10.730)
Likeability	-.0582 .0479 (-1.216)	.0003 .0972 (0.003)	.0746 .1088 (0.686)	.2400 .0982 (2.444)
Jesse Jackson	.7552 .0649 (11.643)	.8072 .1340 (6.024)	.4364 .1663 (2.624)	.3315 .1395 (2.376)
The Debates	.0454 .0531 (0.856)	.3623 .1154 (3.139)	-.0112 .1290 (-0.087)	.0860 .0973 (0.884)
<b>EXPERIENCE</b>	<b>-1.294</b> <b>.0433</b> <b>(-29.886)</b>	<b>-1.297</b> <b>.0839</b> <b>(-15.461)</b>	<b>-.8320</b> <b>.1005</b> <b>(-8.279)</b>	<b>-1.288</b> <b>.0832</b> <b>(-15.481)</b>
Auxiliary Statistics <sup>a</sup>	N = 11,466* Bush = 5,695 Dukakis = 5,771 Log = -5.405.12 R <sup>2</sup> = .49	N = 4,438* Bush = 665 Dukakis = 3,773 Log = -1.313.84 R <sup>2</sup> = .37	N = 3,523* Bush = 3,196 Dukakis = 327 Log = -.827.29 R <sup>2</sup> = .32	N = 2,812* Bush = 1,504 Dukakis = 1,308 Log = -1.272.17 R <sup>2</sup> = .48

*Note:* The statistical results were produced using the probit technique. The dependent variable in the model is vote choice; Michael S. Dukakis (1) or George Bush (2). Estimated probit coefficients and standard errors precede t-values shown in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> See appendix for discussion of the Aldrich-Nelson Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> calculation.

\*  $p \leq .01$  for  $N \geq 1,000$

**TABLE 12**  
**REAGAN DEMOCRATS,**  
***CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES* DATA SET**

**The Effects of Model Independent Variables on Vote Choice**

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ALL DEMOCRATS WHO VOTED FOR REAGAN	LESS THAN \$25,000/YEAR	GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO \$25,000/YEAR	HIGH SCHOOL OR LESS EDUCATION	COLLEGE EDUCATED
<b>CRIME</b>	-.6119 .1186 (-5.159)	-.5544 .1812 (-3.060)	-.6713 .1645 (-4.081)	-.7291 .1603 (-4.548)	-.5008 .1839 (-2.723)
<b>TAXES</b>	.0598 .1342 (0.446)	.0261 .2031 (0.129)	.0777 .1865 (0.417)	.1306 .1880 (0.695)	-.0234 .2018 (-0.116)
<b>ABORTION</b>	-.1927 .2109 (-0.914)	-.3119 .3413 (-0.914)	-.1535 .2758 (-0.557)	-.4566 .3384 (-1.349)	-.0277 .2837 (-0.098)
<b>DUKAKIS' LIBERAL VIEWS</b>	.3384 .1097 (3.085)	.7561 .1729 (4.372)	.0677 .1486 (0.455)	.5725 .1624 (3.525)	.0928 .1581 (0.587)
<b>PATRIOTIC VALUES</b>	-.6945 .1787 (-3.887)	-.7023 .2915 (-2.409)	-.7430 .2375 (-3.129)	-.8568 .2430 (-3.526)	-.5594 .2788 (-2.006)
<b>DEFENSE</b>	-.4726 .2086 (-2.266)	-.3066 .3552 (-0.863)	-.5769 .2683 (-2.150)	-.3766 .2986 (-1.261)	-.4320 .3063 (-1.410)
Helping the Middle Class	.5725 .1066 (5.371)	.7063 .1666 (4.240)	.4487 .1437 (3.122)	.4998 .1514 (3.301)	.6116 .1571 (3.893)
The Environment	.3167 .1742 (1.818)	.2572 .2892 (0.889)	.3299 .2227 (1.481)	.1093 .2819 (0.388)	.4858 .2285 (2.126)
<b>THE ECONOMY</b>	.1452 .1219 (1.191)	.0751 .1871 (0.401)	.2067 .1655 (1.249)	.1342 .1820 (0.737)	.1091 .1726 (0.632)
Budget Deficit	.2598 .1520 (1.709)	.2304 .2466 (0.934)	.2306 .2007 (1.149)	.2857 .2153 (1.327)	.1678 .2260 (0.742)

TABLE 12 (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	ALL DEMOCRATS WHO VOTED FOR REAGAN	LESS THAN \$25,000/YEAR	GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO \$25,000/YEAR	HIGH SCHOOL OR LESS EDUCATION	COLLEGE EDUCATED
Relations with the Soviet Union	-.4217 .2329 (-1.810)	.0908 .3638 (0.250)	-.7768 .3261 (-2.382)	-.3154 .3938 (-0.801)	-.5757 .3028 (-1.901)
Vice Presidential Candidates	.6028 .1256 (4.801)	.5350 .2081 (2.570)	.6708 .1642 (4.086)	.2027 .1870 (1.084)	.9967 .1777 (5.608)
Party Affiliation	1.2516 .1784 (7.014)	1.2972 .2785 (4.658)	1.2532 .2427 (5.164)	1.2498 .2415 (5.176)	1.3335 .2913 (4.577)
Helping the Poor	.8281 .1445 (5.730)	.6713 .1988 (3.376)	1.0689 .2224 (4.805)	.6405 .1921 (3.333)	1.2435 .2366 (5.256)
Likeability	.0117 .1714 (0.068)	.1523 .2616 (0.582)	-.1853 .2346 (-0.790)	.1476 .2464 (0.599)	-.2805 .2525 (-1.111)
Jesse Jackson	.4121 .2611 (1.579)	.4149 .3401 (1.220)	.3515 .4161 (0.845)	-.0162 .4385 (0.037)	.7267 .3367 (2.159)
The Debates	.5526 .1939 (2.850)	.3255 .3582 (.0909)	.6314 .2398 (2.633)	.8404 .3295 (2.550)	.3935 .2538 (1.550)
EXPERIENCE	-1.3179 .1538 (-8.571)	-1.5733 .2753 (-5.714)	-1.2385 .1943 (-6.374)	-1.5653 .2387 (-6.558)	-1.1208 .2116 (-5.296)
Auxiliary Statistics <sup>a</sup>	N = 1,022* Bush = 474 Dukakis = 548 Log = -479.94 R <sup>2</sup> = .48	N = 443** Bush = 198 Dukakis = 245 Log = -205.24 R <sup>2</sup> = .48	N = 579** Bush = 276 Dukakis = 303 Log = -264.24 R <sup>2</sup> = .48	N = 502** Bush = 228 Dukakis = 274 Log = -243.47 R <sup>2</sup> = .49	N = 520** Bush = 246 Dukakis = 274 Log = -228.51 R <sup>2</sup> = .47

Note: The statistical results were produced using the probit technique. The dependent variable in the model is vote choice: Michael S. Dukakis (1) or George Bush (2). Estimated probit coefficients and standard errors precede t-values shown in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> See appendix for discussion of the Aldrich-Nelson Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> calculation.

\* p ≤ .01 for N ≥ 1,000

\*\* p ≤ .05 for N < 1,000

**TABLE 13**  
**GENDER AND RACE, CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES DATA SET**

**The Effects of Model Independent Variables on Vote Choice**

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	MEN	WOMEN	WHITE MEN	WHITE WOMEN	BLACK MEN	BLACK WOMEN
<b>CRIME</b>	-.5287 .0550 (-9.606)	-.6062 .0502 (-12.064)	-.6076 .0654 (-9.294)	-.7152 .0585 (-12.234)	-.4671 .1822 (-2.564)	-.7010 .1957 (-3.581)
<b>TAXES</b>	-.4324 .0621 (-6.964)	-.3596 .0555 (-6.477)	-.5936 .0747 (-7.943)	-.4117 .0645 (-6.381)	-.0292 .2130 (-0.137)	-.5302 .2249 (-2.358)
<b>ABORTION</b>	-.3683 .1048 (-3.513)	-.3405 .0705 (-4.832)	-.2883 .1141 (-2.528)	-.2747 .0765 (-3.589)	-.5315 .3815 (-1.393)	-.4658 .3882 (-1.199)
<b>DUKAKIS' LIBERAL VIEWS</b>	.0762 .0489 (1.559)	.4010 .0466 (8.602)	.0831 .0558 (1.488)	.3988 .0519 (7.689)	.0087 .1845 (0.047)	.6575 .2217 (2.965)
<b>PATRIOTIC VALUES</b>	-.8105 .0853 (-9.505)	-.5884 .0754 (-7.802)	-.7427 .0955 (-7.773)	-.4954 .0816 (-6.071)	-.7079 .3225 (-2.195)	-.7901 .3106 (-2.544)
<b>DEFENSE</b>	-.2179 .0775 (-2.812)	-.2063 .0814 (-2.533)	-.1812 .0870 (-2.084)	-.1441 .0908 (-1.587)	-.5151 .2860 (-1.801)	-.4221 .3785 (-1.115)
Helping the Middle Class	.7239 .0531 (13.633)	.5190 .0439 (11.830)	.7977 .0595 (13.416)	.5962 .0482 (12.373)	.4827 .2034 (2.373)	.0042 .1904 (0.022)
The Environment	.4537 .0698 (6.503)	.4266 .0668 (6.391)	.5641 .0749 (7.533)	.5512 .0710 (7.758)	-.3369 .2619 (-1.286)	-.4597 .3528 (-1.303)
<b>THE ECONOMY</b>	.0155 .0497 (0.313)	-.0515 .0465 (-1.107)	-.0670 .0572 (-1.170)	-.1209 .0529 (-2.284)	.2903 .1841 (1.577)	-.4449 .1826 (-2.437)
Budget Deficit	.3789 .0599 (6.319)	.2030 .0668 (3.039)	.5165 .0644 (8.022)	.3011 .0709 (4.244)	-.0761 .2644 (-0.288)	.1858 .4592 (0.405)



TABLE 13 (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	MEN	WOMEN	WHITE MEN	WHITE WOMEN	BLACK MEN	BLACK WOMEN
Relations with the Soviet Union	-.8256 .0984 (-8.391)	-.5888 .1093 (-5.389)	-.7893 .1088 (-7.253)	-.5309 .1207 (-4.398)	-.8884 .3546 (-2.505)	-.9676 .4173 (-2.319)
Vice Presidential Candidates	.6346 .0606 (10.477)	.6978 .0570 (12.230)	.7579 .0668 (11.351)	.8273 .0612 (13.516)	.1784 .2301 (0.775)	.3629 .3032 (1.197)
Party Affiliation	.1331 .0605 (2.201)	.1923 .0542 (3.548)	.1391 .0681 (2.042)	.1321 .0617 (2.141)	.0390 .2378 (0.164)	.5539 .2426 (2.283)
Helping the Poor	1.1035 .0748 (14.752)	1.0889 .0612 (17.785)	1.1656 .0874 (13.335)	1.0922 .0688 (15.867)	.1376 .2127 (0.647)	.6233 .2391 (2.606)
Likeability	-.1194 .0748 (-1.595)	-.0159 .0627 (-0.254)	-.0202 .0820 (-0.247)	.0630 .0675 (0.934)	-.5457 .3032 (-1.799)	.4449 .4346 (1.024)
Jesse Jackson	.4762 .0939 (5.074)	1.0293 .0943 (10.919)	-.2622 .1410 (-1.859)	.2819 .1348 (2.091)	.4197 .2423 (1.732)	1.0110 .2691 (3.757)
The Debates	.1276 .0815 (1.565)	-.0166 .0704 (-0.236)	.1796 .0894 (2.010)	.0355 .0779 (0.456)	-.3326 .3270 (-1.017)	-.4038 .2973 (1.358)
EXPERIENCE	-1.3654 .0648 (-21.055)	-1.2350 .0587 (-21.045)	-1.2499 .0715 (-17.473)	-1.1422 .0641 (-17.815)	-1.6400 .2686 (-6.106)	-1.1671 .2718 (-4.294)
Auxiliary Statistics <sup>a</sup>	N = 5,329* Bush = 2,862 Dukakis = 2,467 Log = -2,451.12 R <sup>2</sup> = .48	N = 6,113* Bush = 2,822 Dukakis = 3,291 Log = -2,896.61 R <sup>2</sup> = .49	N = 4,392* Bush = 2,676 Dukakis = 1,716 Log = -1,888.91 R <sup>2</sup> = .46	N = 4,944* Bush = 2,669 Dukakis = 2,275 Log = -2,320.79 R <sup>2</sup> = .48	N = 635** Bush = 77 Dukakis = 558 Log = -173.17 R <sup>2</sup> = .35	N = 815** Bush = 56 Dukakis = 759 Log = -146.19 R <sup>2</sup> = .26

Note: The statistical results were produced using the probit technique. The dependent variable in the model is vote choice; Michael S. Dukakis (1) or George Bush (2). Estimated probit coefficients and standard errors precede t-values shown in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> See appendix for discussion of the Aldrich-Nelson Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> calculation.

\*  $p \leq .01$  for  $N \geq 1,000$

\*\*  $p \leq .05$  for  $N < 1,000$

**TABLE 14**  
**REGION, CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES DATA SET**  
**The Effects of Model Independent Variables on Vote Choice**

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	NORTHEAST <sup>a</sup>	SOUTH <sup>b</sup>	MIDWEST <sup>c</sup>	WEST <sup>d</sup>
CRIME	-.6895 .0793 (-8.688)	-.5153 .0694 (-7.418)	-.5456 .0701 (-7.778)	-.4857 .0813 (-5.970)
TAXES	-.3939 .0887 (-4.439)	-.2881 .0772 (-3.732)	-.4693 .0741 (-6.327)	-.3772 .0963 (-3.915)
ABORTION	-.2245 .1224 (-1.834)	-.0570 .1233 (-0.463)	-.5836 .1011 (-5.771)	-.3201 .1322 (-2.420)
DUKAKIS' LIBERAL VIEWS	.4106 .0690 (5.944)	.0883 .0652 (1.355)	.1776 .0623 (2.851)	.2669 .0760 (3.510)
PATRIOTIC VALUES	-.8137 .1216 (-6.691)	-.9455 .1102 (-8.581)	-.5575 .1127 (-4.946)	-.5160 .1135 (-4.545)
DEFENSE	-.1893 .1216 (-1.557)	-.4430 .1129 (-3.922)	-.1694 .1022 (-1.657)	-.0994 .1233 (-0.806)
Helping the Middle Class	.5085 .0683 (7.439)	.7812 .0669 (11.671)	.5693 .0599 (9.508)	.6299 .0815 (7.725)
The Environment	.3519 .0947 (3.716)	.3858 .1014 (3.804)	.3851 .0957 (4.022)	.5507 .0999 (5.514)
THE ECONOMY	-.0928 .0711 (-1.305)	.0169 .0653 (0.259)	.0354 .0620 (0.571)	-.0947 .0757 (-1.250)
Budget Deficit	.5200 .0969 (5.365)	.3344 .0882 (3.790)	.0631 .0792 (0.797)	.3312 .1002 (3.305)
Relations with the Soviet Union	-.6732 .1481 (-4.545)	-.7871 .1466 (-5.368)	-.6737 .1283 (-5.249)	-.8664 .1706 (-5.076)
Vice Presidential Candidates	.8502 .0882 (9.639)	.6906 .0799 (8.641)	.5457 .0743 (7.346)	.6114 .0962 (6.354)
Party Affiliation	.2770 .0878 (3.153)	.2926 .0762 (3.837)	.0883 .0738 (1.197)	.0237 .0905 (0.263)

TABLE 14 (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	NORTHEAST <sup>a</sup>	SOUTH <sup>b</sup>	MIDWEST <sup>c</sup>	WEST <sup>d</sup>
Helping the Poor	1.2717 .1071 (11.874)	1.0847 .0895 (12.109)	1.0029 .0804 (12.465)	1.1965 .1171 (10.216)
Likeability	-.0944 .0992 (-0.951)	-.1824 .0947 (-1.926)	-.0098 .0878 (-0.112)	.0189 .1089 (0.174)
Jesse Jackson	.5384 .1227 (4.388)	.8422 .1184 (7.113)	.7896 .1257 (6.280)	.9539 .1793 (5.320)
The Debates	.0960 .1141 (0.841)	-.0179 .1108 (-0.162)	.0307 .0933 (0.329)	.0810 .1168 (0.693)
EXPERIENCE	-1.4075 .0881 (-15.973)	-1.3094 .0884 (-14.807)	-1.2156 .0786 (-15.452)	-1.2784 .0974 (-13.118)
Auxiliary Statistics <sup>e</sup>	N = 2,790* Bush = 1,243 Dukakis = 1,547 Log = -1,229.99 R <sup>2</sup> = .47	N = 3,184* Bush = 1,771 Dukakis = 1,413 Log = -1,423.90 R <sup>2</sup> = .47	N = 3,280* Bush = 1,690 Dukakis = 1,590 Log = -1,618.20 R <sup>2</sup> = .50	N = 2,212* Bush = 991 Dukakis = 1,221 Log = -1,042.01 R <sup>2</sup> = .49

Note: The statistical results were produced using the probit technique. The dependent variable in the model is vote choice; Michael S. Dukakis (1) or George Bush (2). Estimated probit coefficients and standard errors precede t-values shown in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> Northeastern states include Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, & District of Columbia.

<sup>b</sup> Southern states include Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Texas, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, & Louisiana.

<sup>c</sup> Midwestern states include Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, & Oklahoma.

<sup>d</sup> Western states include Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, & Hawaii.

<sup>e</sup> See appendix for discussion of the Aldrich-Nelson Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> calculation.

\*  $p \leq .01$  for  $N \geq 1,000$

influencing voters against the selection of Dukakis. Rather, the summary evaluation term "radical liberal" achieved significance. The liberal variable achieved significance influencing vote choice against Dukakis among the aggregate electorate, Democrats, men, women, white men, and white women.<sup>2</sup> The evidence suggests that when confronted with making a single statement regarding judgmental assessments of reasons why to be concerned about Dukakis, voters found the term "radical liberal" to be a more comprehensively inclusive label expressing their negative feelings toward the Democratic nominee.

The results of the analyses of the exit poll survey and the October 8-10 survey also suggest an alternative explanation for the inconsistent and unexpected results based on the theory of "mental economies" advanced by Michael Gant and Dwight Davis. The theory attempts to explain how voters can engage in issue-based voting even if they lack the requisite information for such complex decision-making. The assumptions underlying the theory of mental economies embrace the same base tenet of schema theory and the theory of cognitive heuristics; voters engage in information processing that economizes political decision-making. Furthermore, the theory assumes that people are limited in their ability to process and retain information. Therefore, the theory argues:

It is sometimes efficient to remember only summary evaluations [of candidates] while forgetting explicit components of those evaluations. Such summary evaluations are likely to be expressed in global terms such as: "He's a good Democrat." "He is a man you can trust." "He is too liberal." "He is for farmers." None of these statements incorporates unambiguous policy-issue content, but they may, nonetheless, be manifestations of specific issue considerations. (Gant & Dwight 1984, 135)

In the context of the current research concerning the exit poll data, voters who liked Dukakis' specific policy positions may have selected the response choice pertaining to his liberal views because it captured the summary essence of their knowledge

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<sup>2</sup> The *CBS News/New York Times* October 8-10 survey had a sample size of 1,518 respondents. The probit results are included in the appendix. Results for Reagan Democrats and black men and women are not included because the number of respondents was insufficient for proper statistical analysis to be conducted.

concerning the Democratic nominee's issue positions. The summary response may have been a more appropriate selection particularly if specific issues which influenced their vote choice did not appear among the mix of response choices. Similarly, when respondents were confronted with the opportunity to make one single statement expressing their concerns regarding Dukakis, as was the case in the October 8-10 survey, the summary term "radical liberal" may have underscored their specific policy concerns regarding the host of specific "negative cluster" issues.

The results of the probit analyses of both the *CBS News New York Times* exit poll survey and the October 8-10 survey indicate that how voters engage in decision-making and express those decisions in surveys may depend on how they process information themselves and on the survey conditions with which they are confronted. Question and response wording, restrictions on response choice, and the question format itself, whether a single open-ended response or a limited selection of response choices, can potentially impact what information is conveyed and in turn can produce statistical analyses with seemingly contradictory results.

The model controlling for partisan identification explained approximately 49% of the variance in the dependent variable for the electorate as a whole, 37% among Democrats, 32% among Republicans, and 48% among Independents.

Reagan Democrats. Among the classifications of Reagan Democrats analyzed experience proved to be the most potent issue against voters choosing Dukakis (table 12). Comparing coefficients, the strength of the experience variable varied with income and education. Experience was a stronger influence against the selection of Dukakis among lower income (-1.5733) and less educated (-1.5653) Reagan Democrats than higher income (-1.2385) and higher educated (-1.1208) Reagan Democrats. Dukakis' liberal views also varied with income and education. While a significant factor influencing vote choice in favor of Dukakis among Reagan Democrats in general, when controlling for

income and education Dukakis' liberalism was significant only among lower income and less educated Reagan Democrats. In all categories analyzed the economy and taxes did not prove to be a statistically significant factors affecting vote choice among Reagan Democrats. National defense was a significant factor against choosing Dukakis only among Reagan Democrats whose income was greater than or equal to \$25,000 a year.

Crime and patriotic values were significant factors influencing voters against the selection of Dukakis among all categories of Reagan Democrats analyzed. Comparing coefficients, crime was a stronger issue among higher income (-.6713) and less educated (-.7291) Reagan Democrats than lower income (-.5544) and higher educated (-.5008) Reagan Democrats. Controlling for income patriotic values was approximately equal in strength as a voting issue against Dukakis among Reagan Democrats who made less than \$25,000 a year (-.7023) and those who made \$25,000 a year or more (-.7430). However, controlling for education, patriotic values was a stronger issue among Reagan Democrats with a high school education or less (-.8568) than among college educated (-.5594) Reagan Democrats.

Abortion did not achieve statistical significance as a voting issue among any of the categories of Reagan Democrats analyzed. This contradicts results gathered from the model using *ABC News Washington Post* data reported in table 8. As previously discussed, methodological constraints imposed by the *CBS News New York Times* survey's limitation on responses may have produced this result.

The  $R^2$  figure indicates that the model explains approximately 48% of the variance in the dependent variable among Reagan Democrats in general and among the two income categories of Reagan Democrats analyzed. The model explains 49% and 47% of the dependent variable variance among Reagan Democrats with a high school education or less and college educated Reagan Democrats respectively.

Gender and race. Among all gender and racial categories analyzed, experience was the strongest factor influencing vote choice against Dukakis (table 13). The coefficients indicate that experience was a slightly stronger influence against choosing Dukakis among men in the aggregate (-1.3654) and white men (-1.2499) than women in the aggregate (-1.2350) and white women (-1.1422). Experience was a much stronger influence against Dukakis for black men (-1.6400) than black women (-1.1671). With the exception of black women, the economy was not a significant factor influencing vote choice. Surprisingly, among black women the economy tested as a significant influence against the selection of Dukakis.

With the exception of black men, taxes was a significant issue influencing voters against Dukakis among all analyzed categories. On the other hand, defense was only statistically significant among men in general.

The significance of Dukakis' liberal views varied according to gender. Among all categories of women analyzed Dukakis' liberalism was significant in influencing voters to choose the Democratic nominee. The coefficients indicate that Dukakis' liberalism was strongest among black women (.6575). Among men in general, white men, and black men, Dukakis' liberal views did not achieve statistically significant status.

Crime and patriotic values were statistically significant issues influencing voters against Dukakis among all categories analyzed. Abortion again produced mixed results when compared to those reported for the model using *ABC News Washington Post* data. Abortion was a significant issue against Dukakis among men and women in the aggregate and among white women. However, abortion did not achieve significance among black men and women and was marginal as an insignificant issue against Dukakis among white men. Again, a possible explanation for this inconsistency may lie with the methodological constraints of the *CBS News New York Times* survey itself.

The model explains approximately 48% of the variance in the dependent variable among men and white women. Among women, white men, and black men and black

women the model explains 49%, 46%, 35%, and 26% of the dependent variable variance respectively.

**Region.** Experience was the strongest influence against voters choosing Dukakis in all regions of the country (table 14). The variable coefficients indicate that experience was the strongest in the Northeast (-1.4075) followed by the South, West, and Midwest respectively. Taxes were also significant against the selection of Dukakis in all regions. The coefficients indicate that the issue had its strongest impact among voters in the Midwest (-.4693). National defense, however, only achieve statistical significance among voters in the South (-3.922). The economy, on the other hand, did not achieve statistical significance in any region of the country.

Dukakis' liberal views achieved significance influencing voters in favor of the Democratic nominee in the Northeast and West. The variable coefficients indicate that Dukakis' liberalism was strongest in the Northeast (.4106) and weakest in the South (.0883). This result is not surprising as the Northeast has traditionally been the most liberal region of the country and the South the most conservative.

Crime and patriotic values were both statistically significant issues influencing voters against selecting Dukakis in all regions of the country. Similar to the results reported with regard to the Pledge of Allegiance issue in the model using *ABC News Washington Post* data, the t-value of the patriotic values variable was the most potent in the South (-8.581). Again, the issue of abortion proved to be an anomaly. The issue only achieved statistical significance among Midwestern voters. This contrasts with the results reported in the *ABC News Washington Post* model in which abortion was a significant influence against Dukakis among both Southern and Midwestern voters.

The  $R^2$  indicates that the model explains approximately 47% of the variance in the dependent variable among Northeastern and Southern voters. The model explains 50%



and 49% of the dependent variable variance among Midwestern and Western voters respectively.

### Discussion

Was the economy a significant factor influencing voters to choose George Bush? The evidence strongly favors the null hypothesis. In fact, the economy did not achieve statistical significance in any category analyzed except among black women. The coefficient indicates that the economy actually influenced black women to choose Bush. This is surprising since conventional wisdom suggests that blacks, particularly women, would tend to view the economic policies supported by Democratic candidates more favorably. In addition, blacks did not reap the rewards of the economic expansion during the 1980s to the extent that whites benefited from the strong economic recovery. The evidence presented in this analysis suggests that despite other claims, the economy may not have been as significant of an influence advancing Republican presidential fortunes in 1988 as previously thought.

Unlike the economy, the evidence indicates that experience was a significant factor influencing voters to select Bush. Among all categories analyzed the t-values and coefficients indicate that experience was the strongest variable in the model affecting vote choice. The evidence suggests that despite Dukakis' claims to managerial competence resulting from his years as Massachusetts' chief executive, the voters were more inclined to view George Bush as the candidate more experienced to deal with presidential responsibilities, particularly in foreign affairs. Voters' apprehension regarding Dukakis' lack of foreign policy experience is underscored by the evidence which shows that among all voters, Democrats, Independents, higher income Reagan Democrats, all gender and racial categories and regions analyzed, the relations with the Soviet Union variable was a salient vote choice issue influencing voters to select Bush.

Unlike the death penalty, prison furloughs, and the Pledge of Allegiance issues, two "negative cluster" issues, taxes and defense, did not achieve statistical significance among every analyzed category. However, where statistical significance was achieved both issues worked against voters selecting the Democratic nominee. The issue of taxes was significant among all voters in general, Republicans, Independents, all regions, and all gender and racial categories analyzed with the exception of black men. Compared to taxes, national defense was not as strong an issue. Defense achieved significance as an issue against the selection of Dukakis only among all voters, Democrats, higher income Reagan Democrats, men and women in general, and voters residing in the South. Despite Bush's emphasis on national defense issues during the campaign, that fact that national defense was limited in the scope of its statistical significance among the analyzed categories suggests that its saliency was predicated on whether the issue was fundamentally related to personal interests. For example, voters living in communities economically sensitive to the defense industry may have been more susceptible to Republican appeals concerning Dukakis' alleged opposition to many of the defense systems developed and deployed under the Reagan administration. This may explain why the issue achieved significance in the South where states, like Texas, are dependent on the defense industry for jobs.

The Pledge of Allegiance and the death penalty and prison furlough issues are generally represented in the model's patriotic values and crime variables. The analysis results provide additional evidence to support the contention that the symbolic "negative cluster" issues, particularly the death penalty, prison furloughs, and Pledge issues, used by Bush to frame Dukakis as a liberal were significant factors influencing vote choice against the Democratic nominee. Paralleling the evidence of the previous section, both the crime and patriotic values variables achieve significance as voting issues against Dukakis in all categories analyzed.

## THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE REPUBLICAN STRATEGY: THE EFFECTS OF SYMBOLIC VALUE ISSUES IN KEY ELECTORAL STATES

In June, after Michael Dukakis had sown-up the Democratic nomination with his victory in the California primary, polling results had shown the Massachusetts governor with a significant lead over his probable opponent, George Bush. A *USA Today CNN* survey of 1,253 registered voters conducted on June 7-9 had Dukakis beating Bush 45% to 38%. Other poll results echoed the *USA Today CNN* findings. An *NBC News Wall Street Journal* survey found Dukakis with 49% and Bush with 34% and a poll conducted by the Gallop organization gave the Massachusetts governor 52% and the vice president 38%. Dukakis' lead over Bush widened further after the Democratic National Convention. A post convention poll conducted by *NBC News Wall Street Journal* found Dukakis with a 17 percentage point lead; 51% to 34% (Maloney 1989, 75). In the midst of their jubilation concerning the poll results Dukakis' campaign advisors talked of a "fifty-state strategy" (Germond & Witcover 1989, 413).

In reality, the broad national base the Republican party had developed in the aftermath of the Great Society overshadowed the credibility of the Dukakis claim of a fifty state strategy. Beginning in 1968, twenty three states with 202 electoral votes had gone Republican in five consecutive presidential elections creating, in effect, a Republican "lock" on the electoral college.<sup>1</sup> With the exception of Virginia, these 202 electoral votes did not include any electors from states within the old confederacy, a region which had been trending Republican on the national level since 1964. On the other hand, only the

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

<sup>1</sup> The twenty three states include New Hampshire, Vermont, New Jersey, Virginia, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Oregon, California, and Alaska.

District of Columbia with a grand total of 3 electors voted for the Democratic presidential ticket in each of the five presidential elections after 1964.

Besides the Republican advantage in the electoral college, the Democrats were further handicapped by a lack of support talent experienced in presidential politics. Unlike the Bush campaign team, much of Dukakis' inner circle, including campaign manager Susan Estrich, were national level political novices. In contrast, Bush campaign chairman James Baker was a veteran of several national political battles, having managed President Ford's campaign in 1976, George Bush's in 1980, and President Reagan's 1984 reelection effort. The vice president's campaign manager, Lee Atwater, was also no stranger to presidential politics having served in a variety of campaign capacities during the 1970s and 1980s.

As the heady days of spring and summer gave way to the sobering realism of autumn the Dukakis campaign, having witnessed their candidate squander a 17 point lead in the national polls and facing the realities of the Republican electoral college advantage, concentrated their efforts on a strategy which focused on eighteen states and the District of Columbia (figure 15). In terms of electors, the mathematics of the Dukakis strategy amounted to 272 votes, two more than needed to win. To this core group the governor's strategists included seven additional states with a total of 43 electoral votes in which they believed Dukakis was still competitive (figure 15). The Democrat's electoral college strategy left virtually no room for error. Commenting on the dynamics of the Dukakis campaign's electoral strategy Bush campaign manager Lee Atwater compared it to poker saying their plan amounted to nothing more than an "inside-straight" (Germond & Witcover 1989, 449).

For Bush the dynamics of the general election strategy were implemented on a political playing field that centered on a group of large and medium size states in which the race, by early October, was a virtual dead heat. Initially, the Bush strategy amounted to retaining the Republican base in the South and West and targeting Texas, Ohio, and New



Jersey for a total of 273 electoral votes. However, as Dukakis' lead began to evaporate in the face of the Republican onslaught, Bush strategists switched gears and mounted an offensive operation waging the political ground and air war in those states Dukakis needed to win (figure 16). During the final six weeks of the campaign Dukakis spent three-fourths of his time in eight states--California, Illinois, Michigan, Texas, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Missouri. According to Lee Atwater, "Literally, in those last weeks of the campaign, there wasn't a single state that he [Dukakis] was in that he didn't have to have, to win the whole election" (Germond & Witcover 1989, 416). The Bush strategy was simply to bring the battle to Dukakis' own turf. As one campaign official said the Republican strategy was "to shadow the guy--don't let him do anything in the clear--be where he is, get on the air with paid media where he is" (Drew 1989, 347). In the final weeks of the campaign Bush spent more than half his time in six states--California, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, and New Jersey (Germond & Witcover 1989, 416). Bush would often arrive in one of the eight states the Dukakis campaign had targeted shortly after the Democratic nominee had made an appearance. Simultaneously, the vice president's campaign saturated the airwaves in states targeted by the Dukakis team with paid media advertising. The basic goal of the Republican strategy is contained in a comment made by Robert Teeter, the Bush campaign's pollster. "We didn't want an inside straight. If you're aiming for two hundred and seventy electoral votes, you should target three hundred and fifty. If you could carry Texas, Ohio, and New Jersey, you could win be carrying California, or Illinois, or Michigan--any one of those pulled the rug out from under Dukakis" (Drew 1989, 347).

To deny Governor Dukakis his "inside straight" victory, the Bush campaign focused the bulk of their candidate's time and the campaign's resources on winning several key states; notably California, Illinois, Missouri, Ohio, and New Jersey. Eight states are analyzed to assess the extent that the symbolic "negative cluster" value issues affected voters in key electoral states that either the Bush campaign targeted, the Dukakis

campaign needed to win, or both. The states included in the analysis are California, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Highlights of salient political events in each state precede the actual reporting of results. The results are reported in tables 15 through 18.

### California

Campaign highlights. California, with 47 electors in 1988, was the largest electoral prize. As a testament of the importance of the state to both campaigns, Bush and Dukakis each made 21 campaign appearances in California between October 1st and election day, November 8th. From the outset the Bush team made crime a central issue in California. Roger Stone, a Republican consultant who ran Bush's California effort, did not relent on the issue even after Bush decisively beat Dukakis in the October 13th presidential debate. According to Stone the important thing in California was that "we never departed from our game plan--even after the euphoria of the second debate" (Drew 1989, 342). The Bush campaign purchased a "saturation radio" buy highlighting Dukakis' positions on the furlough issue and the Democratic nominee's opposition to the death penalty. Stone claimed the death penalty was at least as strong an issue against Dukakis as the prison furlough program among California voters (Drew 1989, 343).

The Bush campaign was not the only organization in California focusing on Dukakis and crime. On October 20th, three weeks before election day, a pro-Bush independent expenditure organization, *Committee for the Presidency*, began to broadcast anti-Dukakis ads in Pacific coast media markets featuring the victims of furloughed criminal Willie Horton (Maloney 1989, 150).

Traditionally, Californians have been sensitive to environmental issues. To capitalize on Californians' concern for their environment the Republicans attempted to paint Dukakis as unacceptable because of the governor's alleged neglect of Boston harbor.

TABLE 15

**STRATEGIC ELECTORAL STATES,  
ABC NEWS/WASHINGTON POST DATA SET**

**The Effects of Model Independent Variables on Vote Choice**

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	CALIFORNIA	ILLINOIS	MARYLAND	MICHIGAN
ABORTION	.2425 .0860 (2.819)	-.2278 .0952 (-2.393)	.1539 .2471 (0.623)	-.2742 .0789 (-3.475)
THE DEATH PENALTY	-1.2404 .1018 (-12.185)	-.9629 .1145 (-8.409)	-1.2341 .2844 (-4.339)	-.8573 .0971 (-8.829)
THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE	-.7592 .1564 (-4.863)	-.8937 .1603 (-5.575)	-1.1401 .4293 (-2.656)	-1.2209 .1676 (-7.285)
THE ACLU	.0423 .1585 (0.267)	.0245 .1692 (0.145)	-.3683 .4398 (-0.837)	.2035 .1549 (1.314)
PRISON FURLOUGHS	-1.0155 .1539 (-6.599)	-.7104 .1462 (-4.859)	-1.6136 .5614 (-2.867)	-.8145 .1433 (-5.682)
Dukakis/Bush Debates	.0052 .0745 (0.070)	.3098 .0784 (3.950)	-.3113 .2075 (-1.500)	.0653 .0762 (0.857)
Bentsen/Quayle Debates	.3091 .1199 (2.579)	.6806 .1335 (5.097)	.3117 .3213 (0.970)	.1054 .1263 (0.834)
Party Affiliation	-.1006 .0731 (-1.376)	-.2716 .0835 (-3.251)	.1684 .2289 (0.736)	-.0612 .0778 (-0.786)
Presidential Candidate Personality	-.2905 .1168 (-2.486)	-.0642 .1147 (-0.560)	-.1328 .3421 (-0.388)	-.2517 .1118 (-2.251)
College Costs	.5870 .1440 (4.077)	.6641 .1444 (4.597)	1.1683 .4254 (2.746)	.4509 .1227 (3.675)



TABLE 15 (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	CALIFORNIA	ILLINOIS	MARYLAND	MICHIGAN
Health Care	.9050 .1147 (7.884)	.4471 .1152 (3.879)	.9403 .2942 (3.196)	.8189 .1019 (8.039)
The Environment	.7944 .1120 (7.091)	.3837 .1287 (2.980)	-.3007 .3314 (-0.907)	.3364 .1047 (3.211)
Drugs	-.0687 .1057 (-0.651)	.0768 .1075 (0.715)	-.5114 .2824 (-1.811)	-.1928 .0980 (-1.968)
Education	.3122 .1111 (2.811)	.3413 .1130 (3.021)	.4213 .3426 (1.230)	.2879 .1047 (2.750)
The Iran Contra Affair	1.0137 .1513 (6.698)	.8885 .1531 (5.804)	1.7252 .6950 (2.482)	.9972 .1396 (7.144)
Social Security	.2205 .1210 (1.822)	.0911 .1106 (0.824)	.2678 .2841 (0.943)	.1683 .1025 (1.642)
Capital Gains Tax	-.4672 .1686 (-2.770)	-.3561 .1654 (-2.152)	-.1446 .5715 (-0.253)	-.5233 .1796 (-2.914)
Foreign Competition	-.4362 .1221 (-3.570)	-.4125 .1348 (-3.060)	-.3418 .3671 (-0.931)	.0608 .1214 (0.501)
Dan Quayle	.6867 .1256 (5.468)	.5100 .1330 (3.834)	.4784 .3439 (1.391)	.3845 .1218 (3.156)
Lloyd Bentsen	1.1863 .1564 (7.582)	1.3471 .1992 (6.762)	1.4733 .4274 (3.447)	1.6297 .1742 (9.356)
Auxiliary Statistics <sup>a</sup>	N = 2,358* Bush = 1,040 Dukakis = 1,318 Log = -1.084.57 R <sup>2</sup> = .48	N = 1,901* Bush = 829 Dukakis = 1,072 Log = -.995.58 R <sup>2</sup> = .51	N = 422** Bush = 195 Dukakis = 227 Log = -.208.23 R <sup>2</sup> = .50	N = 2,072* Bush = 1,050 Dukakis = 1,022 Log = -1.058.06 R <sup>2</sup> = .51

Note: The statistical results were produced using the probit technique. The dependent variable in the model is vote choice; Michael S. Dukakis (1) or George Bush (2). Estimated probit coefficients and standard errors precede t-values shown in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> See appendix for discussion of the Aldrich-Nelson Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> calculation.

\*  $p \leq .01$  for  $N \geq 1,000$

\*\*  $p \leq .05$  for  $N < 1,000$

**TABLE 16**  
**STRATEGIC ELECTORAL STATES,**  
**ABC NEWS/WASHINGTON POST DATA SET**

**The Effects of Model Independent Variables on Vote Choice**

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	NEW JERSEY	OHIO	PENNSYLVANIA	TEXAS
ABORTION	.2250 .1026 (2.192)	-.3878 .0906 (-4.278)	-.4123 .0798 (-5.166)	-.3064 .0840 (-3.644)
THE DEATH PENALTY	-1.1675 .1117 (-10.448)	-.8124 .1061 (-7.652)	-.9321 .0929 (-10.024)	-.9479 .0917 (-10.335)
THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE	-.8388 .1694 (-4.950)	-.6882 .1578 (-4.359)	-.7124 .1233 (-5.774)	-.8391 .1263 (-6.641)
THE ACLU	.2427 .1718 (1.412)	-.1188 .1618 (-0.734)	-.1339 .1377 (-0.972)	.1161 .1322 (0.878)
PRISON FURLOUGHS	-1.1103 .1832 (-6.060)	-1.0781 .1631 (-6.609)	-1.1061 .1559 (-7.094)	-.6801 .1277 (-5.326)
Dukakis/Bush Debates	.1077 .0821 (1.312)	.0776 .0746 (1.041)	.0558 .0747 (0.747)	.2899 .0735 (3.945)
Bentsen/Quayle Debates	.4927 .1340 (3.677)	.3377 .1239 (2.726)	.4343 .1170 (3.712)	.5006 .1210 (4.137)
Party Affiliation	-.1207 .0854 (-1.413)	-.1006 .0781 (-1.288)	-.1988 .0761 (-2.610)	.0139 .0726 (0.192)
Presidential Candidate Personality	-.3114 .1221 (-2.550)	-.2987 .1127 (-2.649)	-.1876 .1022 (-1.835)	-.4947 .1229 (-4.022)
College Costs	.6074 .1316 (4.614)	.6783 .1382 (4.907)	.6242 .1158 (5.388)	.4067 .1208 (3.365)

TABLE 16 (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	NEW JERSEY	OHIO	PENNSYLVANIA	TEXAS
Health Care	.5556 .1196 (4.646)	.6002 .1022 (5.869)	.7954 .0989 (8.041)	.7674 .1063 (7.217)
The Environment	.2770 .1106 (2.505)	.3188 .1180 (2.702)	.2854 .1044 (2.732)	.5206 .1082 (4.812)
Drugs	-.0782 .1044 (-0.749)	-.0863 .0971 (-0.889)	-.1241 .0927 (-1.339)	-.0927 .0943 (-0.982)
Education	.3081 .1199 (2.569)	.1320 .1089 (1.213)	.4318 .1001 (4.315)	.2220 .0966 (2.297)
The Iran Contra Affair	.9285 .1577 (5.888)	.9496 .1529 (6.211)	.8690 .1368 (6.352)	.8410 .1284 (6.547)
Social Security	.3123 .1203 (2.595)	.0947 .0987 (0.960)	.2168 .0906 (2.392)	.1278 .1066 (1.199)
Capital Gains Tax	-.4560 .1566 (-2.912)	-.5013 .1705 (-2.940)	-.4796 .1500 (-3.197)	-.7318 .1444 (-5.069)
Foreign Competition	-.4563 .1395 (-3.272)	-.1240 .1203 (-1.031)	-.2700 .1199 (-2.251)	-.2383 .1142 (-2.086)
Dan Quayle	.7428 .1381 (5.376)	.1764 .1143 (1.543)	.7655 .1176 (6.509)	.5539 .1214 (4.560)
Lloyd Bentsen	1.9079 .2587 (7.375)	1.6342 .1929 (8.469)	1.2927 .1678 (7.701)	1.7914 .1419 (12.625)
Auxiliary Statistics <sup>a</sup>	N = 1,893* Bush = 1,025 Dukakis = 868 Log = -903.44 R <sup>2</sup> = .49	N = 2,029* Bush = 1,065 Dukakis = 964 Log = -1,069.90 R <sup>2</sup> = .51	N = 2,394* Bush = 1,146 Dukakis = 1,248 Log = -1,199.34 R <sup>2</sup> = .50	N = 2,560* Bush = 1,410 Dukakis = 1,150 Log = -1,152.60 R <sup>2</sup> = .47

Note: The statistical results were produced using the probit technique. The dependent variable in the model is vote choice: Michael S. Dukakis (1) or George Bush (2). Estimated probit coefficients and standard errors precede t-values shown in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> See appendix for discussion of the Aldrich-Nelson Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> calculation.

\*  $p \leq .01$  for  $N \geq 1,000$

**TABLE 17**  
**STRATEGIC ELECTORAL STATES,**  
**CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES DATA SET**

The Effects of Model Independent Variables on Vote Choice

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	CALIFORNIA	ILLINOIS	MARYLAND	MICHIGAN
CRIME	-.5256 .1086 (-4.841)	-.6396 .1744 (-3.667)	-.8112 .2365 (-3.429)	-.5052 .1718 (-2.940)
TAXES	-.3849 .1275 (-3.017)	-.1542 .1604 (-0.961)	-.7059 .2981 (-2.368)	-.4207 .2217 (-1.898)
ABORTION	-.0894 .1951 (-0.458)	-.5022 .2313 (-2.171)	-.8515 .4541 (-1.875)	-.3207 .2412 (-1.329)
DUKAKIS' LIBERAL VIEWS	.3546 .1068 (3.319)	.4419 .1474 (2.997)	.0254 .2213 (0.115)	.4261 .1742 (2.445)
PATRIOTIC VALUES	-.5496 .1631 (-3.368)	-1.2644 .3038 (-4.161)	-.6849 .3422 (-2.001)	-.5773 .3137 (-1.840)
DEFENSE	-.3158 .1863 (-1.695)	-.3098 .2540 (-1.219)	-.5393 .4247 (-1.269)	-.1217 .3001 (-0.406)
Helping the Middle Class	.5487 .1117 (4.910)	.5774 .1423 (4.058)	.7150 .2336 (3.061)	.3981 .1751 (2.274)
The Environment	.3508 .1301 (2.697)	.7670 .2574 (2.981)	.6404 .3401 (1.883)	.0354 .2335 (0.152)
THE ECONOMY	-.2189 .1037 (-2.110)	-.1051 .1460 (-0.719)	-.2601 .2131 (-1.221)	-.0566 .1582 (-0.358)
Budget Deficit	.4477 .1450 (3.087)	-.0177 .2144 (-0.083)	.1123 .2931 (0.383)	.2391 .2251 (1.062)

TABLE 17 (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	CALIFORNIA	ILLINOIS	MARYLAND	MICHIGAN
Relations with the Soviet Union	-.9058 .2589 (-3.498)	-1.4198 .4913 (-2.890)	-.9729 .4105 (-2.369)	-.7081 .4587 (-1.543)
Vice Presidential Candidates	.4160 .1321 (3.149)	.6346 .1792 (3.542)	.9659 .2919 (3.308)	.1781 .2014 (0.885)
Party Affiliation	-.1346 .1190 (-1.131)	.4259 .1865 (2.283)	.5471 .2762 (1.981)	-.0650 .1893 (-0.343)
Helping the Poor	1.1883 .1699 (6.993)	1.0927 .1949 (5.607)	1.8408 .4055 (4.539)	.8508 .1932 (4.403)
Likeability	-.2161 .1486 (-1.454)	.2138 .2103 (1.017)	-.0633 .3514 (-0.180)	-.1966 .2526 (-0.778)
Jesse Jackson	1.0271 .2245 (4.574)	.0115 .2791 (0.041)	1.0394 .3523 (2.950)	1.1219 .3105 (3.613)
The Debates	-.2272 .1601 (-1.419)	-.1759 .2195 (-0.801)	.6883 .4123 (1.669)	.2100 .2388 (0.879)
EXPERIENCE	-1.3331 .1324 (-10.064)	-1.0747 .1832 (-5.865)	-1.6792 .2835 (-5.923)	-1.4244 .1974 (-7.213)
Auxiliary Statistics <sup>d</sup>	N = 1,203* Bush = 494 Dukakis = 709 Log = -.551.61 R <sup>2</sup> = .48	N = 628** Bush = 327 Dukakis = 301 Log = -.292.25 R <sup>2</sup> = .48	N = 339** Bush = 144 Dukakis = 195 Log = -.124.91 R <sup>2</sup> = .42	N = 490** Bush = 197 Dukakis = 293 Log = -.231.84 R <sup>2</sup> = .49

Note: The statistical results were produced using the probit technique. The dependent variable in the model is vote choice; Michael S. Dukakis (1) or George Bush (2). Estimated probit coefficients and standard errors precede t-values shown in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> See appendix for discussion of the Aldrich-Nelson Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> calculation.

\*  $p \leq .01$  for  $N \geq 1,000$

\*\*  $p \leq .05$  for  $N < 1,000$

**TABLE 18**  
**STRATEGIC ELECTORAL STATES,**  
***CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES* DATA SET**

**The Effects of Model Independent Variables on Vote Choice**

<b>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>	<b>NEW JERSEY</b>	<b>OHIO</b>	<b>PENNSYLVANIA</b>	<b>TEXAS</b>
<b>CRIME</b>	-.6749 .2356 (-2.864)	-.7159 .1850 (-3.869)	-.7005 .2207 (-3.173)	-.6002 .1496 (-4.012)
<b>TAXES</b>	.0082 .2666 (0.031)	-.6179 .2023 (-3.053)	-.5255 .2212 (-2.375)	-.3006 .1837 (-1.636)
<b>ABORTION</b>	-.3524 .4875 (-0.723)	-.8758 .3115 (-2.811)	-.5575 .2848 (-1.957)	-.1110 .2854 (-0.389)
<b>DUKAKIS' LIBERAL VIEWS</b>	.4937 .2016 (2.449)	.1407 .1683 (0.836)	.7299 .1961 (3.721)	-.1727 .1382 (-1.250)
<b>PATRIOTIC VALUES</b>	-1.1521 .3968 (-2.903)	-.5627 .2995 (-1.879)	-1.0528 .3405 (-3.091)	-.6492 .2411 (-2.693)
<b>DEFENSE</b>	-.0057 .3259 (-0.018)	-.3769 .3064 (-1.230)	-.1068 .3369 (-0.317)	-.7014 .2509 (-2.795)
Helping the Middle Class	.4977 .2168 (2.296)	.4496 .1602 (2.805)	.4254 .1673 (2.543)	.9122 .1467 (6.217)
The Environment	.0412 .2768 (0.149)	-.0322 .2602 (-0.124)	-.0953 .3049 (-0.313)	.9186 .3471 (2.646)
<b>THE ECONOMY</b>	-.1915 .2294 (-0.835)	.0554 .1644 (0.337)	.1345 .1801 (0.747)	.3281 .1454 (2.257)
Budget Deficit	.1329 .3021 (0.440)	-.2068 .2342 (-0.883)	.3653 .2499 (1.462)	.2950 .2236 (1.319)

TABLE 18 (continued)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	NEW JERSEY	OHIO	PENNSYLVANIA	TEXAS
Relations with the Soviet Union	-1.5955 .7645 (-2.087)	-.1957 .2596 (-0.754)	-.7014 .3894 (-1.801)	-.0271 .2810 (-0.097)
Vice Presidential Candidates	.7799 .2716 (2.871)	.7198 .2010 (3.581)	1.0881 .2357 (4.616)	.6687 .1682 (3.976)
Party Affiliation	.1604 .2840 (0.565)	.1323 .2124 (0.623)	.3492 .2411 (1.448)	.2149 .1760 (1.221)
Helping the Poor	1.4790 .4656 (3.177)	1.2162 .2098 (5.795)	.9675 .2335 (4.142)	1.1581 .2021 (5.728)
Likeability	-.4619 .3101 (-1.489)	.0592 .2415 (0.245)	-.1967 .2177 (-0.904)	-.5405 .2369 (-2.281)
Jesse Jackson	.8547 .3632 (2.353)	1.3959 .3091 (4.516)	.0732 .3889 (0.188)	.7612 .2636 (2.887)
The Debates	.4987 .4096 (1.217)	-.1632 .2798 (-0.583)	.0968 .2747 (0.352)	.4181 .2507 (1.667)
<b>EXPERIENCE</b>	<b>-1.2391</b> <b>.2665</b> <b>(-4.650)</b>	<b>-.9329</b> <b>.2097</b> <b>(-4.448)</b>	<b>-1.4169</b> <b>.2160</b> <b>(-6.559)</b>	<b>-1.5871</b> <b>.2058</b> <b>(-7.711)</b>
Auxiliary Statistics <sup>a</sup>	N = 291* Bush = 121 Dukakis = 170 Log = -132.32 R <sup>2</sup> = .48	N = 484* Bush = 250 Dukakis = 234 Log = -227.39 R <sup>2</sup> = .48	N = 437* Bush = 209 Dukakis = 228 Log = -193.20 R <sup>2</sup> = .47	N = 726* Bush = 375 Dukakis = 351 Log = -301.49 R <sup>2</sup> = .45

*Note:* The statistical results were produced using the probit technique. The dependent variable in the model is vote choice; Michael S. Dukakis (1) or George Bush (2). Estimated probit coefficients and standard errors precede t-values shown in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> See appendix for discussion of the Aldrich-Nelson Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> calculation.

\* p ≤ .05 for N < 1,000

**TABLE 19**  
**1988 PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION,**  
**POPULAR & ELECTORAL VOTES/STRATEGIC STATES**

	GEORGE BUSH (R)		MICHAEL S. DUKAKIS (D)		
STATE (Electoral votes)	POPULAR VOTES	% <sup>a</sup>	POPULAR VOTES	% <sup>a</sup>	PLURALITY
California (47)	5,054,917	51.8	4,702,233	48.2	352,684 (R)
Illinois (24)	2,310,939	51.0	2,215,940	49.0	94,999 (R)
Maryland (10)	876,167	51.5	826,304	48.5	49,863 (R)
Michigan (20)	1,965,486	54.0	1,675,783	46.0	289,703 (R)
New Jersey (16)	1,743,192	56.9	1,320,352	43.1	422,840 (R)
Ohio (23)	2,416,549	55.5	1,939,629	44.5	476,920 (R)
Pennsylvania (25)	2,300,087	51.2	2,194,944	48.8	105,143 (R)
Texas (29)	3,036,829	56.3	2,352,748	43.7	684,081 (R)

Source: Presidential Elections, 1789-1992, *Congressional Quarterly*, 1995

<sup>a</sup> Percentages are recorded for the major party candidates only and do not reflect the total vote cast.

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On election day the Dukakis campaign mounted an aggressive grassroots "get-out-the-vote" effort. Democrats had 10,500 volunteer leaders in the state's 23,627 precincts who made over 70,000 phone calls each day during the final week of the campaign (Morrison 1988, 231). However, their efforts were not enough to mute the effects of Bush's massive media barrage and the eleventh hour pitch for support on the vice president's behalf from the Golden State's favorite son, Ronald Reagan. Bush defeated Dukakis in California by a margin of less than 2% of the total vote cast (table 19).

ABC News Washington Post data set. The results of the probit test indicate that three of the "negative cluster" issues; the death penalty (-12.185), the Pledge of Allegiance



(-4.863), and the prison furlough issue (-6.599) were significant factors influencing Californians to vote against Dukakis (table 15). The results also confirm Stone's assessment concerning the influence of the death penalty on vote choice. The coefficients of the two crime issues, the death penalty and the furlough issue, were fairly equal in their degree of strength against Dukakis. The fact that the environment was a significant factor influencing voters to select Dukakis (7.091) indicates that among Californians Bush's efforts at denigrating Dukakis' environmental record failed. The  $R^2$  figure estimates that the model explained approximately 48% of the variance in the dependent variable among California voters.

CBS News New York Times data set. The probit tests indicate that among the variables associated with the "negative cluster" issues crime (-4.841), taxes (-3.017), and patriotic values (-3.368) were significant influences against voters choosing Dukakis (table 17). Defense was not significant, nor was the economy. However, experience (-10.064) was overwhelmingly the strongest variable in the model influencing vote choice against the Massachusetts governor. Specific voter concerns regarding foreign policy experience may be reflected in the relations with the Soviet Union variable (-3.498). Overall, experience issues appear to have been the strongest influences against Dukakis as the variable coefficients are greatest in the model for the experience variable (-1.3331) and the relations with the Soviet Union variable (-.9058). Dukakis' liberal views tested significant influencing vote choice in the governor's favor. The model provides additional evidence to suggest that Bush failed to make the environment a salient voting issue against Dukakis among California voters. As in the model using the *ABC News Washington Post* data, the t-value for the environment variable was significant (2.697) but worked in favor of voters choosing Dukakis. The  $R^2$  figure indicates that 48% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the model.

### Illinois

Campaign highlights. Like California, crime was the focal point of the Bush campaign and local Republican efforts on behalf of the vice president. The Bush campaign purchased large segments of television time to air the "Revolving-door" ad. However, the most controversial campaign tactic was practiced by the state GOP. In October, the Illinois Republican party distributed an anti-Dukakis brochure focusing on the Democratic candidate's support for prison furloughs and his opposition to both the death penalty and the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools. Headlined with "All the murderers, rapists, drug pushers, and child molesters in Massachusetts vote for Michael Dukakis," the brochure claimed that "Dukakis has said that if the people of Massachusetts vote by referendum to reinstate the death sentence, he will commute every death penalty given to murderers by juries" and that the Democratic nominee "supports the 'right' of Massachusetts convicts to vote." Outraged by the brochure, Dukakis, in an appearance in Quincy, Illinois on October 19th, called the tactic "political garbage" (Black & Oliphant 1989, 303).

Another brochure from the Illinois GOP featured a well-known Chicago mass murderer, John Wayne Gacy. After a celebrated 1980 trial highlighted by a large amount of national and local media coverage, Gacy was convicted of killing 33 young men and boys. The brochure, capitalizing on Gacy's infamous status, proclaimed: "Stop and think! If John Wayne Gacy had committed his atrocious crimes in Boston instead of Chicago, he would be eligible for weekend passes under Michael Dukakis' furlough program" (Jamieson 1992, 473).

Traditionally, Democratic candidates win Illinois if their margins in Chicago and the Cook County suburbs can offset Republican votes in the southern part of the state. Unfortunately for Dukakis, Bush won the Chicago suburbs resulting in the vice president receiving a 95,000 vote plurality out of over 4.5 million cast (table 19).

ABC News Washington Post data set. The results indicate that the issues of crime and patriotism dominated over other variables in the model as issues influencing Illinois voters against choosing Dukakis (table 15). The t-values for the death penalty (-8.407), the Pledge of Allegiance issue (-5.573), and the prison furlough issue (-4.856) achieved significance influencing vote choice against Dukakis. Comparing the coefficients, the death penalty (-.9629) was a stronger crime issue than prison furloughs (-.7104) for Illinois voters. The coefficient of the Pledge of Allegiance variable (-.8937) indicates that it was fairly equal in its potency with the death penalty issue. The  $R^2$  figure shows that approximately 51% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the model.

CBS News New York Times data set. The probit tests indicate that crime (-3.667) and patriotic values (-4.161) were significant influences against voters choosing Dukakis (table 17). Comparing the coefficients it appears that patriotic values (-1.2644) had a stronger effect than crime (-.6396) among Illinois voters. Other "negative cluster" issues, notably taxes and defense issues, were not significant. However, abortion (-2.171) was significant as was Dukakis' liberal views (2.997). Experience worked strongly in Bush's favor. While the experience variable had the strongest t-value (-5.865), it appears that when variable coefficients are compared it was not the strongest influence against Dukakis. Among the variable mix the relations with the Soviet Union variable posted the strongest coefficient (-1.4198). The  $R^2$  indicates that the model explains 48% of the variance in the dependent variable among Illinois voters.

### Maryland

Campaign highlights. Illinois was not the only state where the local GOP was active in disseminating anti-Dukakis mailings on the subject of crime. A local fund raising letter, referring to Dukakis and Horton as a "team," was mailed from David Fleming, the

chair of the Maryland Republican party. Mailed in September, the letter asked, "Is this your pro-family team for 1988?" The text of the letter added, "You, your spouse, your children, and your friends can have visit from someone like Willie Horton if Mike Dukakis becomes president" (Jamieson 1992, 472). The strategic intent embodied in the content of the letter is notable because two of Horton's well-known victims, Cliff and Angela Barnes, reside in the state. The letter's release generated a storm of controversy which ultimately resulted in the vice president's campaign chair James Baker publicly disavowing its content. In response to the controversy Baker stated that the letter was "totally out of bounds, totally unauthorized; it was not authorized by this [the Bush] campaign" (Feagin & Vera 1995, 116).

When the ballots were counted Bush defeated Dukakis by less than 50,000 votes; a narrow margin in traditionally Democratic Maryland. The Washington suburbs of Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties are two of the most Democratic suburbs in the nation. However, Dukakis' margins in these counties were insufficient to place Maryland in the Democratic electoral vote column in 1988.

ABC News Washington Post data set. The t-value results indicate that the death penalty (-4.339), the Pledge of Allegiance (-2.656), and prison furloughs (-2.867) were the strongest issues influencing voters against Dukakis (table 15). However, comparing coefficients shows that the prison furlough issue had the strongest impact (-1.6136) followed closely by the death penalty (-1.2341) and the Pledge issue (-1.1401). In fact, of the eight states analyzed the coefficient of the furlough variable was greatest in Maryland, the state where Horton committed his most infamous crime. The  $R^2$  figure indicates that approximately 50% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the model.

CBS News New York Times data set. Among the variables representing the "negative cluster" issues crime (-3.429), taxes (-2.368), and patriotic values (-2.001) were

significant influences against Maryland voters choosing Dukakis (table 17). Not surprisingly, when comparing the coefficients of the significant anti-Dukakis "negative cluster" variables crime (-.8112) had the most potency. Among Maryland voters experience seemed to be the dominate issue working against Dukakis. Both the t-value (-5.923) and the coefficient (-1.6792) of the experience variable were the strongest among the variable mix. Defense, the economy, and Dukakis' liberal views did not test significant. The model explains approximately 42% of the variance in the dependent variable.

### Michigan

Campaign highlights. Michigan was important to Bush strategists because of the high concentration of Reagan Democrats in the state. Macomb County, a predominately white suburb located just north of Detroit, is home to a large number of manufacturing plants, many connected with the automobile industry. Since the 1972 election working class Macomb County has been reliably Republican in presidential contests. Robert Teeter, a Michigan native, claims that the Bush campaign picked his home state to deal the fatal blow to Dukakis' electoral fortunes partly because Michigan had become less Democratic over the years (Drew 1989, 347). To keep Reagan Democrats from returning to their traditional partisan loyalties the Bush campaign engaged in an aggressive advertising campaign focusing on the issues of crime and national defense.

On election day Bush won a comfortable victory in Michigan. The vice president's 8% margin over Dukakis was the result of sufficient pluralities in suburban Detroit Macomb and Oakland Counties to offset the Democratic nominee's urban vote advantage.

ABC News Washington Post data set. The t-values show that among Michigan voters the death penalty (-8.829), the Pledge of Allegiance (-7.285), and prison furloughs

(-5.682) were strongly significant influences against voting for Dukakis (table 15). The effects of the Bush campaign's emphasis on crime is apparent in the relative strength of the death penalty (-.8573) and the prison furlough (-.8145) coefficients. The coefficient of the Pledge issue (-1.2209) indicates that it was a stronger influence against Dukakis than the two crime issues. Abortion was also a statistically significant factor working against voters selecting Dukakis. The model explains approximately 51% of the variance in the dependent variable.

CBS News New York Times data set. The probit tests indicate that the crime variable (-2.940) was the only "negative cluster" factor that was a significant influence against Dukakis among Michigan voters (table 17). In part, the findings confirm the results derived from the *ABC News Washington Post* data with regard to the overall strength of crime issues among the "negative cluster" mix. However, the fact that the patriotic values variable does not achieve statistical significance contrasts with the results regarding the Pledge issue in the *ABC News Washington Post* data set. Survey methodology may be responsible for this anomaly. As previously mentioned, *CBS News New York Times* exit poll respondents, when answering the questions used in this research, could only select a maximum of two responses from those provided forcing individuals to engage in systematic prioritizing. Respondents to the *ABC News Washington Post* exit survey were under no such restrictions. While the patriotic values variable is close to achieving statistical significance (-1.840) it is plausible that restrictions on the number of responses affected the data results and account for the fact that the Pledge issue tests significant while the patriotic values variable does not.

Among the remaining variables, experience (-7.213) again worked strongly in favor of voters choosing Bush. The potency of the coefficient (-1.4244) indicates that experience was the strongest factor influencing vote choice among the variable mix. Dukakis' liberal views tested significant as influencing Michigan voters to select the

Democratic nominee. However, the economy, taxes, and national defense did not achieve statistical significance. The  $R^2$  figure indicates that the model explains 49% of the variance in the dependent variable.

### New Jersey

Campaign highlights. The Garden State became the setting for the general election campaign's most celebrated media events underscoring the Pledge of Allegiance issue. Twice during the month of September the vice president highlighted the issue of patriotism through two highly visible trips to flag factories, one located in Bloomfield, New Jersey. The Bush campaign also saturated the New York and Philadelphia media markets with commercials concerning the prison furlough and death penalty issues.

In addition, the Republicans used the environment as an issue against Dukakis in New Jersey. Taking advantage of a 1987 Dukakis proposal to discard Massachusetts sewage in the Atlantic Ocean near New Jersey, the Bush campaign produced and aired a commercial highlighting Governor Dukakis' application for a permit to dump off the coast of the Garden State. The commercial was similar in style and content to the famous "Harbor" ad which challenged Dukakis' competence concerning the clean-up of waterways adjacent to the city of Boston. The commercial referred to Dukakis as "a risk New Jersey can't afford to take."

On November 8th Bush defeated Dukakis decisively in the Garden State taking approximately 57% of the vote to 43% for his Democratic opponent.

ABC News Washington Post data set. The t-value results indicate that the death penalty (-10.448), the Pledge of Allegiance (-4.950), and the prison furlough (-6.060) issues were strongly significant factors influencing Garden State voters against Dukakis (table 16). The coefficients indicate the death penalty (-1.1675) and the prison furlough

(-1.1103) issues were equally strong negative influences against Dukakis while the Pledge was somewhat less potent (-.8388). The probit results show that despite Bush's efforts to make the environment an issue against Dukakis, it did not negatively affect vote choice against the Massachusetts governor. In fact, the positive nature of the coefficient indicates that as an issue influencing vote choice the environment actually worked in favor of Dukakis among New Jersey voters. The model explains approximately 49% of the variance in the dependent variable.

CBS News New York Times data set. Among New Jersey voters crime (-2.864) and patriotic values (-2.903) were significant factors influencing choice against Dukakis (table 18). However, the probit test indicates that the Democratic candidate's liberal views were significant factors influencing Garden State voters to select him over Bush. Taxes, defense, and the economy were not statistically significant influences on vote choice. Comparing t-values, experience (-4.650) was the strongest variable factor influencing vote choice against Dukakis. However, comparing coefficients relations with the Soviet Union (-1.5955) was the most potent negative influence. Unlike the *ABC News Washington Post* data findings, the environment did not test significant. Again methodological reasons similar to those outlined in the discussion of the Michigan results could be the root cause. The  $R^2$  suggests that 48% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the model.

### Ohio

Campaign highlights. When considering who to select as a vice presidential running mate many political observers believed Governor Dukakis would select Ohio Senator and space hero John Glenn. However, because of some questions regarding personal finances the ever cautious Dukakis opted instead for Texas Senator Lloyd



Bentsen (Drew 1989, 347). Lee Atwater considered Dukakis' selection of Bentsen instead of Glenn a political mistake. According to Bush's campaign manager, "If they had taken John Glenn [then] you'd have had a relatively close election that would have stymied our whole campaign because I doubt that we would have seriously tried to compete in Ohio. . . . It was a totally irrational political decision" (Germond & Witcover 1989, 416). The absence of Glenn from the Democratic ticket permitted the Bush campaign to effectively compete for Ohio's 23 electoral votes. As in other target states, the Bush campaign underscored the issues of crime and patriotism in their assault on Governor Dukakis.

Handicapped without native-son John Glenn on the ticket, Dukakis lost Ohio by over 475,000 votes. Of the targeted states with large electoral votes, only Bush's adopted home state of Texas gave the vice president a larger plurality than the Buckeye State (table 19).

ABC News Washington Post data set. Among the "negative cluster" issues the death penalty (-7.652), the Pledge of Allegiance (-4.359), and prison furloughs (-6.609) were significant influences against voters choosing Dukakis (table 16). Comparing coefficients, the prison furlough issue (-1.0781) had a stronger impact than either the death penalty (-.8124) or the Pledge issue (-.6882). Abortion (-4.278) also registered as a significant factor influencing choice against Dukakis among Ohio voters. Of the remaining variables only presidential candidate personality (-2.649) and the capital gains tax issue (-2.940) achieved voting issue status against Dukakis. Fifty one percent of the dependent variable variance is explained by the model.

CBS News New York Times data set. Reported t-values indicate that among the "negative cluster" issues crime (-3.869), taxes (-3.053), and abortion (-2.811) were significant factors influencing voters against selecting Dukakis (table 18). As is the case

with the Michigan results, patriotic values (-1.879) is shy of achieving statistical significance in the *CBS News New York Times* data set while the Pledge issue is reported as significant in the test using *ABC News Washington Post* data. Again, methodological constraints may be responsible for this discrepancy. The economy, defense, and Dukakis' liberal views did not achieve statistical significance. Among the variable mix, experience reported the largest t-value (-4.448) and the highest coefficient (-.9329) indicating that it had the strongest negative effect on voters choosing Dukakis. The  $R^2$  indicates that 48% of the dependent variable variance is explained by the model.

### Pennsylvania

Campaign highlights. A rust-belt industrial state, Pennsylvania is home to a large population of ethnic, working class voters, many of whom voted for Ronald Reagan in both 1980 and 1984. Pennsylvania provided the Bush campaign with a microcosm laboratory for the implementation of their national strategy. Bush not only engaged in a paid media blitz, but to enlighten voters about Governor Dukakis' crime record the Bush campaign utilized surrogates in the Key Stone State. One surrogate, a reporter, had extensively investigated and written about Willie Horton and the prison furlough issue (Germond & Witcover 1989, 423).

Dukakis advocacy of gun control and abortion rights also proved to be handicaps among Pennsylvania voters. Dukakis' state campaign coordinator, Lanny Johnson, was shocked to learn that 60% of Pennsylvania adults held hunting licenses and were prime targets for mailings from both the Bush campaign and the National Rifle Association (Germond & Witcover 1989, 424).

Among the large northern states, Pennsylvania has one of the stronger pro-life populations. This is best exemplified by the fact that a pro-life Democrat, Robert Casey, was elected governor in 1986 and reelected in 1990. The saliency of the abortion issue

among Pennsylvania voters is demonstrated by the fact that the *ABC News Washington Post* exit poll showed that among the issues important in making their presidential choice abortion came out on top with 35% of the respondents selecting the issue. Of those citing abortion as important in their presidential choice 57% selected Bush.

Dukakis held his urban base winning 69% of the vote in Philadelphia and 60% in Allegheny County (Pittsburgh). However, Bush's strength in the suburban and rural counties offset the Democrat's urban margins to propel the vice president to a narrow victory in Pennsylvania.

*ABC News Washington Post data set.* The probit tests indicate that among Pennsylvania voters abortion (-5.166), the death penalty (-10.024), the Pledge of Allegiance (-5.774), and prison furloughs (-7.094) were strongly significant factors influencing choice against Dukakis (table 16). The significance of abortion working against voters selecting Dukakis, a pro-choice candidate, is not surprising as the pro-life position has enjoyed strong support from Pennsylvanians. Dukakis' party affiliation (-2.610) achieved significance status along with the capital gains tax (-3.197) as factors influencing choice against the Democratic nominee. The  $R^2$  figure indicates that the model explains approximately 50% of the variance in the dependent variable.

*CBS News New York Times data set.* The probit tests demonstrate that of the "negative cluster" issues crime (-3.173), taxes (-2.375), and patriotic values (-3.091) were statistically significant influences against voter selection of the Massachusetts governor (table 18). Dukakis' liberal views achieved significance as a factor influencing voters to select the Democratic nominee. The abortion issue achieved near significance (-1.957). Again, methodological constraints may have influenced the strength of abortion as a factor influencing vote choice among this data set. Experience achieved the most potent t-value (-6.559) and the largest coefficient (-1.4169) among Pennsylvania voters indicating that

among the variable mix it had the strongest overall effect on vote choice. The economy and national defense did not achieve statistical significance. The model explains 47% of the variance in the dependent variable.

### Texas

Campaign highlights. Adopted home state of George Bush and home of Democratic vice presidential nominee Lloyd Bentsen, the presidential race was initially highly competitive in Texas. The race was regarded to be competitive, not only because of the state's 29 electoral votes, but because of the rematch, albeit indirectly, between Bush and Bentsen. In 1970 Bentsen defeated Bush, his GOP challenger, in the race for the United States Senate. With Bentsen on the ticket the Dukakis campaign expressed confidence in being able to carry Texas invoking nostalgic memories of another election twenty eight years earlier in which the "Boston-Austin" team of Kennedy and Johnson defeated another incumbent vice president in the Lone Star state.

To deny Dukakis his nostalgic victory, the Republican campaign made heavy use of radio and television advertising concentrating on the issues of crime, school prayer, the Pledge of Allegiance, and defense (Drew 1989, 343). A "Get Out of Jail Free" card, reminiscent of the Monopoly board game, was mailed by the Bush campaign to 400,000 Texans. The card claimed Dukakis "had let convicted rapists, murderers, and drug dealers out of prison on weekend passes and even while out on furlough they raped and tried to kill again" (Jamieson 1992, 473). In addition, state Republicans mailed thousands of brochures with the words to the Pledge of Allegiance proclaiming in headline fashion: "These are the words Dukakis doesn't want your child to have to say!" (Blumenthal 1990, 295-296).

The defense industry is an important source of employment in Texas. To underscore Dukakis' perceived weaknesses in matters dealing with national security the

Bush campaign made twelve separate radio ads. Broadcast in regions with large defense-related plants, one ad proclaimed: "He's [Dukakis] not just talking about America losing ground. He's talking about Texans losing jobs!" (Blumenthal 1990, 296).

Independent organizations sympathetic to Bush were also active in Texas. The NRA, focusing on the issue of gun-control, "concentrated its anti-Dukakis efforts in rural areas, in the South--especially Texas" (Jamieson 1992, 477). The NRA purchased billboards along Texas highways that contained a single statement in quotation marks, "I don't believe in people owning guns." Under the quote appeared the name of Michael Dukakis. The billboards were complemented by a radio campaign featuring NRA spokesman Charlton Heston proclaiming that while governor Dukakis "did everything he could to take guns away from honest citizens" (Jamieson 1992, 477). ALAMO-PAC attacked Dukakis on the crime issue producing and airing an ad in Texas that charged that Dukakis vetoed mandatory prison sentences for convicted drug dealers, had opposed the death penalty for drug "murderers," and supported weekend furloughs for drug convicts. A second ad produced by ALAMO-PAC showed a burglar, presumably freed under a furlough program, creeping into a dark bedroom (Jamieson 1992, 474).

A race that had initially been considered competitive, by election day the presidential contest in Texas was a Republican rout. Texas transplant George Bush defeated Dukakis by over 680,000 votes (table 19).

*ABC News Washington Post data set.* The t-values indicate that abortion (-3.644), the death penalty (-10.335), the Pledge of Allegiance (-6.641), and prison furloughs (-5.326) were all issues that significantly influenced Texans against voting for Dukakis (figure 16). The coefficients show that the death penalty (-.9479) and the Pledge issue (-.8391) were more potent than the furlough issue (-.6801) and abortion (-.3064). Not surprisingly, Senator Bentsen was the strongest significant variable in favor of Texans choosing Dukakis (12.625). While Bentsen was a positive factor working in Dukakis'

favor among each of the analyzed states, not surprisingly, it was in Texas that the Bentsen variable achieved its highest t-value. The model accounted for 47% of the variance in the dependent variable.



CBS News New York Times data set. Among the "negative cluster" issues crime (-4.012), patriotic values (-2.693), and defense (-2.795) worked strongly against Texans choosing Dukakis (table 18). The success of the Bush campaign's aggressive use of paid media highlighting national defense issues in the Lone Star State is demonstrated by the fact that of the eight states discussed in this analysis, only in Texas did defense prove to be a statistically significant factor. In addition, only in Texas did the economy prove to be a statistically significant factor, which in this case, worked to influence choice in Dukakis' favor. Like defense, the significance of the economic variable reflect the effects of regional and local factors. Texas did not benefit economically to the same extent that other regions and states in the country did during the 1980s in part because world oil prices collapsed. A depressed local economy worked to the Democrats' advantage in Texas. The liberal views of the Democratic nominee did not achieve significance as a factor influencing vote choice. Experience, again, reported the greatest t-value (-7.711) among the variable mix. Similarly, the coefficient of the experience variable (-1.5871) was the largest thus indicating that the issue had the strongest influencing effect on vote choice. The  $R^2$  indicates that approximately 45% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the model.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The general election results indicate that George Bush scored a resounding victory winning 54% of the popular vote which translated into 426 electoral votes (figure 17). Regionally, Dukakis was only competitive with Bush in the Northeast where both candidates secured approximately 50% of the popular vote. Bush outpolled Dukakis in both the West and Midwest by comfortable margins and won a landslide victory among Southerners (table 20 and figure 18). Exit poll results indicate that Bush's winning coalition was predicated on four factors; a strong Republican base vote, a plurality of votes from Independents, reversing the Democrat's traditional advantage among women by securing a large portion of votes from white females, and support from a significant percentage of Reagan Democrats (figures 19 & 20).

What do the results of this research suggest? First, the Bush campaign was successful in defining Michael Dukakis as a liberal. Among the electoral categories analyzed, with the exception of working class Reagan Democrats, the longitudinal analyses measuring both the strength of association between vote choice and perceptions of Dukakis as too liberal and the probability that a Bush supporter, when compared to a Dukakis supporter, thought the Democratic nominee was too liberal increased over the course of the general election campaign. Similarly, the longitudinal analysis of the electorate's ideological perceptions of Dukakis indicate a positive increase during the course of the election cycle in the percentage of voters believing the Massachusetts governor to be a liberal.

Second, the value-based "negative cluster" issues used by Bush to define Dukakis as a liberal and examined in this research support the argument advanced by the theory of





**TABLE 20**  
**1988 PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION**  
**POPULAR AND ELECTORAL VOTES BY REGION**

REGION	GEORGE BUSH (R)			MICHAEL S. DUKAKIS (D)			PLURALITY
	POPULAR VOTES	% <sup>e</sup>	ELECTORAL VOTES	POPULAR VOTES	% <sup>e</sup>	ELECTORAL VOTES	
Northeast <sup>a</sup>	11,314,247	50.4	73	11,124,714	49.6	62*	189,533 (R)
South <sup>b</sup>	14,295,168	58.6	147	10,085,047	41.4	0	4,210,121 (R)
Midwest <sup>c</sup>	13,593,227	53.0	116	12,039,029	47.0	29	1,554,198 (R)
West <sup>d</sup>	9,683,455	53.1	90	8,560,284	46.9	21	1,123,171 (R)
<b>Total</b>	<b>48,886,097</b>	<b>53.9</b>	<b>426</b>	<b>41,809,074</b>	<b>46.1</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>7,077,023 (R)</b>

Source: **Presidential Elections, 1789-1992**, *Congressional Quarterly*, 1995

<sup>a</sup> Northeastern states include Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, & District of Columbia.


<sup>b</sup> Southern states include Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Texas, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, & Louisiana.

<sup>c</sup> Midwestern states include Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, & Oklahoma.


<sup>d</sup> Western states include Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, & Hawaii.

<sup>e</sup> Percentages are recorded for the major party vote only and do not reflect the total vote cast.

\* One Democratic elector from West Virginia, Margaret Leach, actually cast her vote for Lloyd Benisen for President; her vote is recorded in the table for the actual Democratic candidate, Michael S. Dukakis.



**FIGURE 19/Vote Choice (By Partisan Classification)**  
*ABC News/Washington Post Exit Poll, November 8, 1988*



**FIGURE 20/Vote Choice (By Gender and Race)**  
*ABC News/Washington Post Exit Poll, November 8, 1988*

symbolic politics; that through the use of issues laden with symbolic meaning affective predispositions can be stimulated so as to influence voting behavior. The symbolic "negative cluster" value issues that George Bush used to define Michael Dukakis as a liberal were effective in influencing vote choice among key electoral groups. Three of the "negative cluster" issues addressed in this research, the Pledge of Allegiance, the death penalty, and prison furloughs, were measured as significant factors which consistently influenced vote choice against Dukakis in all partisan classifications, categories of Reagan Democrats, regional, and gender and racial categories analyzed (the only exception was prison furloughs which did not achieve statistical significance as a voting issue among black women). The near universal saliency of the Pledge of Allegiance, the death penalty, and prison furloughs can be attributed to the emphasis that the Bush campaign placed on these three issues as focal points in their national and targeted state strategies. Both the death penalty and prison furlough issues were featured prominently in Bush's paid media campaign. The Bush campaign's "Revolving-door" and "Crime quiz" television spots and their radio counterparts saturated media markets across the country, particularly in states with large electoral votes. And the infamous "Willie Horton" television spot sanctioned by the independent expenditure committee, *Americans for Bush*, was also broadcast frequently. The free media kept the Pledge of Allegiance issue at the forefront of public attention through Bush's frequent recitations of the Pledge at rallies and his periodic visits to flag factories. In fact, during the campaign's final week if polls indicated that the race was too close to call Bush's media team had prepared a television spot highlighting Dukakis' veto of the Pledge of Allegiance bill. The spot was never used (Taylor 1990, 204).

Abortion and the ACLU issues did not achieve the same level of consistency across all analyzed categories. A plausible reason for this is that the Bush campaign chose not to emphasize these two issues to the same degree as other "negative cluster" counterparts. The ACLU issue never appeared in any paid media spot and only received

media attention when Bush chose to attack Dukakis for his affiliation with the group in stump speeches and during the first televised presidential debate. Similarly, the candidates' positions on abortion were not highlighted to any great degree during the general election campaign. It must be considered that Bush strategists, conscious of a perceived gender gap, may have decided to avoid using the abortion issue in any consistent, national level fashion for fear of alienating pro-choice Republican women. However, when abortion and the ACLU issue happened to be important factors influencing vote choice among groups analyzed in this research their significance appears to be a function of income and education. Less educated and lower income Reagan Democrats were more inclined to view abortion as a significant factor in their vote choice against Dukakis while dismissing the ACLU issue. Conversely, the ACLU issue achieved significance and abortion did not among Reagan Democrats with higher education levels and income.

Two other "negative cluster" issues, taxes and national defense, did not impact vote choice consistently across analyzed categories. When taxes and defense were significant they were not generally as potent as the crime and patriotic values variables represented by the death penalty, prison furloughs, and Pledge of Allegiance issues in the model using *ABC News Washington Post* data. However, it must be recognized that the results may be suspect because the survey instrument used in the analysis of taxes and national defense limited the number of response choices requiring voters to engage in systematic prioritization. This methodological constraint may have affected the degree of potency of the tax and national defense issues as they relate to their "negative cluster" counterparts. Despite this constraint, the model indicates that taxes, and to a lesser degree national defense, impacted vote choice against Dukakis among certain electoral subgroups. As previously discussed, the degree of significance of the defense variable may have been correlated with regional and local economic factors such as employment.

The results also address the issues of the economy and experience and their effect on vote choice. Academic researchers have spent considerable time and effort arguing

about the effects of retrospective and prospective assessments of the economy on vote choice. In addition to previous studies concerning the 1988 election, conventional wisdom suggests that Bush should have benefited electorally because of the robust economic situation during and immediately preceding the election year. However, the evidence presented in this research indicates that the economy was not a consistently significant factor influencing vote choice. Only among black women and Texans did the economy matter.

However, unlike the economy, experience appears to be the issue that most significantly influenced vote choice against the Democratic nominee. Among all analyzed groups the coefficients of the experience variable were the greatest indicating that the issue was the strongest determinant of vote choice against Dukakis.

Third, the research suggests that both campaigns and non-rational factors, such as symbolic values, do impact voting behavior. Vince Breglio, a Bush pollster, agrees with this assessment:

There's no question about that. This country still votes for people who share a mainstream traditional value system. And I'm sorry these values aren't reflected in Cambridge, [Massachusetts], but across the rest of America they are an important determinant of the vote. And [through the campaign] we got our message out.<sup>1</sup>

Scholars have argued that campaign content and strategy matter in mobilizing potential supporters (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) and influencing perceptions of the candidates (Nimmo & Savage 1976):

We know that for many voters perceptual/response dispositions form early in the campaign, but that a sufficiently large number are influenced by the campaign, particularly as portrayed in the media, to suggest that campaigns at least make some difference. (Nimmo & Savage 1976, 39)

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted from an interview with Vince Breglio and Dukakis campaign pollster Irwin "Tubby" Harrison conducted by Ben Wattenberg for *Public Opinion*, volume 11, number 5, January/February 1989, page 51.

This research has provided evidence to support the contention that campaign strategy does matter in determining electoral outcomes. The statistical analyses presented here confirm the suspicions of qualitative researchers and political commentators who claim that the Bush campaign was successful in using certain symbolic value issues to create the image among the electorate as a whole, and Reagan Democrats in particular, that Dukakis was a liberal. The evidence also suggests that Nimmo and Savage are correct in claiming that voters respond to candidates on the basis of the perceptions they have of them thus making candidate images a significant short-term force in elections. During the course of the general election campaign Dukakis' unfavorable rating increased from 37% of the electorate on Labor Day to 50% on the eve of the election with one of every two white voters having a negative opinion of the Democratic nominee (Maloney 1989, 74).

In the final analysis, the election results, in conjunction with the statistical evidence presented in this study, suggest the importance of two traditionally non-Republican electoral groups which helped to provide Bush with his margin of victory; Reagan Democrats and women.

### Reagan, Now Bush, Democrats

The actual exit poll results and the probit analyses of the effects on vote choice of the symbolic "negative cluster" value issues, particularly the death penalty, prison furloughs, and the Pledge of Allegiance, indicate that the Bush strategy of targeting Reagan Democrats with the "Dukakis is a liberal" message succeeded beyond the campaign's initial expectations. According to *NBC News* correspondent Connie Chung, "Bush campaign strategists consistently said that Bush only need[ed] one third of Reagan Democrats to win."<sup>2</sup> On election day, exit poll surveys indicated Reagan Democrats

<sup>2</sup> Transcribed from video tape of *NBC News* television coverage of the 1988 election. 8 November 1988.

composed 12% of the voters who went to the polls. Of this 12% the *ABC News Washington Post* exit poll survey reports George Bush received 48% of their votes and Michael Dukakis 51%.<sup>3</sup> Despite the survey showing Dukakis winning back over half of the Democrats who voted for Reagan in 1984, according to the Bush campaign's electoral formula regarding Reagan Democrats suggested by Chung the vice president's 48% showing among this group was more than adequate for victory. The post-election analysis conducted by *ABC News* concluded that Reagan Democrats composed a full 10% of Bush voters:

Three quarters of all Bush's Democratic support, a tenth of all his backers, came from previous Democratic Reagan voters. Only a quarter of Bush's Democratic supporters, two percent of his vote, were non-Reagan supporters or officially newly-minted "Bush Democrats." (Smith 1989, xlviii)

If the *ABC News Washington Post* exit poll results are accurate then approximately 10.9 million of the over 91.5 million voters who cast ballots on election day, Tuesday, November 8th were Reagan Democrats. Considering that Bush defeated Dukakis by 7 million votes, it is not unreasonable to infer that the over 5.2 million Democrats who had supported Ronald Reagan in 1984 and subsequently voted for George Bush in 1988 formed a critical component of the vice president's winning electoral coalition.

#### Gender: Women Dump the Duke!

Women voters also formed a key component of Bush's electoral coalition. In May women voters sided with Dukakis 53% to 35% for Bush (Pomper 1989, 121). By election day, Dukakis' lead among women evaporated. Bush muted the Democrats' traditional advantage among this key electoral subgroup by battling Dukakis to a near draw among female voters. The *ABC News Washington Post* exit poll showed Bush

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<sup>3</sup> Figures taken from *The '88 Vote*, an analysis of exit poll statistics produced by *ABC News*.

winning 50% of the women's vote to 49% for his Democratic opponent (figure 20). The reversal of Bush's fortunes among female voters can be traced to the presidential vote preferences of white women. On election day Bush won 55% of the white female vote.

Two symbolic value issues worked against Dukakis among women: patriotism and crime. The Pledge of Allegiance issue was a significant factor reversing Dukakis' fortunes among female voters. According to the statistical evidence gathered from the *ABC News Washington Post* exit poll, the Pledge of Allegiance was a significantly stronger issue among women than men. This confirms the conclusions drawn by Farah and Klein:

The Pledge of Allegiance influenced women's vote intention, but not men's. Men who thought the Pledge was not an important issue were as likely to vote for Bush over Dukakis (52 to 38 percent) as those who felt the issue mattered (49 to 38 percent). Women who believed the Pledge was an important issue rewarded Bush (52 to 31 percent); those who felt it was not important favored Dukakis (49 to 37 percent). (Pomper 1989, 123)

Issues of personal security also were significant factors influencing women, particularly white women, to choose Bush. However, unlike the Pledge of Allegiance, the death penalty and prison furlough issues affected white men and white women fairly equally. Whether or not it was the intention of the Bush campaign or the independent expenditure committees supporting the vice president's candidacy to heighten racial fears and prejudice by emphasizing Willie Horton, the image of a black criminal raping a white woman certainly impacted vote choice. Before the fall campaign, women were more likely than men to view Dukakis as the tougher candidate on criminals (Pomper 1989, 124). However, by October, after the Republican media blitz, the result was reversed; a plurality of both men and women thought that Bush would be tougher on crime. Of those who believed the vice president was tougher on criminals 86% of the men supported Bush and only 6% Dukakis. Among women, 79% supported Bush and 10% the Massachusetts governor (Pomper 1989, 124).

Finally, the evidence provided in this study suggests that non-rational factors, such as value issues, can influence political behavior. When attempting to understand how



voters make their electoral choices it is important not to limit one's analysis to solely rational criteria such as economic performance, partisanship, and issue specifics. It must be understood that each campaign is comprised of a unique set of circumstances determined by the characteristics of the participants themselves, the strategies they and their campaign teams employ, and the general social, economic, and political environment in which the campaign is conducted. Political professionals and consultants often use emotional symbolic issues in their attempts to influence the electoral behavior of voters. This being the case, when recognizable non-rational factors, such as emotional symbolic value issues, are injected into the campaign dialogue it is important not to discount their potential significance as powerful determinants of vote choice.

One of the most interesting observations concerning the 1988 presidential general election campaign is its striking similarity to the 1978 Massachusetts Democratic gubernatorial primary campaign. The fact George Bush used a series of symbolic value issues, similar to those employed by Edward J. King to oust Dukakis from the Boston state house, indicates that both the Democratic presidential nominee and his political inner circle did not possess an adequate appreciation of the influence such issues could have on the public's perceptions of Dukakis and their effect on subsequent voting behavior. What is even more striking is that Dukakis allowed Bush to replicate the basic strategy used by King to influence similar demographic voting groups both his opponents needed to court in order to build winning electoral coalitions. Despite his 1978 gubernatorial defeat, the potential effects both campaign strategy and symbolic value issues can have on voters' perceptions of the candidates and how such issues can influence their subsequent voting behavior were clearly lost on Michael Dukakis.

## APPENDIX

### SELF-DESCRIBED IDEOLOGICAL TENDENCIES & CANDIDATE PREFERENCES AMONG DEMOGRAPHIC SUBGROUPS OF MASSACHUSETTS VOTERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE 1978 DEMOCRATIC GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY

#### ALL VOTERS

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	35% (N = 26)	56% (N = 79)	70% (N = 39)	53% (N = 144)
Michael S. Dukakis	65% (N = 48)	44% (N = 62)	30% (N = 17)	47% (N = 127)
Totals	27% (N = 74)	52% (N = 141)	21% (N = 56)	100% (N=271)

#### DEMOCRATS

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	26% (N = 11)	57% (N = 46)	71% (N = 17)	50% (N = 74)
Michael S. Dukakis	74% (N = 31)	43% (N = 35)	29% (N = 7)	50% (N = 73)
Totals	29% (N = 42)	55% (N = 81)	16% (N = 24)	100% (N=147)

#### INDEPENDENTS

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	43% (N = 13)	54% (N = 31)	63% (N = 15)	53% (N = 59)
Michael S. Dukakis	57% (N = 17)	46% (N = 26)	37% (N = 9)	47% (N = 52)
Totals	27% (N = 30)	51% (N = 57)	22% (N = 24)	100% (N=111)

#### HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION OR LESS

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	59% (N = 17)	62% (N = 41)	74% (N = 20)	64% (N = 78)
Michael S. Dukakis	41% (N = 12)	38% (N = 25)	26% (N = 7)	36% (N = 44)
Totals	24% (N = 29)	54% (N = 66)	22% (N = 27)	100% (N=122)

#### GREATER THAN A HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	20% (N = 9)	51% (N = 38)	66% (N = 19)	44% (N = 66)
Michael S. Dukakis	80% (N = 36)	49% (N = 37)	34% (N = 10)	56% (N = 83)
Totals	30% (N = 45)	50% (N = 75)	20% (N = 29)	100% (N=149)

**INCOME LESS THAN \$10,000 A YEAR**

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	56% ( <i>N</i> = 9)	67% ( <i>N</i> = 28)	75% ( <i>N</i> = 12)	66% ( <i>N</i> = 49)
Michael S. Dukakis	44% ( <i>N</i> = 7)	33% ( <i>N</i> = 14)	25% ( <i>N</i> = 4)	34% ( <i>N</i> = 25)
Totals	22% ( <i>N</i> = 16)	56% ( <i>N</i> = 42)	22% ( <i>N</i> = 16)	100% ( <i>N</i> = 74)

**INCOME LESS THAN \$15,000 A YEAR**

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	44% ( <i>N</i> = 15)	65% ( <i>N</i> = 43)	75% ( <i>N</i> = 21)	62% ( <i>N</i> = 79)
Michael S. Dukakis	56% ( <i>N</i> = 19)	35% ( <i>N</i> = 23)	25% ( <i>N</i> = 7)	38% ( <i>N</i> = 49)
Totals	26% ( <i>N</i> = 34)	52% ( <i>N</i> = 66)	22% ( <i>N</i> = 28)	100% ( <i>N</i> = 128)

**INCOME LESS THAN \$20,000 A YEAR**

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	38% ( <i>N</i> = 18)	58% ( <i>N</i> = 55)	67% ( <i>N</i> = 28)	55% ( <i>N</i> = 101)
Michael S. Dukakis	62% ( <i>N</i> = 30)	42% ( <i>N</i> = 40)	33% ( <i>N</i> = 14)	45% ( <i>N</i> = 84)
Totals	26% ( <i>N</i> = 48)	51% ( <i>N</i> = 95)	23% ( <i>N</i> = 42)	100% ( <i>N</i> = 185)

**INCOME GREATER THAN \$20,000 A YEAR**

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	31% ( <i>N</i> = 8)	52% ( <i>N</i> = 24)	79% ( <i>N</i> = 11)	50% ( <i>N</i> = 43)
Michael S. Dukakis	69% ( <i>N</i> = 18)	48% ( <i>N</i> = 22)	21% ( <i>N</i> = 3)	50% ( <i>N</i> = 43)
Totals	30% ( <i>N</i> = 26)	54% ( <i>N</i> = 46)	16% ( <i>N</i> = 14)	100% ( <i>N</i> = 86)

**UNION HOUSEHOLDS**

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	35% ( <i>N</i> = 9)	55% ( <i>N</i> = 30)	61% ( <i>N</i> = 11)	51% ( <i>N</i> = 50)
Michael S. Dukakis	65% ( <i>N</i> = 17)	45% ( <i>N</i> = 25)	39% ( <i>N</i> = 7)	49% ( <i>N</i> = 49)
Totals	26% ( <i>N</i> = 26)	56% ( <i>N</i> = 55)	18% ( <i>N</i> = 18)	100% ( <i>N</i> = 99)

**NON-UNION HOUSEHOLDS**

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	34% ( <i>N</i> = 16)	57% ( <i>N</i> = 49)	74% ( <i>N</i> = 28)	54% ( <i>N</i> = 93)
Michael S. Dukakis	66% ( <i>N</i> = 31)	43% ( <i>N</i> = 37)	26% ( <i>N</i> = 10)	46% ( <i>N</i> = 78)
Totals	27% ( <i>N</i> = 47)	50% ( <i>N</i> = 86)	23% ( <i>N</i> = 38)	100% ( <i>N</i> = 171)

**BLUE COLLAR**

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	44% ( <i>N</i> = 7)	59% ( <i>N</i> = 24)	80% ( <i>N</i> = 8)	58% ( <i>N</i> = 39)
Michael S. Dukakis	56% ( <i>N</i> = 9)	41% ( <i>N</i> = 17)	20% ( <i>N</i> = 2)	42% ( <i>N</i> = 28)
Totals	24% ( <i>N</i> = 16)	61% ( <i>N</i> = 41)	15% ( <i>N</i> = 10)	100% ( <i>N</i> = 67)

## WHITE COLLAR

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	34% ( <i>N</i> = 13)	49% ( <i>N</i> = 27)	52% ( <i>N</i> = 12)	45% ( <i>N</i> = 52)
Michael S. Dukakis	66% ( <i>N</i> = 25)	51% ( <i>N</i> = 28)	48% ( <i>N</i> = 11)	55% ( <i>N</i> = 64)
Totals	33% ( <i>N</i> = 38)	47% ( <i>N</i> = 55)	20% ( <i>N</i> = 23)	100% ( <i>N</i> = 116)

## URBAN

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	39% ( <i>N</i> = 12)	56% ( <i>N</i> = 31)	68% ( <i>N</i> = 13)	53% ( <i>N</i> = 56)
Michael S. Dukakis	61% ( <i>N</i> = 19)	44% ( <i>N</i> = 24)	32% ( <i>N</i> = 6)	47% ( <i>N</i> = 49)
Totals	30% ( <i>N</i> = 31)	52% ( <i>N</i> = 55)	18% ( <i>N</i> = 19)	100% ( <i>N</i> = 105)

## SUBURBAN

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	33% ( <i>N</i> = 14)	56% ( <i>N</i> = 48)	70% ( <i>N</i> = 26)	53% ( <i>N</i> = 88)
Michael S. Dukakis	67% ( <i>N</i> = 29)	44% ( <i>N</i> = 38)	30% ( <i>N</i> = 11)	47% ( <i>N</i> = 78)
Totals	26% ( <i>N</i> = 43)	52% ( <i>N</i> = 86)	22% ( <i>N</i> = 37)	100% ( <i>N</i> = 166)

## MEN

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	40% ( <i>N</i> = 18)	58% ( <i>N</i> = 36)	79% ( <i>N</i> = 27)	57% ( <i>N</i> = 81)
Michael S. Dukakis	60% ( <i>N</i> = 27)	42% ( <i>N</i> = 26)	21% ( <i>N</i> = 7)	43% ( <i>N</i> = 60)
Totals	32% ( <i>N</i> = 45)	44% ( <i>N</i> = 62)	24% ( <i>N</i> = 34)	100% ( <i>N</i> = 141)

## WOMEN

CANDIDATE	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Totals
Edward J. King	29% ( <i>N</i> = 8)	54% ( <i>N</i> = 43)	55% ( <i>N</i> = 12)	49% ( <i>N</i> = 63)
Michael S. Dukakis	71% ( <i>N</i> = 20)	46% ( <i>N</i> = 36)	45% ( <i>N</i> = 10)	51% ( <i>N</i> = 66)
Totals	22% ( <i>N</i> = 28)	61% ( <i>N</i> = 79)	17% ( <i>N</i> = 22)	100% ( <i>N</i> = 129)

### RIDIT SCORES

The ridit score for a response category equals the proportion of observations below that category plus half the proportion in that category. They are used to describe the differences between groups measured on an ordinal variable. For the July 1988 survey of all voters and their views of Michael Dukakis the ridit scores are calculated as follows:

**"Are Michael Dukakis' views  
too liberal, just about right, or too conservative for you?"**

July 88/All voters	Too Conservative	Just About Right	Too Liberal	Total
<b>Bush</b>	52	26	264	342
<b>Dukakis</b>	28	424	35	487
<b>Total</b>	80	450	299	829

Let  $\pi_i$  denote the proportion of the sample observations that are in the  $i$ th category of the ordinal variable. For the above table the proportions are:

$$\pi_1 = 80/829 = .096$$

$$\pi_2 = 450/829 = .543$$

$$\pi_3 = 299/829 = .361$$

Ridit scores are the average cumulative proportions for these responses. Therefore:

For the "too conservative" category the ridit score is  $r_1 = .096/2 = .048$

For the "just right" category the ridit score is  $r_2 = .096 + .543/2 = .3675$

For the "too liberal" category the ridit score is  $r_3 = .096 + .543 + .361/2 = .8195$

Notice that the ridit scores fall between 0 and 1 and increase as they move left to right on the scale. A summary of the respondents' views of Dukakis' political ideology can be calculated for Bush supporters and Dukakis supporters by computing the mean ridit scores for each group. The mean ridit score for each group is calculated as follows:

$$r_1 = [52(.048) + 26(.3675) + 264(.8195)]/342 = .668$$

$$r_2 = [28(.048) + 424(.3675) + 35(.8195)]/487 = .382$$

Since  $r_1 > r_2$  then Bush supporters tend to believe that Dukakis is too liberal compared to similar feelings held by Dukakis supporters.

Because mean ridit scores fall between 0 and 1 then the mean ridit score for the combined sample must equal .5. In the example, for instance, the mean ridit score for the combined sample is:

$$[80(.048) + 450(.3675) + 299(.8195)] = .5$$

A useful interpretation of the ridit score is to approximate the probability that a randomly selected individual from group 1 (Bush supporters) ranks higher than a randomly selected individual from group 2 (Dukakis supporters). This can be accomplished by using the formula  $r_1 - r_2 + .5$ . Hence in the example the estimate of the probability that a Bush supporter thinks Dukakis is too liberal compared to a Dukakis supporter is:

$$.668 - .382 + .5 = .786$$

Or, an alternative way to interpret the statistic is as follows. The probability that a Dukakis supporter thinks Dukakis is too liberal compared to a Bush supporter is:

$$1 - .786 \text{ or } r_2 - r_1 + .5 \Rightarrow .382 - .668 + .5 = .214$$

### ALDRICH-NELSON PSEUDO $R^2$

The  $R^2$  used in the research is calculated using the Aldrich-Nelson Pseudo  $R^2$  method. The formula is as follows:

$$R^2 = -2(\log \text{ likelihood})/[N - 2(\log \text{ likelihood})]$$

To illustrate, data from table 3 is used to calculate the Pseudo  $R^2$  for the "all voters" category,  $N = 93,929$  and  $\log \text{ likelihood} = -58,946.13$ :

$$R^2 = -2(-58,946.13)/[93,929 - 2(-58,946.13)] \approx .56$$

## QUESTION WORDING/CODING

The coding of the dependent variable, vote choice, in each model analyzed in this research is (1) for Michael Dukakis and (2) for George Bush. The wording of the survey question and its responses from the *ABC News Washington Post* exit poll that is analyzed in this research using the probit technique is as follows:

**"Were any of the items below *VERY IMPORTANT* in making your presidential choice?"** (respondents were not restricted in their number of selections)

The Dukakis/Bush debates  
 The Bentsen/Quayle debates  
 My candidate's political party  
 My candidate's personality  
 Bush choosing Quayle for Vice President  
 Dukakis choosing Bentsen for Vice President  
 The candidates' stands on:

1) Abortion, 2) The death penalty, 3) College costs, 4) Health care, 5) The Pledge of Allegiance, 6) The ACLU, 7) Environmental problems, 8) Illegal drug problems, 9) Education, 10) The Iran-Contra Affair, 11) Prison furloughs, 12) Social Security, 13) Capital gains tax, 14) Foreign competition

The wording of the survey questions and their responses from the *CBS News New York Times* exit poll that are analyzed in this research using the probit technique are as follows:

**"Which issues mattered most in deciding how you voted?"** (respondents were restricted to a maximum of two selections)

1) Punishing criminals, 2) Helping the Middle Class, 3) Environment and pollution, 4) Economic prosperity and jobs, 5) The federal budget deficit, 6) Not raising taxes, 7) Defense spending, 8) U.S.-Soviet relations, 9) Abortion

**"Which factors mattered most in deciding how you voted?"** (respondents were restricted to a maximum of two selections)

1) The vice presidential candidates, 2) Dukakis' liberal views, 3) He is my party's candidate, 4) He cares about poor people, 5) I like him as a person, 6) Patriotic values, 7) Jesse Jackson's role, 8) The debates, 9) Experience

**ANALYSIS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES REGRESSED AS  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE TO ASSESS MULTICOLLINEARITY**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Controlling Variables</b>	<b>R<sup>2</sup> of Model with Dependent Variable Vote Choice</b>	<b>Independent Variable Regressed as Dependent Variable</b>	<b>R<sup>2</sup> of Regressed Independent Variable</b>
<i>ABC News</i>	Democrats	.40	Abortion	.29
<i>ABC News</i>	Democrats	.40	Death Penalty	.29
<i>ABC News</i>	Democrats	.40	Health Care	.34
<i>ABC News</i>	Democrats	.40	Environment	.37
<i>ABC News</i>	Democrats	.40	Education	.39
<i>ABC News</i>	Democrats	.40	College Costs	.31
<i>ABC News</i>	Democrats	.40	Drugs	.31
<i>ABC News</i>	Democrats	.40	Social Security	.27
<i>ABC News</i>	Republicans	.32	Abortion	.24
<i>ABC News</i>	Republicans	.32	Death Penalty	.35
<i>ABC News</i>	Republicans	.32	Pledge of Allegiance	.27
<i>ABC News</i>	Republicans	.32	Prison Furloughs	.26
<i>ABC News</i>	Republicans	.32	Environment	.23
<i>ABC News</i>	Republicans	.32	Education	.28
<i>ABC News</i>	Republicans	.32	Drugs	.32
<i>ABC News</i>	Republicans	.32	Social Security	.24
<i>ABC News</i>	Republicans	.32	Health Care	.24
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Men	.38	Abortion	.27
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Men	.38	Death Penalty	.32
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Men	.38	Education	.37



Data Set	Controlling Variables	R <sup>2</sup> of Model with Dependent Variable Vote Choice	Independent Variable Regressed as Dependent Variable	R <sup>2</sup> of Regressed Independent Variable
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Men	.38	College Costs	.35
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Men	.38	Health Care	.27
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Women	.30	Abortion	.26
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Women	.30	Death Penalty	.28
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Women	.30	ACLU	.29
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Women	.30	Pledge of Allegiance	.26
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Women	.30	Prison Furloughs	.24
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Women	.30	College Costs	.29
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Women	.30	Education	.41
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Women	.30	Capital Gains Tax	.29
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Women	.30	Health Care	.34
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Women	.30	Environment	.27
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Women	.30	Drugs	.32
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Women	.30	Iran Contra Affair	.24
<i>ABC News</i>	Black Women	.30	Social Security	.34
<i>CBS News</i>	Democrats	.37	Experience	.13
<i>CBS News</i>	Black Men	.35	Experience	.16
<i>CBS News</i>	Black Women	.26	Experience	.08

# ANALYSIS OF OCTOBER 8-10 CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES SURVEY

The following model used data from the October 8-10 *CBS News New York Times* survey (sample size of 1,518 cases) and was analyzed using the probit technique:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \dots + \beta_i x_i \text{ where } Y = \text{vote choice, } x_1 = \text{ACLU involvement, } x_2 = \text{radical liberal, } x_3 = \text{crime, } x_4 = \text{prison furloughs, } x_5 = \text{capital punishment, } x_6 = \text{taxes, } x_7 = \text{military defense spending arms control, } x_8 = \text{abortion, } x_9 = \text{the Pledge of Allegiance}$$

The coding of the dependent variable is (1) for Michael Dukakis and (2) for George Bush. Model independent variables are derived from open-ended responses to the question, "Regardless of how you intend to vote, what worries you most about electing Michael Dukakis as President in 1988?" The 51 coded categories to the responses included the following (the symbolic "negative cluster" value-issues are bolded):

nothing; personal qualities; lack of trust/integrity; weak/not a leader; cannot deliver on promises; panders; not qualified/lack of experience; background/New Englander; performance as governor; war/peace; party/Democrat; Jackson connection; Bentsen; ACLU involvement; environment; **radical liberal**; becoming conservative; repeat of Reagan years; Congress; Supreme Court appointments; policies/issues; do not know where he stands; moral issues; social programs; **crime**; **prison furloughs**; health plan; elderly; **capital punishment**; poor people; economic policies; jobs; taxes; gun control; budget/deficit/inflation; foreign policies; **military/defense spending/arms control**; gay rights; big business; **abortion**; child-care; too attached to blacks/black issues; spending--general big government; farmers; education; disregard for human rights; too much like Jimmy Carter; tougher on drugs; **Pledge of Allegiance**; other; everything

The results of the probit analysis indicate that the radical liberal variable was the only variable that achieved significance among all voters, Democrats, men and women, and white men and women. The radical liberal variable did not achieve significance among Independents or Republicans. Among Republicans the large standard error resulted in a t-value approximately equal to zero. Results for Reagan Democrats and black men and women are not included because the number of respondents was insufficient for proper analysis to be conducted. The results for analyzed voting categories are as follows:

Independent Variable	All Voters	Democrats	Independents	Men	Women	White Men	White Women
Radical Liberal	-.9497 .2906 (-3.268)	-1.1980 .4912 (-2.439)	-.9599 .5956 (-1.611)	-1.0130 .3945 (-2.568)	-.8660 .4362 (-1.985)	-.9118 .3956 (-2.305)	-1.1327 .5349 (-2.118)
Sample Size	N = 688 Dukakis = 279 Bush = 409	N = 183 Dukakis = 150 Bush = 33	N = 164 Dukakis = 71 Bush = 93	N = 294 Dukakis = 110 Bush = 184	N = 365 Dukakis = 161 Bush = 204	N = 269 Dukakis = 91 Bush = 178	N = 332 Dukakis = 133 Bush = 199

Note: The statistical results were produced using the probit technique. The dependent variable is vote choice: Michael Dukakis (1) or George Bush (2). The estimated probit coefficients and standard errors precede t-values shown in parentheses; \*  $p \leq .05$  for  $N \leq 1,000$

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
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## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Shaun Patrick Richard Herness received his undergraduate education at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, where in May of 1986 he received a Bachelor of Arts degree in American government. Mr. Herness began his graduate studies in 1989 when he enrolled at The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, where in May of 1991 he received a Master of Arts degree in American politics. After completing his studies at Catholic University, Mr. Herness entered The George Washington University, Graduate School of Political Management, Washington, DC, where in July of 1993 he received a Master of Arts degree in political management. President of Herness and Associates, a political consulting and campaign management firm, Mr. Herness has advised candidates on numerous state and local campaigns while pursuing his graduate studies in both Washington, DC, and Gainesville, Florida. Mr. Herness is a member of Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society.


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Walter A. Rosenbaum, Chairperson  
Professor of Political Science


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Wayne L. Francis  
Professor of Political Science


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M. Margaret Conway  
Professor of Political Science


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James W. Button  
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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

  
Michael D. Martinez  
Associate Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Ronald P. Formisano".

Ronald P. Formisano

Professor of History

This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

May, 1996

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Dean, Graduate School